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RETROACTIVITY AND LEGAL CHANGE: 
AN EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 
Jill E. Fisch* 
In this Article, Professor Fisch assesses cu1-rent retroactivity doctrine and proposes a 
new framework for retroactivity analysis. Current law has failed to reflect the complexity 
of defining retroactivity and to harmonize the conflicting concerns of efficiency and fair­
ness that animate retroactivity doctrine. By drawing a sharp distinction between adjudi­
cation and legislation, the law has also o·uerlooked the similarity of the issues that 
retroactivity raises in both contexts. Professor Fisch's analysis, influenced by the legal 
pmcess school, uses an equilibrium approach to connect retroactivity analysis to theories 
of legal change. Instead of focusing on the nature of the new legal rule, this approach 
emphasizes the context in which change occurs. If an area of the law is settle d, a stable 
equilibrium, 1·eliance interests are at their peak. Retroactivity thus presents serious fair­
ness and efficiency concerns and should be disfavored. If the regulatory context is in 
flux, an unstable equilibrium exists, and retroactivity may be more appropriate. Professor 
Fisch's use of equilibrium theory improves doctrinal analysis of the temporal line-drawing 
associated with legal change and clm·ifi es the relationship of 1·etroactivity rules to law­
making p owe1·. 
O
ne of the most complicated questions created by legal change is 
the temporal one : what limits, if any, should be  placed on a new 
rule ' s  application to transactions that predate the adoption of the rule ? 
Retroactivity analysis attempts to answer this question by providing 
guidance as to the appropriate temporal l imits for legal c hange . 1  
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, using the parlance of the Legal Process 
School, framed retroactivity analysis as a choice between an old and a 
new legal rule - a "conflict of laws in time."2 Determining the l imits 
of legal change has been controversial . Courts, legislators, and com-
* Professor, Fordham Law School; Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School, Spring r 995. 
Earlier drafts of this Article \Nere presented to faculty workshops at Columbia Law School, 
B rooklyn Law School, the University of Minnesota School of Law, the University o f  Arizona 
School of Law, and the Marshall-\Vythe School of Law, College of \\'il l iam and lVIary. I received 
many useful comments at each session. I am particularly grateful to Anne Alstott, J im Chen,  
Richard E pstein, Dan Farber, Marty Flaherty·, Phil Frickey, Mike Gerhardt, Abner Greene, 
Charles Koch, Henry Monaghan, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dan Richman,  Tony Sebok, Peter 
Strauss, Steve The!, and my mother for their individual critic isms and suggestions. G abrielle 
Lese, Columbia Law School Class of 1 997, provided excellent research assistance. 
l Rules of stare decisis also structure the temporal parameters of legal change and are closely 
related to the analysis  of retroactivity considered in this Article, but  direct exploration of the 
relationship i s  beyond this Article's scope. Takings, Ex Post Facto, and Contract C lause j urispru­
dence also pose related questions. See i1�(ra pp. 1 0 72-7 3; cf HF:i'iRY M .  HART, JR.. & ALBERT _lVI. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBU��·IS 10: THE lVL\Kit"G Ai'iD APPLlCATIO:" OF L-\W 6 2 0  
(vVil l iam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phil ip P .  Frickey eds., rev . ed.  1994 ) (describing the Contrac t  C lause 
l imitation on retroactive application of a statute, but explaining that "the Constitution  steps in to 
forbid not the retroactive imposition of a burden on primary conduct but the deprivation of an 
expected benefit from a previous exercise of a primary power"). 
2 HART & SACKS, supra note I, at 6 1 6 . 
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mentators have repeatedly debated the appropriate parameters for ret­
roactivity analysis,3 and the debate shows few signs of abating.4 
The general principle that statutes operate prospectively and judi­
cial decisions apply retroactively5 is a matter of black letter law,6 but 
dissatisfaction with the application of this principle to various situa­
tions caused the Supreme Court to depart from the traditional ap­
proach.  7 In the absence of an analytic foundation for the departures,  
however, the Court quickly discovered that its effort to inject flexibil­
ity into retroactivity doctrine was unworkable . The Court ' s  doctrine 
has suffered from two shortcomings . First, it has failed  to acknowl­
edge the struggle animating traditional retroactivity doctrine: the effort 
to reconcile competing and often conflicting concerns about fairness 
and economic efficiency.8 Underlying these concerns are foundational 
assumptions about the process by which legal rules change . Second, in 
delineating the temporal scope of legal change , the Court ' s  doctrine 
has traditionally relied on a sharp distinction between adjudica.tion 
and legislation, even though new judge-made rules and statutory 
change both generate similar concerns.9 This distinction has ca . tsed 
3 See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-l'vfaking, 75 
B.U. L. Rr:v. 941 (1995) ;  Richard H .  Fal lon, Jr. & Daniel ] .  Meltzer, New Law, Non-Re!Yoactivity, 
and Constitutional Remedies, 1 04 H.->.RV. L. REV. 1 73 1  (199 1 ); Tvlichael ]. Graetz, Retmactivity 
Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1 820 ( 19 8 5 ); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transi­
tions, 99 H.-\RV. L. REv. 509 ( r g86) ;  Saul Levmore, The Case joY Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. 
Lu;.-\L STUD. 265 (1993) ;  Stephen R. Munzer. A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 6r TEX. L. 
Rn·. 425 ( 1 982). 
4 Debate about retroactivity remains as pervasive in Congress as in the courts. See, e.g., 
H.R. 2 2 5 6 ,  104th Cong. § ro2  (1995)  (proposing elimination of retroactive liability for environmen­
tal actions occurring prior to Jan . r, rC)8 7 ) ; S.J Res. 8, r o4th Cong. (ICJCJS); see also H .R. Res. 6, 
r o4th Cong. s ro6(d) (1995) (changing House rules to bar consideration of any measure that con­
tains "a retroactive Federal income tax rate increase"); Common Sense Legal Reforms . ..\ct of r 995, 
H.R. 10, r o4th Cong. � r o6(B) (requiring House Committee Report on any bill or joint resolution 
"oi a public character" to specify "[t)he rctroacti \'e applicability, if any, of that bill or j oint 
resolution''). 
5 As discussed below in section II.A. it is diiflcult even to formulate a clear analytic distinc­
tion between retroactive and prospective lawmaking. See generally Stephen R. :Munzer, RetYoac­
tive Law, 6]. LEGAL STUD. 3 73, 374-8 1 (1977) (analyzing various efforts to define retroactivity). 
6 See Rivers v.  Roadway Express, Inc . ,  sr r U.S. 2 98, 3 1 1-12 (1994) (''The principle that 
statutes operate only prospectively, while j udicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to 
every law student . . ." (quoting United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 5 9  U.S .  70, 79 (1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
7 See infra p. 1059· 
s Alternatively, the choice can be described as a contlict between rationality and reasonable­
ness. This conflict is pervasive in legal analysis, see, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness 
and Rationality in Negligence TheoYy, 48 ST.-\N. L. REV. 3 1 1  ( r gg6) ,  although i t  has not been 
highl ighted in discussions of retroactivity. 
9 The analysis is complicated by the iact that analyzing administrative agency action under 
existing doctrine requires courts to characterize the nature of the action as either legislative or 
adjudicatory. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown C'niv. Hosp . , 48S U.S .  204 , 2 08 ,  2 1 5  ( r gSS) (charac­
terizing agency action as legislative and concluding that the agency lacked authority to promul­
gate a. retroactive legislative rule); Abner S .  Greene, Adjudicative RetJ·oactivity in Administrative 
ross HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W [Vol. r ro:ro55 
the identity of the lawmaker, rather than the nature of the legal 
change, to drive the discourse . 
Most recently, the Supreme Court's recognition of the intellectual 
poverty of its retroactivity analysis has led to efforts to formulate a 
more rational analytical structure, albeit with limited success.  The 
Court has addressed retroactivity questions on at least seven occasions 
in the past five years, 1 0  but its decisions, rife with separate opinions,  
reflect a variety of conflicting and confusing approaches.  This Article 
deconstructs those approaches and, for the first time , relates retroactiv­
ity analysis to the broader process of legal change . The Article sug­
gests that a comprehensive analysis of retroactivity requires a structure 
for understanding legal change and uses equilibrium theory to propose 
such a structure . 
Equilibrium theory provides a framework for evaluating legal 
change as a function of the legal context into which that change is 
introduced. Rather than evaluating new legal rules in isolation - in 
terms of their novelty or foreseeability - equilibrium theory focuses 
the inquiry on the regulatory structure and seeks to characterize that 
structure in terms of its stability. Adoption of a new legal rule can, 
but need not, constitute a destabilizing influence on the underlying 
legal structure . Equilibrium theory thus provides a tool for j udging 
stability within the legal system. This judgment clarifies the extent to 
which a legal change disturbs a stable system. It also helps determine 
the appropriate method of addressing the effect of that disturbance on 
the regulatory objectives of fairness and efficiency. Because selection 
of temporal limits is motivated by an effort to address the disturbance 
of stability effected by legal change , focusing on the disturbance per­
mits a more principled approach to retroactivity analysis . Addition­
ally, the process of deconstructing retroactivity doctrine provides 
further insight into the normative consequences of the traditional doc­
trinal relationship between a lawmaker ' s  identity and its c apacity to 
initiate legal change. 
Law , 1991  Sur.  CT.  REV. 2 6 1 , 2 6r-6g. See generally David L .  Shapiro, The Choice of R u lemak­
ing or A djudication in the Development of A dministrative Po licy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 9i2 
(rg6s) (arguing that agencies should make greater use of rulemaking rather than adjudication, in 
part to help resolve uncertainty as to the consequences of regulated behavior). 
10 See Reynoldsvil le Casket Co.  v. Hyde, 115 S.  Ct. li4S, 1747 (1995 )  (rej ecting the effort to 
limit retroactive application of a rgSS Supreme Court decision to claims accrued before its an­
nouncement); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. ,  rrs S. Ct. 1 44 7 ,  q63 ( 1 995 )  (invalidating a statu­
tory attempt retroactively to change the law appl icable to cases that had reached final judgment); 
U nited States v. Carlton,  5 1 2  U .S .  26, 35 ( 1 994) (concluding that retroactive amendment of  the 
Internal Revenue Code did not violate the Due Process Clause); RiciCYS, 5 r r U.S .  at 3 00 (refusing 
to app ly the 199 1  C ivil Rights Act retroactively); Landgraf v .  USI Fi lm Prods., 5 1  r U.S .  244, 
2 65-66, 2 76-78 ( 1 994) (adopting a presumption against construing a statute to have retroactive 
effect); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of T�xation, 509 U.S .  86, go ( 1 993 )  (eliminating selective adjudi­
cative prospectivity in civil cases); General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 5 03 u.S. rSr, rgo-gr ( 1 9 92)  
(upholding a retroactive state statute against Due Process and Contract Clause chal lenges) .  
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I. BACKGROUND OF RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE 
I059 
Although the general rule of adjudicative retroactivity had been 
followed by courts for hundreds of years, 1 1  in the r g6os the U .S .  
Supreme Court began to  limit some decisions to  prospective applica­
tion. 1 2 Shortly thereafter, the Court started to apply new statutory 
rules to pending cases, even when the statute had been passed subse­
quent to the events giving rise to the litigation. 13 B oth of these devel­
opments represented departures from traditional retroactivity doctrine 
that eventually proved unsatisfactory. In its most recent decisions,  the 
Court has substantially retreated from these departures, leaving some 
degree of ambiguity in its wake . 
A.  Adjudicative Retroactivity 
The Court 's  departure from the general rule of adjudicative retro­
activity was initially spurred by its reluctance to apply the Warren 
Court ' s  criminal procedure decisions of the rg6os 14 in a manner that 
would free the numerous defendants who had been convicted before 
the announcement of the new legal standards .15 Subsequently, the 
Court adopted a discretionary approach to adjudicative retroactivity in 
the civil context. The Court described this rule in Chevron Oil Co. v. 
Huson:16 
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new 
principle of law, either by overruling c lear past precedent o n  which liti­
gants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose 
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.  Second, it h as been stressed 
that 'we must . . .  [look] to the prior history of the rule in question, its 
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or 
1 1  Justice Scalia discusses the long h istory of  adjudicative retroactivity in his concurring opin-
ion in Harper v. Vil·ginia Department of Taxation, 509 U .S.  at 106-07 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
12 See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
13 See injm p. ro64.  
14 See, e.g., Escobedo v.  Illinois, 378 U .S .  478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that the Sixth Amend­
ment right to counsel attaches when a person becomes a criminal suspect); Gideon v.  ·wainwright, 
3 72 U.S.  3 3 5 ,  335-45 ( 1 963 )  (announcing a constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases); Mapp 
v.  Ohio, 367 U.S .  643, 65 5-5 7 ( 1 961) (applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state 
officers). 
IS As a result, in Linkletter v. Walker, 3 8 1  U.S. 6 r 8 , 628 ( 1 965 ) ,  the Court adopted a discre­
tionary approach to adjudicative retroactivity in criminal cases. Prior to LinkletteY, the Court had 
occasionally departed from its general rule of adjudicative retroactivity. See, e.g., Note, Prospec­
tive Oven·uling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Cozn·ts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 9 1 6-2 1  
(!962) (diset;ssing pre-Linkletter cases). Justice Cardozo is generally credited with popularizing 
the idea of using prospective adjudication as a means by which to redress the hardship produced 
by some retroactive applications of judge-made law. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE 
OF THE JuDICIAL PROCESS 1 46--49 ( 1 92 r); see also Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of "Sun­
bursts": Techniques of Prospecti-ve Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 1 ,  631-42 ( 1 96 7 )  (describing 
Justice Cardozo 's role in the historical development of prospective adjudication). 
16 404 U .S. 97 (I9 ? 1 ) .  
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retard its operation. '  Finally, w e  have weighed the inequity imposed by 
retroactive application . . . .  1 7  
The Court had adhered to the Chevron Oil test for more than fif­
teen years 18 when consideration of prospective adj udication resurfaced .  
Again the Court first acted in the criminal context. In Griffith v. Ken­
tucky , 19 the Court repudiated the principle that courts engaged in di­
rect review of a criminal conviction have discretion to limit a new rule 
of law to prospective application . 20 The Court based this conclusion 
upon constitutional principles .  The Court held first that determining 
the temporal application of a new constitutional principle of criminal 
procedure was legislative rather than judicial in nature . Second, the 
Court concluded that applying different legal rules to similarly situated 
defendants based on which case reached the Court first was 
improper . 2 1  
Dictum i n  the Griffith opinion stated that the Court ' s  holding had 
no application to civil cases, which continued to be governed by the 
Chevron Oil test. 2 2 Subsequent decisions addressing adjudicative ret­
roactivity in civil cases found the Court unable to agree on an appro­
priate method of analysis and, frequently, unable even to formulate a 
majority opinion. To date, the legal status of adj udicative nonretroac­
tivity remains unclear. 
In American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith,23 Justice O'Connor, writing 
for a plurality of four Justices, explicitly refused to extend Griffith to 
civil cases .24 Instead, the plurality opinion reaffirmed the vitality of 
the Chevron Oil test and, applying that test, concluded that retroactive 
application of an earlier decision invalidating certain highway use 
taxes under the Commerce Clause would unfairly burden the state ' s  
1i !d. at ro6-o7 (citations omitted) (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S .  at 629). 
1 8  The discretionary approach to adjudicative retroactivity was often criticized. For example, 
Justice Harlan repeatedly argued against prospectivity. See, e.g., Desist v .  U nited States, 394 U . S .  
2 44, 2 5 8  (!969) (Harlan, ] . ,  dissenting); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 66;, 676-77 (1971) 
(Harlan, ]., concurring in part and dissenting i n  part). 
19 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
20 In Teague v .  Lane, 489 U.S. 288 ( rg8g), a plurality of the Court held that new constitutional 
rules of criminal p rocedure would not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus proceedings un­
less the rule at issue fel l  with in  one of two narrow exceptions. See id. at 310-r r;  see also Marc 
M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v.  Lane, 69 
N.C.  L. REv. 371 (1991) (analyzing the Teague decision). 
21  See GYiffith, 479 U.S. at 32 2 -23. 
22 See id. at 32 2 n .S .  
23  496 U .S. 167 (1990). 
24 See id. at r 78 ("Although the Court has recently determined that new rules of criminal 
procedure must be applied retroactively to al l cases pending on direct review or not  yet final, . 
retroactivity of decisions in the civil context 'continues to be governed by the standard announced 
in [Chevron Oil) ."' (citations omitted) (alteration in  original) (quoting GYiffitlz, -179 U . S .  at 3 2 2 
n.S)). 
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current operations and future plans made in reliance on the tax reve­
nues collected.  25 
In its next decision on this issue, James B.  Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Georgia ,26 the Court retreated further from Chevron Oil .  James B eam 
considered the doctrine of selective or modified prospectivity, an inter­
mediate practice that permitted courts to apply a newly announced 
rule in the case in which the rule was announced b ut to make the 
holding otherwise prospective . 2 7  Selective prospectivity, like the Chev­
ron Oil test, allowed courts to distinguish among litigants, applying 
the new rule to some and the old rule to others. Under Chevron Oil ,  
the relevant retroactivity criteria included the extent to which particu­
lar litigants had relied on the old rule . Selective prospectivity added a 
layer to the inquiry: a new rule could be applied to the litigants who 
got to the Court first but, under the Chevron Oil test, could be made 
nonretroactive as to those litigants whose cases had proceeded less 
rapidly. 
The James Beam Court concluded that it was improper to treat 
similarly situated litigants differently. Instead, the Court held that a 
new rule of law that is applied to one set of litigants must be applied 
retroactively to all similarly situated litigants . 28  Although this conclu­
sion might appear to follow directly from the reasoning in Griffith, the 
decision in James Beam was so difficult that it generated five separate 
opinions, none of which commanded the support of more than three 
Justices .  
Justice Souter ' s  opinion, which garnered the most support, rea­
soned that the same equality principles that applied in the criminal 
context also forbade differential treatment of similarly situated litigants 
in civil cases . 29 Thus, the doctrine of selective prospectivity could not 
stand. Because the Court had already applied its holding to one set of 
litigants , ] ustice Souter concluded that the holding had to be applied 
retroactively. Justice Souter explicitly stated,  however, that he was not 
addressing the validity of pure adjudicative prospectivity .30 
25 See id. at 182-83. Assessing the significance of the Ame1·ican Trucking decision was diffi­
cult for two reasons . First, although the opinion addressed principles of retroactivity in detail, the 
petition for certiorari did not ask the Court to overrule Chevron Oil based on GYijfith. The only 
question before the Court was whether "the Arkansas Supreme Court appl[ ied] Chevron Oil cor­
rectly." !d. at qS. Second, the fifth vote in AnzeYican Ii·ucking was provided by Justice Scalia, 
\Vho concurred in  the j udgment because he bel ieved that the new rule of law, of which the plain­
tiff sought retroactive application, was incorrect. See id. at 202-05 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
j udgment). Justice Scalia explicitly disagreed with Justice O'Connor 's  retroactivity analysis, stat­
ing that "prospective clecisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what 
the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be . "  I d. at 201. 
26 sor U.S. 529 (rggr). 
2i See  id. at 53i (explaining selective prospectivity). 
28 See id. at 540, 544· 
29 See id. at 540. 
30 See id. at 544 ("We do not speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity''). 
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Three Justices concurred in the j udgment for conflicting reasons .  
Justice White agreed with the rejection of selective prospectivity but 
wrote separately to state his continued belief that the doctrine of  pure 
prospectivity remained valid in the c ivil context.31 In contrast, Justice 
Scalia argued that principles of separation of powers rendered both 
pure and selective prospectivity unconstitutional. The nature of the 
judicial power, according to Justice Scalia, does not allow courts to 
announce principles of law divorced from their application to the 
pending case .32 Justice Blackmun also concluded that pure prospectiv­
ity was unconstitutional, but he  based his reasoning on Article III's 
limitation of the Court 's  role to deciding actual cases or controver­
sies . 33  Finally, Justice O 'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Kennedy in dissent, defended both the practice of purely 
prospective adjudication and the continued viability of the Chevron 
Oil test.34 
At the time of the decision, the impact of James Beam on prospec­
tive adjudication was impossible to measure . Only two Justices had 
clearly articulated their opposition to prospectivity, and four  had reaf­
firmed their support for it. Thus, the reader of James B eam may un­
derstandably find a step unaccounted for in the Court ' s  subsequent 
conclusion, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation ,35 that James 
B eam spelled an end to adjudicative nonretroactivity. Although 
Harper and Jmnes B eam involved the same issue, Justice Thomas ' s  
five-Justice majority opinion36 in Harper went further and appeared to 
invalidate pure, as well as selective, prospectivityY This aspect of  the 
opinion seemed to be dictum because the question of pure prospectiv­
ity was not implicated by the case .38 Nonetheless, in a later decision, 
the Court characterized Harper as "establish[ing] a firm rule of retro­
activity ."39 To date , no proffered rationale for this "firm rule" has 
commanded the support of a maj ority of the Court. Nor has the 
Court explained whether its apparent rejection of pure prospectivity is 
based on prudential considerations or is constitutionally compelled .  
3! See id. at 5 4 6  (vVhite, ] . ,  concurring in  the j udgment) ("The propriety of prospec tive appli­
cation of decision in this Court, in both constitutional and statutory cases, is settled by our  prior 
decisions."). 
3Z See id. at 5 49 (Scalia, ]., concurring in the judgment). 
33 See id. at 54  7 (B lackmu n ,  ]., conc urring in the j udgment). 
34 See id. at 5 49-59 (O 'Connor, ]., dissenting). 
35 509 U .S .  86 ( 1 993) .  
36  Justices Kennedy and White, although they concurred in part, did not jo in this aspect of 
the majority opinion and wrote separately to i ndicate their continued belief that pure prospectiv­
ity was valid and appropriate in certain cases. See id. at r r o  ( Kennedy, ].,  concurring in part 
and concurr ing in  the j�.;dgment). 
37 See id. at rrs (O'Connor, ]., dissenting) (quoting statements in the majority opinion 111 
which "the Court intimates that pure prospectivity may be prohibited as wel l "). 
38 See id. at I I 6 .  
3 9  Landgraf v .  usr Fi lm Prods., 5 I I U.S. 244, 2 7 9  n.J2 (I994l-
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A 1995 Supreme Court decision, Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. 
Hyde , 40 provides the latest gloss on the issue. The Ohio Supreme 
Court had determined, relying in part on the Ohio Constitution , that 
the U .S .  Supreme Court's decision in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. 
Midwesco Enterprises, Inc. 41 could not be retroactively applied "to 
those claims already accrued when that decision was announced by 
the United States Supreme Court. " 42 The U.S .  Supreme Court re­
versed, stating only that Harper governed the retroactivity of the B en­
dix decision. 43 The Court rejected reliance and other remedial 
considerations as bases for adjudicative nonretroactivity, distinguishing 
several previous decisions upholding nonretroactivity as involving cir­
cumstances in which "a set of special federal policy considerations . . .  
led to the creation of a well-established, independent rule of law . "44 
The Court concluded that "a concern about reliance alone"  does not 
justify "what amounts to an ad hoc exemption from retroactivity. "45 
Thus, Reynoldsville Casket indicates both that fairness considerations 
are insufficient to justify adjudicative retroactivity and that the 
Supreme Court's determination of the temporal reach of a rule of fed­
eral law is independently b inding on state courts under the Supremacy 
Clause . 
B. Legislative Retroactivity 
The Court 's  decisions in the legislative context have been charac­
terized by similar vacillation between a flexible discretionary approach 
and a bright-line rule . Legislative retroactivity raises two distinct ana­
lytical issues: the existence of legal limitations on legislative power to 
regulate retroactively, and the interpretive principles to be used in as­
sessing the extent to which legislation should be construed as retroac­
tive .  The former issue has received relatively little attention from the 
modern Supreme Court.46 Despite general acceptance of the principle 
that "retrospective laws are . . .  generally unjust; and . . neither ac­
cord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the 
social compact,"47 the modern Court has been consistently deferential 
to legislative retroactivity. The principle of legislative nonretroactivity 
40 rrs S. Ct. I/45 (rggs). 
41 486 U.S. 888 (rg88). 
42 Hyde v. Reynoldsville Casket Co., 6 2 6  N . E . 2 d  75 , 7 8  (Ohio 1 994) (citing Section r 6 ,  Article 
I of the Ohio Constitution). 
43 See Reynoldsville Casket ,  rrs S. Ct. at 1748, 175 2. 
44 I d. at q 5 r. 
45 !d. 
46 See infra pp. 1074-75 (discussing due process analysis of legislative retroactivity). 
47 Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S .  827, 855 (rggo) (Scalia,]. ,  concur­
ring) (alterations in original) (quoting 2 jOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARfES ON THE CONSTITUTrON 
OF THE UN!TED STATES § 1 398, at 2 5 1  (Boston, Charles C. Little & James B rown 2 d  ed. r8 5 r )) 
( internal quotation marks omitted). 
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found early support in the substantive due process and contract rights 
enforced by the Court prior to the New Deal, but the subsequent ero­
sion of the doctrine of substantive due process curtailed any j udicial 
inclination to subject retroactive legislation
. 
to intensive scrutiny. 48 
Although these constitutional developments have resulted in sub­
stantial deference to legislative decisions to regulate retroactively, the 
Court has had some difficulty ascertaining when Congress has exer­
cised that power. Many statutes do not expressly specify their tempo­
ral scope. The traditional presumption against legislative retroactivity 
suggests that, in the absence of clear statutory language , statutes 
should be interpreted to apply only to post-enactment transactions.  
However, restrictive readings of a statute's reach may be inconsistent 
with the legislative objective . 
This concern led the Court in Bradley v. School B oaYd of Rich­
mond 49 and ThoYpe v. Housing A u thoYity of DuYham, 5 0 cases decided 
during the same time period as ChevYon Oil , to apply the statutory 
law in effect at the time of the decision, even though that law had 
been adopted subsequent to the events giving rise to the litigation .5 1 
The Bmdley Court explained this approach :  "We anchor our holding 
in this case on the principle that a court is to apply the law in e ffect at 
the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in mani­
fest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the 
contrary ."5 2 The Bmdley Court then articulated an analytical frame­
work resembling the ChevYon Oil test in which the decision to apply a 
legislative change retroactively depended on "(a) the nature and iden­
tity of the parties, (b) the nature of their rights , and (c) the nature of 
the impact of the change in law upon those rights . "5 3 This framework 
gave the Court discretion to impose its views concerning the fairness 
of retroactive application and the extent to which retroactivity would 
serve the legislative objective . This heightened use of judicial discre­
tion parallele d  contemporaneous developments m adj udicative 
retroactivity. 54 
Subsequently, as the Court retreated from its discretionary ap­
proach to adjudicative retroactivity, its analysis of legislative retroac-
48 See, e .g. , James L. Kainen, The Histo;-ical Framework fm· Reviving Constitu tional P;-otec­
tion for Prope1·ty and Contmct Rights, i9 COR.!"\/ ELL L.  REv. S7, 1 02-23 (1993 )  (describing nine­
teenth-century decisions invalidating retroactive legislation on the ground of interference with 
vested rights and tracing the modern retreat from those princ iples). 
49 4!6 u.s. 696 (I9i4). 
so 3 93 u.s. 2 68 (! 969) .  
5 1 See  Bradley, .:p6 U .S. at iii ; Thm·pe, 393 U.S.  at 2Sr  C'[A]n appellate court m ust  apply the 
law in effect at the time it renders its decision . ") .  
52 Bmdley, 416 U.S .  a t  iii. The Court relied on United S tates v .  S choo ner Peggy , 5 U.S.  (I 
Cranch) 1 03, rro ( rSor ) ,  and o n  ThoYpe . See  Bmdley, .:p6 U.S .  at 715. 
53 Bradley, 416 U.S .  at iii· 
s� See supm pp .  rosg-63. 
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tivity also moved away from discretion and back to a traditional 
presumption against retroactive application. The Court 's  use of the 
traditional presumption in Bennett v. New Jersey 55 and B owen v. 
Georgetown University H ospital56 conveyed mixed signals about Brad­
ley's presumption of retroactivity. The Court moved to address the 
seeming inconsistency of the decisions in Landgraf v. US! Film Prod­
ucts57 and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc. 5 8  
Justice Stevens 's  majority opinion in Landgraf59 acknowledged the 
"apparent tension" between the two lines of cases on legislative retro­
activity60 but denied the existence of a confiict. 6 1  Instead, the Court 
sought to reconcile both lines of cases by reformulating its retroactivity 
analysis. Under Landgraf, new statutes are to be applied to pending 
cases, even absent specific legislative authorization,  in three c ircum­
stances :  when a court is considering the propriety of inj unctive relief, 
when the statute addresses a court ' s  jurisdiction,  or when the statute 
changes procedural rules . 62 The application of current law is j ustified 
in these cases, according to the Court, because it does not constitute 
true retroactivity. A statute only has retroactive effect if "it would im­
pair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party ' s  liability 
for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions 
already completed. "63 The "well-settled presumption"  against retro­
activity is only triggered when the statute has such "genuinely" retro­
active effect.64 
The Landgraf majority opinion did a masterful job of reconciling a 
variety of apparently conflicting cases into a unified whole, at least as 
a descriptive matter. The Court reaffirmed the presumption against 
statutory retroactivity and qualified this presumption with exceptions 
that covered many prior decisions, including Bmdley and Thorpe. As 
a normative matter, the Court explained that the presumption "is 
founded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice ,  and 
accords with long held and widely shared expectations about the usual 
operation of legislation . "65 
55 470 US. 632 ( I 98s). 
56 488 U .S. 204 (I 988). 
5 7  3 I I U.S .  244  ( I 994).  
5 8 S I I U.S.  298 ( I 994) .  
59 The factual background of Landgraf and Rivers is discussed in  more detail below. See 
infra pp.  I II0-13 . 
60 Landgraf, srr U.S.  at 2 64-65 . 
61 See id. at 2 73  (stating that there is "no conflict" between the Bradley p rinciple that a court 
should "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision" and "a presumption against 
retroactivity when the statute in question is unambiguous" (quoting B radley v. School Bd . of 
Richmond, 4 1 6  U.S. 696 ,  71 1 ( 1 974))). 
62 See id. at 2 7 3-79 . 
63 !d. at 2 80.  
64 !d. at 277. 
65 !d. at 286 . 
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The Court 's  decision in Landgraf can also be explained by con­
cerns about notice and fairness similar to the concerns that animated 
the Court 's  analysis of adjudicative retroactivity in Chevron Oil. The 
Landgraf Court explained that the expanded damage provisions added 
to Title VII by the 199 1 Civil Rights Amendments were " the  type of 
legal change that would have an impact on private parties '  plan­
ning"66 and that, even when the law simply increases the remedies for 
previously illegal conduct, "a degree of unfairness is inherent whenever 
the law imposes additional burdens based on conduct that occurred in 
the past. "67 
Neither the Court ' s  renewed hostility to retroactive legislation nor 
its concerns about notice and fairness have caused it to invalidate ex­
plicitly retroactive legislation ,  but there are indications that these con­
siderations have begun to permeate the Court ' s  analysis . In United 
States v. Carlton ,68 the Court upheld congressional power to eliminate 
a tax deduction retroactively, even though the taxpayer-plaintiff had 
specifically structured his transaction in reliance on the existence of 
the deduction .69 However, the Court cautioned that its review was 
limited in scope70 and, in concluding that the statute was constitu­
tional, expressly relied on the statute ' s  "curative" effecU 1 and its rela­
tively short period of retroactivity.72  Although the maj ority opinion 
reaffirmed the application of minimal rational basis scrutiny, the sepa­
rate opinions of Justices O 'Connor and Scalia7 3 cast doubt on the ap­
plicability of the majority 's reasoning beyond the specific facts of the 
case .  
6 6  I d .  at  2 8 2 .  
67 Id. at 2 83 n.Js . 
68 5 1 2  U.S .  2 6  (I 994l -
69 See id.  at 3 2 -3 3 .  
70 The Court  required o nly that the  statute be rationally re lated to  a legitimate legislative 
p urpose. See id. at 35 . 
7 1 See id. at 31 . 
72 See id. at 3 2 -3 3 .  The Court distinguished legislation that created a "wholly new tax" or 
that involved a long period of retroactive effect. Id. at 34· The Court also highl ighted tax legisla­
tion as an area in which Congress has customarily adopted statutes with short periods of retro­
activity and in which taxpayer reliance on the existing provisions of the Internal Revenue Code is 
unreasonable. The Court found that this custom was "required by the practicalities of  producing 
national legislation." Id.  at 3 3  (quoting United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S.  2 9 2 ,  2 96 (1981)) 
( internal quotation marks omitted). But see Tate & Lyle, Inc.  v .  Commissioner, 87 F .3d 99 ,  
ro;--DS (3d Cir .  1 996 )  (distinguishing Carlton and upholding an IRS regu lation with a six-year 
period of retroactivity against a due process challenge). 
73 See Carlton ,  5 1 2  U .S.  at 36-3 8  (O 'Connor, J., concurring in the j udgment) ( argu ing  that 
recognition of  the need to raise revenue as a rational legislative purpose would legitimate every 
retroactive tax statute, and warning that the "governmental i nterest in revising  the ta.x laws m ust  
at  some point give way to  the  taxpayer ' s  interest in finality and repose"); id .  at  39-40 (Scalia, J . ,  
concurring in  the  j udgment) (arguing that, under the  majority 's  approach to  substantive due pro­
cess, legislation "el iminating the specifically promised reward for costly action after  the action ha.s 
been taken, and refusing to reimburse the [over $6oo,ooo] cost" is "harsh and oppressive by any 
normal measure"). 
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II. RATIONALIZING RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
A .  The Indeterminate Nature of Retroactivity 
! 0 6 7  
A recurring problem with the Supreme Court 's  retroactivity analy­
Sis has been the Court 's  inability to comprehend the nature of retroac­
tive lawmaking.  The Court has traditionally characte rized 
retroactivity as a binary construct within which the application of a 
new rule is either retroactive or prospective.  74 In Landgraf, the Court 
explained that a retroactive rule is one that "attaches new legal conse­
quences to events completed before its enactment," whereas a rule that 
applies only to conduct occurring subsequent to its enactment is pro­
spective . 7 5  This binary construct is artificial, however, and the Court ' s  
use of  the construct to  constrain the range of  temporal options i s  too 
facile . 7 6  
To begin with, a rule that i s  fully prospective should not apply to 
preenactment transactions at all ; most rules that the Court would de­
scribe as prospective in fact affect prior transactions.  For example, 
elimination of the tax deduction for interest on home mortgages, even 
if implemented in future taxable years, would have a substantial im­
pact on existing homeowners . 7 7  Grandfathering provisions, which pro­
vide that transactions initiated under an old rule will continue to be 
governed by that rule , are tools used to limit the impact of a legal 
change and to achieve more complete prospectivity. Legislatures make 
limited use of grandfathering provisions, but the very existence of such 
provisions belies the notion that new legislative rules are generally 
prospective . In the absence of any retroactive effect, grandfathering 
would be unnecessary. 78  
As an alternative to grandfathering, legislatures may use phase-in 
periods or postenactment effective dates, which moderate but do not 
eliminate the retroactive impact of new rules . 7 9  These transition peri-
7 4  See, e .g. , Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno,  494 U.S.  8 2 7 , 836-3 8  ( I 990) (fram­
ing the issue as whether a statute should be applied retroactively to judgments entered before its 
effective date). 
7 5 Landgraf v.  USI Film Prods . ,  5 I I U.S .  2 44 ,  2 70 (1994) .  
7 6 The practices of  other countries with regard to legislative retroactivity differ substantially 
from the practices in the U nited States and demonstrate the wide range of approaches to the 
problem of retroactive lawmaking. See infra note 146  (describing Austral ian and B razil ian ap­
proaches to retroactive ta.x legislation). 
77 Professor Graetz provides a similar example: p rospective repeal of the tax exemption for 
interest on an outstanding m unicipal bond. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: Tlze Case of 
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision ,  1 2 6  U .  P.-\ . L .  REv. 4 7 ,  5 7-5 8 ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
78 Takings jurisprudence serves an  analogous function . Virtually a l l  regulatory chan ges ad­
dressed by takings analysis are nominally prospective; compensation under the Takings Clause is 
transition relief for the retroactive effects of nominally prospective regulation.  S ee, e . g. , Kaplow, 
su,Dra note 3, at 5 I 1 - 1 2  (analogizing transition issues in retroactivity and takings contexts). 
79 See, e .g. , Kaiser, 494 U .S .  at 83 I (describing the congressional decision to delay a statutory 
effective date for six months after enactment "[t]o permit courts and the bar to prepare themselves 
for the changes wrought by the Act"). 
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ods reduce the effect of new rules on contemplated transactions or 
transactions in progress at the time of adoption and, like grandfather­
ing, reflect the fact that nominally or technically prospective rules 
have retroactive effects. 80 
The retroactive impact of nominally prospective rules has led some 
commentators to describe two senses in which a rule can operate ret­
roactively.s 1 Primary retroactivity describes rules that "change what 
was the law in the past";82 secondary retroactivity describes nominally 
prospective rules with retroactive effects. Although the scholars who 
initially drew this distinction recognized that both types  of retroactiv­
ity present similar concerns and should be analyzed similarly,83 courts 
have recently used the distinction to narrow the class of legal rules 
subj ect to retroactivity analysis by excluding legal changes that are 
nominally prospective.84 The Ninth Circuit took this approach in Na­
tional Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Sullivan ,85 in which it character­
ized a Medicare regulation that limited reimbursement to Medicare 
providers as involving merely secondary retroactivity. Although the 
regulation "undeniably affected the future legal consequences of past 
transactions , "86 it did not "alter[ ] the past legal consequences of past 
actions . "87  Accordingly, the court concluded that the regulation did 
"not violate any rule relating to retroactivity, " such as the Supreme 
80 See genera lly Graetz, supra note 7 7 ,  at 8 7 (arguing that phased-in or delayed effective dates 
are superior to grandfathering as a means of providing transition relief). 
8 ! See, e .g. , John K. McNulty, Corporations and the Inte;-temporal Conflict of Laws , 55 CAL.  
L. REv. 1 2 ,  5 8-5 9 ( 1 9 6 7 )  (distinguishing between primary and secondary retroactivity) ;  \V. David 
S lawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 C .AL .  L .  
REv. 2 1 6 ,  2 I  7 - r S  ( 1 960) (distinguishing between "method" retroactivity and "vested r ights" retro­
activity); see also Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroac­
tive Legislation , 73 H.ARV. L. REv. 6 9 2 ,  692 ( r 96o) (defining retroactive ru les as ru les that "give[ ] 
to preenactment conduct a different legal effect from that which i t  would have had without  the 
passage of the statute "). 
82 Bowen v.  Georgetown Univ. Hasp . ,  488 U.S. 2 04 ,  2 20 ( 1 988)  (Scalia, J . ,  concurring) .  
83 See,  e. g. , Hochman, supra note S r ,  at 692  (stating that nominal ly prospective statutes with 
retrospective effects should be included "within any discussion of retroactive legislation"); Mc­
Nulty, supra note S r ,  at 59 ("[S]tatutes which purport to have only post-enactment effect may also 
be c lassified as retroactive i nsofar as they bear importantly on prior events by affecting their 
future legal consequences as of  the time the new law is adopted. ") .  
34 Justice Stevens took this approach in Landgraf, stating that a statute does not  operate "ret­
rospectively" merely because it defeats expectations or is applied to preenactment conduct .  See  
Landgraf v.  USI  F i lm Prods . .  5 1 1  U . S .  244 ,  2 69  ( 1 994) ;  see also Landgraf v.  U SI F i lm Prods. and 
Rivers v .  Roadway Express, Inc. ,  5 r r U .S .  2 44 ,  2 93 n.3 ( 1 994)  (Scal ia, J., concurring in  the j u dg­
ments) (arguing  that secondary retroactivity does not violate the presumption against  retroactive 
application of statutes). 
ss 95 7 F . z d  664 (9th Cir .  1 99 2 ) . 
86 Id. at 6 7 1 .  
S i !d. (quoting Bowen ,  488 U .S .  at 2 r g  (Scalia, ] . ,  concurring) ) .  
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C o urt ' s  l imitation o n  retroactive rulemaking by administrative 
agencies. 88 
This Article does not accept a definitional distinction between pri­
mary and secondary retroactivity. In addition to constituting an im­
proper reading of the work of early retroactivity scholars, the 
distinction is analytically incoherent.89 Defining retroactivity in terms 
of the transition costs created by legal change demonstrates this inco­
herence .  Although the effort to assess and address transition costs 
motivates retroactivity analysis,90 these costs are largely unaffected by 
whether a legal change is nominally retroactive . 9 1  For example, the 
distribution and wealth effects of a change in liability rule are no dif­
ferent in kind than the effects of a change directed to property values.  
A rule that retroactively imposes a million dollars in liability on a 
manufacturer for past pollution activities has the same wealth effect as 
the nominally prospective adoption of stricter emissions controls that 
reduce the value of the manufacturer ' s  factory by a million dollars. 
Moreover, if the purpose of a statute is to deter harmful  conduct, ret­
roactive imposition of liability does not serve this objective , even 
though retroactive imposition can serve other legitimate ends, such as 
specifying a class of persons to bear the costs of previously harmful 
activities . 92 
It is therefore possible to distinguish between nominally retroactive 
rules ,  which are explicitly directed at preenactment transactions ,  and 
nominally prospective rules, which expressly cover only postenactment 
transactions but have some effect on prior transactions .  There are also 
distinctions within the category of nominally retroactive rules .  For ex­
ample, a lawmaker can limit the application of a rule to particular 
subclasses .  A rule that applies only in subsequently filed litigation af-
SS !d . ; see also Bowen, 488 U .S. at 208 (rejecting the general authority of administrative agen­
cies to engage in retroactive rulemaking). 
89 See, e.g. , Kaplow, supra note J, at 5 1 5  (criticizing the n arrow definition of retroactivity 
employed by Munzer as unsatisfactory); \Villiam V. Luneberg, Retroactivity and A d m inistrative 
R.ulemaking, 1 9 9 1  DUKE L.J. 1 06 ,  1 5 6-sS (testing the distinction between primary and secondary 
retroactivity and concluding that "courts wil l  be hard-pressed to invent pr incipled distinctions 
between types of retroactivity") .  
90 See, e.g. , Kaplow, supra note 3 .  at 5 1 8 (framing retroactivity analysis in terms of the appro­
priate response to the transition costs created by changes in government policy). 
9! See, e.g. , Graetz, supra note i i ,  at 49-50 (describing the similarity in impact of nominally 
prospective and nominally retroactive laws and observing " the inadequacy of the analysis support­
ing widespread condemnations of nominally retroactive provisions, often accompanied by benign 
acceptance of prospective ru les") . 
92 The allocation of these costs should be distinguished from the imposition of social or moral 
stigm a . Retroactive civil  liabil i ty need not convey any moral judgment abou t  the propriety of  
previously permitted activity. To the extent that retroactive legal change a.ttempts to  convey 
moral judgments through p unitive means, the implications of retroactivity might properly be a.d­
dressed through a broader reading of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, e.g. , Jane Harris Aiken, Ex 
Post Facto in the C£vil Context: Unbridled Pun ishment , S r  Kv. L .J.  3 2 3 ,  3 2 3-26  ( 1 993)  (arguing 
that the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply to  retroactive applications of  punitive civi l  laws). 
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fects some , but not all ,  preenactment transactions. A rule that applies 
to all pending cases, regardless of when they were filed or when the 
events that gave rise to the lawsuit transpired, is more retroactive .  
Most retroactive are provisions such as  section 2 7 A(b) of the  Securities 
Exchange Act of 1 9 3 4 ,  which apply a new rule to change the result in 
fully litigated final j udgments . 93 
B oth courts and legislatures can control the temporal range of their 
lawmaking. Apart from the line-drawing associated with traditional 
retroactivity analysis, courts gain additional flexibility through the use 
of their equitable and remedial powers. One example is the Supreme 
Court 's  decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co.  v. lvlarathon 
Pipe Line Co. ,94 in which the Court struck down as unconstitutional 
the federal bankruptcy code ' s  grant of j urisdiction to b ai1kruptcy court 
j udges . 95 Concerned about the impact of this decision on pending 
bankruptcy litigation, the Court stayed its decision, in effect providing 
a transition period to "afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute 
the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adj udication,  
without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy 
laws. "96 In Teague v. Lane ,97 the Court achieved a similar result 
through the use of its remedial powers. By constraining the scope of 
the remedy provided through habeas corpus review, the Court limited 
the application of its constitutional criminal procedure decisions to a 
class of pending cases, thereby mediating between purely prospective 
application and full retroactivity.98 
Understanding the concept of retroactivity as a spectrum or range 
of temporal options rather than as a binary construct provides a better 
description of the nature and consequences of legal change , but even 
this analysis remains incomplete . ·within the spectrum, the preceding 
discussion has relied on the Landgraf conception of retroactive rules as 
rules that change the legal effect of preadoption events. This concep­
tion is troubling, however, because the very components of the defini­
tion are themselves indeterminate . Stephen JVIunzer has observed, for 
example , that specifying the temporal scope of events to which a new 
rule is to be applied is definitionally insufficient; one must also specify 
93 See inji·a 1 0 7 7-;8 (discussing section 2 7 A  and the Plaut decision)_ The Civi l  Rights Act of 
1 990,  S .  2 1 04,  r o 1st  Cong. ( 1 990), the bi l l  vetoed by President Bush that preceded the statute 
addressed in Landgraf, would have applied retroactively to final judgments. See  Landgraf v. USI 
Fi lm Prods. ,  s r  r U.S .  244 .  2 5 5  n . 8  ( 1 994) (describing the retroactivity provisions of the 1 990 bi l l ) ;  
id. at 2 5 5-56 & n .9  (citing the retroactivity provisions as one reason for the veto) 
94 458 U . S  so ( r 98 2 ) .  
95 See id. at 8 7  _ 
96 !d. at 88 . 
97 489 U . S .  2 88 ( ! 989) .  
98 See id. at 305-10 (adopting Justice Harlan ' s  position that new constitutional criminal pro­
cedure rules apply retroactively only to cases pending on d irect review).  
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the nature of the application .99 Munzer  identifies two types of retroac­
tive laws . Strongly retroactive rules are backward-looking; they 
change the legal consequences of prior events from the date at which 
the event occurred. 100 Thus, strong retroactivity operates as if the new 
rule had always been the law. Weakly retroactive rules are forward­
looking; they change the legal consequences of prior events, but only 
from the date of the creation of the rule . 10 1  To illustrate the contrast, 
Munzer  describes a law retroactively validating a previously invalid 
marriage . If the law is strongly retroactive, the marriage is treated as 
if it had always been valid. If the law is weakly retroactive,  the mar­
riage is only valid from the date on which the validating law is 
adopted; the law does not erase the previous period of invalidity. 102 
The Landgraf formulation is also troubling because it relies on a 
conception of legal rights or obligations that predates the adoption of a 
legal change without specifying where this conception comes from. 
The Landgraf Court stated that retroactive rules are rules that change 
the legal effects of preenactment conduct. In the absence of adjudica­
tion determining those effects, how is a court to ascertain whether they 
have been changed? It does not make sense to describe a retroactive 
rule as increasing a party 's liability unless there has been some initial 
assessment of that liability. In the absence of judicial action fixing the 
rights and responsibilities of the parties, arguably no such liability ex­
ists. Looking at parties ' expectations to determine if a legal change is 
sufficient to trigger heightened j udicial scrutiny is one alternative , but 
this standard is also problematic . 103 
Because the application of a new rule to post-adoption events is 
not considered retroactive,  the Landgraf test also requires the deci­
sionmaker to decide when the rule has been adopted. Determining the 
date of adoption is not always straightfonvard. Although the date 
when a statute is signed into law can be specified with precision , the 
date of the creation of another type of legal rule, like a j udicial inter­
pretation of that statute , is often less clear. Indeed, one difficulty in 
applying the Chevron Oil test is determining whether adjudication has 
created a new legal rule at all . 1 04 
99 See M u nzer,  sup ra note 5 ,  at 3 i 3 ,  3 8 5 -90.  
1 00 See  id. at 3 8 3 .  
1 0 1  See  id. 
102 See  id. 
103 Th ese expectations can be wrong for many reasons having nothing to do with a retroactive 
c hange in the !8_w. C larifications in the law or the fail ur e  of lawmakers to enac t expected c h anges 
can similarly defeat parties ' expectations about the legal consequences of their actions.  Under this 
reasoning, these situations should be treated analogously to retroactive lawmaking. See Kaplow, 
supra note 3,  at 5 q - r 8 .  
104 Professc;rs Fallon and Meltzer provide an extended analysis of t h e  " n ew r u l e "  req uirement 
of Chevron Oil .  See Fallon & IVIeltzer, supra note 3, at qg6. 
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Finally, the specification of the relevant event is a key component 
of retroactivity analysis and, as the Bradley decision illustrates, may 
not be self-evident. In Bradley , the Court used a statute passed dur­
ing the pendency of a lawsuit as the authority for an award of attor­
neys ' fees . 105 Whether the Court 's  use of the statute even constituted 
retroactive application depended on one ' s  construction of the relevant 
event . 1 06 If the relevant event was the commencement of litigation or 
the incurring of attorneys ' fees,  the statute was applied retroactively. 
If the operative event was the ultimate judgment awarding attorneys ' 
fees,  application of the statute was not retroactive . 107  Attorneys ' fees  
are commonly awarded in a collateral proceeding at  the  conclusion of 
the case. The relevant event can therefore be  defined in such a way as 
to render application of the statute in Bradley retroactive only if ap­
plied to previously terminated litigation .  108 
The foregoing discussion underscores the problems associated with 
treating retroactivity in terms of bright-line categories .  Nonetheless, 
these categories ,  as the following section discusses, have been central 
to the Court ' s  analysis of the constitutional limitations on retroactive 
lawmaking. The discussion also suggests that formulating a precise 
definition of retroactivity is a difficult enterprise - one that is beyond 
the scope of this Article . 109 The elusive nature of a precise definition 
is not critical to the analysis in this Article because , although drawing 
a precise line between retroactive and prospective legal rules is diffi­
cult, classifying legal changes by degree and distinguishing between 
applications that have greater and lesser retroactive effects is possible .  
This  distinction converts the evaluation of retroactive lawmaking from 
a binary issue into a quantitative analysis . Rather than asking 
105 Bradley \'. School Bel .  of Richmond, . p 6  U.S. 696, 709-10  ( 1 9 74) .  
106 Justice Scalia has explained that the appropriate question i s  the determination of the rele­
vant retroactivity event, which i s  to be determined by inquiry into the statutory purpose. See 
Landgraf V .  usr Fi lm Prods. and Rivers v. Roadway E:.;press, I n c . ,  ) I I  U.S.  244 ,  2 9 1  ( 1 994)  
( Scalia, J . ,  concurring in the j udgments ) .  He has ,  of course, disc laimed the legitimacy of j udicial 
inquiry into statutory purpose in  other contexts. See generally lVIichael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of TirJo 
Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices B lack and Scalia, 74 B .U .  L. RE\'. 2 5 ,  2 6-2 7 ( 1 994 )  
(describing Justice Scc1lia's rej ection of legislative purpose analysis i n  favor of  textual analysis) .  
107 See Landgmf and Rivers , 5 1 1  U . S .  at 2 89 (Scalia, J . ,  concurring in the j udgments) 
(''[A]pplication of an attorney 's fees provision to ongoing litigation is arguably not retroactive . ") 
However, the trial court entered the in i tial j udgment awarding attorneys ' fees prior to the adop­
tion of the statute .  See Bmdley, 4 1 6  U S. at 706 .  
lOS The text of  the statute a t  issue in Bradley offers support for character iz ing the relevant 
event  as the entry of final j udgment. The statute authorized an award of fees "(u]pon the entry of 
a fi nal order by a court of  the United States ."  Bmdley, 4 1 6  U.S. at 709 n . 1 2 .  No such final order  
h ad been entered in Bmdley by the court of appeals (or  the Supreme Court) p r i o r  t o  the  enac t­
ment of the statu te . 
109 Indeed, efforts to formulate a precise defini tion of retroacti \·ity may be m isguided. To the 
extent that \'arious problems make an attempted definition incomplete, re l iance on that definition 
wil l  obfuscate the transition issues created by nominally p rospective legal changes.  For an exam­
ple ,  see pp. 1 1 1 7-18 below. 
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whether retroactivity is appropriate , we should ask what degree of ret­
roactive impact is appropriate . 
B. Constitutional Constraints on Retroactivity 
The analysis of current retroactivity law in Part I demonstrates 
that prudential considerations rather than constitutional arguments 
have dominated the discourse about the appropriate scope of legal 
change .  Several Justices have invoked constitutional support for their 
retroactivity analyses, but the Court has not fully confronted the issue 
of whether and to what extent the Constitution limits judicial or legis­
lative ability to define the temporal effect of a new legal rule . 1 1 0 
Although a variety of constitutional provisions, such as the Con­
tract, 1 1 1  Takings, 1 1 2 and Equal Protection Clauses, appear facially ap­
plicable to retroactivity analysis, 1 13 doctrinal limits on the reach of 
these provisions have curtailed their impact on the temporal reach of 
1 1 0  In the civil context, the Court as a whole continues to adhere to the principle set forth in 
G1·eat NoYthem Ry. Co. v. Sunbw·st Oil & Ref Co. , 2 8 7  U.S .  358 ( 1932 ),  that the federal constitu­
tion does not speak to the issue of retroactive adj udication .  See id. at 3 64-6 6 .  Sunbunt only 
addressed the issue of whether the federal constitution prohibits a state court from adjudicating 
prospectively. See id. at 364 .  A rticle III may impose broader l imitations on the federal govern­
ment. The Court 's  fai lure to distinguish explicitly between the state and federal governments in 
this context leaves open the question of  how constitutional l imitations affect retroactivity in the 
federal lawmaking process. This question also raises interesting federalism issues that are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
1 1 1  S ee, e.g. , General Motors Corp. v .  Romein ,  5 03 U . S .  t S I ,  r 86-9 1 ( 19 9 2 )  (concluding that, 
although retroactive legislation could violate the Contract C lause, a Michigan statute that retroac­
tively overturned the state supreme court 's  interpretation of an earlier workers ' compensation 
statute did not violate the Contract Clause because it  did not impair any preexisting contractual 
obl igation) .  
1 1 2 See,  e . g. , Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, s oS l..i .S.  
602 , 6, p-42 ( 1993)  (observing that it  would be "surprising" if  the statute at issue violated the 
Takings Clause given that it  did not violate the D ue Process Clause (quoting Connolly v. Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp . ,  4i5 U.S .  z rr, 2 2 3 ( t g 8 6 )) ( in ternal quotation marks omitted)). See genevally 
Wiil iam K. Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings , 24 HOFSTRA L. Rt:v. 1 ( 1995 ) 
(describing l imitations on the abi l i ty of takings j urisprudence to redress the costs of government 
action). 
1 13 The constitutional doctrines applicable to the temporal reach of a new legal rule have been 
analyzed extensively elsewhere. S ee, e .g. , H.-\R.T & SACKS, supYa note 1, at 6 r g- 2 8  (discussing 
constitutional l imitations on statutory lawmaking); ]. Richard Doidge, Note, Is Purely Retroactive 
Legislation Limited by S eparation of Pown·s ?: Rethinking United States v. Klein,  79 CORNELL L. 
RF:v. 9 10,  945-53 ( 1994) (evaluating the separation of powers implications of retroactive legisla­
tion); Andre\\' C. YVeiler, Note, Has Due Process Struck Out ? The Judicial R ubberstam.ping of 
Retroactive Economic Laws , 42  Du�-:::  L.J. r o 6 9 ,  1 0 73-75  ( 1993) (criticiz ing the courts for fai l ing 
8_dequately to scru tinize retroactive economic laws for due process violations). 
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legal change . 1 1 4 Even the Ex Post Facto Clause, with its explicit pro­
hibition on retroactivity, applies only in the criminal context. 1 1 5 
The Due Process Clause appears to be  most directly on point, but 
the Court has not subjected retroactive legislation to close due process 
scrutiny, requiring only that the legislation have some rational basis. 
The Court has made clear, however, that the retroactive operation of a 
statute is subj ect to a separate due process inquiry: 
[R]etroactive legislation does h ave to meet a burden not faced by legisla­
tion that has only future effects . "It does not follow . . .  that what Con­
gress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The 
retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects ,  must 
meet the test of due process, and the j ustifications for the latter may not 
suffice for the former. " . . .  B ut that burden is met simply by showing 
that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself j ustified by a 
rational legislative purpose . 1 1 6  
In its opinion i n  Carlton , the Court suggested criteria for evaluating 
the rationality of retroactive legislation ,  including the remedial nature 
of the statute and the period of retroactive operation. 1 1 7 These criteria 
are applied only according to the lenient requirement of "a legitimate 
legislative purpose furthered by rational means . " 1 1 8 Thus, although 
early decisions rendered in an era of rigorous due process review sug­
gested theories under which retroactive legislation would have been 
especially problematic, the post-Lo chner decline in substantive due 
process has undermined the premise of those decisions .  1 1 9 Under cur­
rent doctrine, the Due Process Clause does not prohibit retroactive leg­
islation unless that legislation is harsh and oppressive . 1 20 
1 1 4 S e e  genemlly G ERALD GuNTH ER, CONST1TLITTONAL L-\W 465�90 ( r z th ed .  1 9 9 1 )  (collecting 
cases on the Takings C lause and the Contract Clause and observing that these provisions h ave 
not served as restraints on retroactive legislation when there is a suffic iently overriding publ ic  
interest). 
1 1 5 See Calder v.  Bu l l ,  3 U.S .  (3 Dal l . )  386 , 390�9 1 ( I 7 98). But see THE FED I::R.·\LIST Nn. 44, 
at 282�83 (James Madison) (Cl inton Rossiter ed. ,  1 961) (describing "[b]il l s  of attainder, ex post 
facto laws, and Jaws impairing the obl igation of contracts . . .  (as] contrary to the first principles 
of the social compact and to every principle of sound legislation" without expressly l imiting the 
criticism to criminal legislation). A complete analysis of the Ex Post Facto C lause is beyond the 
scope of this  Article, which addresses changes in  civi l  ru les. 
1 1 6 Pension Benefit G uar. Corp. v .  R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 7 1 7 , 730 ( 1 984) (c i tation omi tted) 
(quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,  428 U.S.  r ,  r 6�r 7 ( 1 9 71i )) .  
1 1 7 See United States v. Carlton,  5 1 2  U.S .  2 6 ,  30�33 ( 1 994) .  
1 1 8 General Motors Corp . v .  Romein,  503 U.S .  r 8 r ,  1 9 1  ( 1 99 2 ). 
1 1 9 See, e .g. , Carlton , 5 1 2  U.S. at 34 (explaining that cases requ iring greater j udicial scrutiny 
were decided "during an era characterized by exacting review of economic legislation under an 
approach that ' has long since been discarded"' (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 3 7 2  U.S. 7 2 6 ,  730 
( 1 963))) ;  Kainen, sup1·a note 48, at  102  ("(R]etroactivity is a superfluous category i n  modern due 
process amdysis.") ;  Weiler, supm note I r 3 ,  at  1072  (stating that the Court has never sustained a 
due process challenge to any retroactive economic law). 
1 20 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 43 1 U .S .  1 ,  1 7  n . 1 3  ( 1 9 7 7 )  ("The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally does not prohibit retrospective c iv i l  legislation, 
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The Court has not identified an analogous due process limitation 
on adjudicative retroactivity. This silence is not surprising, given that 
adjudicative retroactivity was the exclusive practice for most of the 
period during which due process limitations would likely have been 
developed. 1 2 1 Even when the experiment with prospective adjudica­
tion under the Chevron Oil test presented the opportunity for the Jus­
tices to use due process arguments in support of nonretroactivity, none 
did so.  Those Justices who defended adjudicative nonretroactivity 
b ased on considerations of fairness, notice ,  and reliance never argued 
that these factors were of constitutional magnitude . 
Indeed, the constitutionality of retrospective adjudication is so well 
established that constitutionally b ased objections have been raised in­
stead against the prospective adjudication experiment. The most 
prominent objection is based on principles of separation of powers and 
constitutional conceptions of the judicial power. The narrower form of 
the constitutional objection to prospective adjudication is based on the 
case or controversy requirement. 1 2 2  In James Beam ,  Justice Blackmun 
argued that a decision that does not affect the rights of the litigants 
appearing before the court but merely sets forth a rule of law applica­
ble to future cases is not within a federal court ' s  j udicial power - a 
power limited to deciding only actual cases brought before it. 1 2 3 
Justice Scalia 's  opinion in James Beam went further than Justice 
B lackmun 's ,  arguing that the nature of the judicial power conferred 
upon the federal courts by the Constitution is inconsistent with pro-· 
spective adjudication . 1 24  Justice Scalia 's  argument is based on what 
he described as the common law tradition embodied in the j udicial 
unless the consequences are particularly ' harsh and oppressive. ' "  (quoting \Nelch v. Henry, .3 05 
U.S .  I 34 ,  I47 ( I 938))) .  
1 2 1  Similarly, the Court has never taken the view that j udicial changes in the law are subject 
to the Takings Clause. See Barton H .  Thompson, Jr. , Judicial Takings , 76  VA. L. REv. r 449 ,  
I 45 0-5 5 ( r 990) (suggesting that current doctrine does not  treat j udicial changes in  the  law as 
takings,  but  arguing that it should do so). Nor has the Court, in the modern era, read the Con­
tract C lause to invalidate state j udicial decisions undermining contractual expectations .  See, e .g. , 
Tidal Oi l  Co.  v. Flanagan, 2 63 U . S .  444,  45 r ( r 9 24 )  (holding that the Contract C lause is "directed 
only against impairment by legislation"); B arton H. Thompson, Jr . ,  The HistoYy of the Judicial 
Impairment "DoctYine" and Its Lessons joY the Contract Clause ,  44 STAN. L. REV. 1 3 73 ,  I 3 7 5  
( r 9 9 2 )  [hereinafter Thompson, Judicial Impairment] (describing the Supreme Court's continued 
adherence to this view). 
1 2 2  S ee, e .g. , United States Nat ' !  Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am. ,  soS U.S .  4 3 9 ,  446 
( r 99 3 )  ('" The exercise of j udicial power under Art .  III of  the Constitution depends on the exist­
ence of a case or controversy, ' and 'a federal court [lacks] the power to render advisory opin­
ions. ' "  (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 3 9 5 ,  40r ( r 9 7 5 )) (alteration i n  original)). 
1 23 See James B. Beam Disti l l ing Co. V. Georgia, sor U .S .  5 2 9 ,  547 ( I 9 9 I )  (B lackmun, J. ,  con­
curring in  the j udgment) (''[T]his Court's function in articulating new rules of decision must com­
port with its duty to decide only ' Cases '  and ' Controversies . "' (quoting U . S .  CONST. ai't. III, § 2 ,  
c l  r )) .  
124 See id .  at  5 48-49 (Scalia, J . ,  concurring in  the  j udgment). 
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The Plaut decision relied i n  part o n  formal separation o f  powers 
principles. 139 The Court reviewed a series of historical sources that 
were consistent with Justice Scalia ' s  formalist approach to separation 
of powers1 40 and ascribed to the Framers a "sense of a sharp necessity 
to separate the legislative from the j udicial power, prompted by the 
crescendo of legislative interference with private judgments of the 
courts . " 1 4 1  Despite its apparent embrace of a rigid separation of pow­
ers framework, the Court based its conclusion on the narrower ground 
that Congress had improperly interfered with the conclusiveness of a 
court-entered judgment. That is, the only element of the adj udication 
process that the Court found to be exclusively judicial in n ature was 
the power to render a judgment sufficiently final to preclude legisla­
tive revision:  
When retroactive legislation requires its o w n  application in a case al­
ready finally adj udicated, it does no more and no less than " reverse a 
determination once m ade, in a particular case."  . . . Our decisions stem­
ming from Rayburn's Case . . . h ave uniformly provided fair w arning 
that such an act exceeds the powers of Congress. 142  
Nevertheless, the Court expressly reaffirmed the power of Congress to 
revise judgments during the appellate process through retroactive stat­
utory amendment. 1 43 
Plaut 's limitation on the lawmaking power of Congress stems from 
the conclusion that the power granted to courts by Article III is the 
power to make determinations in individual cases and to enter judg­
ment based on those determinations. Under this interpretation of Arti­
cle HI, congressional lawmaking that interferes with that power usurps 
the judicial role and impermissibly crosses the line that separates legis­
lative lawmaking from judicial lawmaking. The Court ' s  holding in 
Plaut thus supports the idea of the Constitution as a source of tempo­
ral limits on the lawmaking process . 
C. Limitations of the Constitutional Analysis 
Reliance on constitutionally based arguments is problematic , even 
assuming that the Constitution 's  separation of powers structure man­
dates some temporal limits on federal lawmaking. The Constitution 
does not define retroactivity; the parameters of any constitutional limi-
139 Although the respondents in Plaut argued that section 2 7 A(b) violated both separation of 
powers and the Due Process C lause, the Court did not address the due process chal lenge because 
separation of powers provided a narrower ground for adjudication. See id. at 1 4 5 2 .  
1 40 See id. at 1 45 3-5 6 .  
1 4 1  Jd. at 1 4 5 4 .  
1 42 !d. at 1456  (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. S r ,  at 5 4 5  (Alexander Hamil ton)  (Jacob E .  
Cooke ed. ,  rg6 r )) (citations omitted). 
1 43 See id. at 145 7 (holding that the distinction between final j udgments and j u dgments that 
are still on appeal is  implicit in Article III 's creation of a j ud icial department). 
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tations are therefore inherently ambiguous. 1 44 Moreover,  because ap­
plication of a legal rule cannot be constrained within objective 
categories labeled "retroactive" or  "nonretroactive , " 1 45 constitutional 
principles cannot definitively answer questions of legitimacy . 1 46 For 
example, recognizing that most new rules impose some retroactive ef­
fects undermines the claim that retroactive legislation necessarily vio­
lates the Due Process or Takings Clauses. Similarly, arguments that 
Article III requires retroactive adjudication, as articulated by Justice 
Scalia, 147 neglect the fact that most judicially created rules are only 
somewhat retroactive ; long-established principles of adjudication limit 
the degree to which nominally retroactive rules impact prior events . 148 
Finally, blurring the bright line between retroactivity and prospectivity 
weakens the separation of powers argument that the position of the 
lawmaker in the constitutional structure inherently limits the temporal 
reach of a legal rule . 
Thus, seekers of constitutional solutions are reduced to the argu­
ment that the Constitution supplies outer limits on retroactivity analy­
sis by requiring some minimum degree of retroactivity for j udicial 
1 44 This ambiguity is present even in  the criminal context, in which the Ex Post Facto Clause 
expressly addresses retroactive lawmaking. O n  one hand, the Court has held that neither retroac­
tive civil legisl ation with punitive consequences nor retroactive application of  certain new proce­
dural rules violates the Clause. S ee Aiken, supm note 92 , at 333-49 .  On the other hand, 
retroactively enhancing the punishment applicable to an offense through a rule of legislative or 
j udicial origin is unconstitutional. See generally id. (analyzing the Court's l imitation of the Ex 
Post Facto Clause in the civil context to  cases involving unmistakably punitive statutes). 
14 5 See supra section II.A. 
146 See, e.g. , Levmore, supra note 3, at 2 6 7 (describing the prospective-retroactiv2 distinction as 
"elusive or even senseless" with reference to the economic effects of te�x enactments) .  This conclu­
sion is furthered by the recognition that our instincts about the "normal" temporal range associ­
ated with a particular method of legal change are the product of socialization rather than 
intuition. Practices vary substantially in other countries, even countries with similar legal systems. 
For example, the Australian government often announces legislation by media release at the time 
that it is proposed; if  the legislation is enacted, it is effective from the date of the release, even 
though adoption of the legislation may not occur for some time.  See Michael Gi l l ,  New Approach 
Needed to Reduce Rel1·ospective Law Problems , AuSTRALIAN L. NEWS, Aug. 1 98 6 ,  at 5 (describ­
ing this practice as "government by media release"). Thus, ta.x legislation in Australia may be 
considerably more retroactive than most U.S. legis lation .  In  contrast, the B razilian Constitution 
goes beyond limiting the nominal retroactivity of tax legislation and limits its retroactive effect as 
well .  See  B RAz. C .F .  ( r 988)  title VI, ch .  I, § II, art. 1 5 0  (III) (a)-(b) (prohibiting the government 
from collecting taxes "for taxable  events that occurred before the law that instituted or  increased 
them went into force" and barring the collection of any taxes "in the same fiscal year in which the 
law that instituted or increased them was published"), reprinted in CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WoRLD 79-So (Albert P. B l austein & Gisbert H .  Flanz  eds .  & Keith S.  
Rosenn trans. ,  BRAZIL Supp. 1 993) .  
1 4 7 See  supra pp. 1 0 7 5-76 .  
1 48 The temporal reach o f  nominally retroactive rules may be limited by a variety o f  doctrines, 
including res j udicata, statutes of limitations, the Teague limitations on the scope of habeas 
corpus, and the principles of finality discussed in Plaut .  A jurisdictionally based constitutional 
analysis does not incorporate these doctrines and thus provides an inadequate descriptive c laim 
about the current law of retroactivity. 
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decisions and prohibiting some varieties of retroactive legislation . This 
watered-down constitutional claim returns the discussion to a quanti­
tative analysis of how much retroactive effect is permissible . More­
over, the indeterminate nature of retroactivity explains the Court ' s  
consistent return to policy considerations .  Even if the Constitution 
provides some tools, such as due process ,  for limiting the temporal 
reach of new legal rules in extreme cases ,  there is a range of possible 
temporal applications to which the Constitution does not speak at all . 
The separation of powers arguments for limiting adjudicative non­
retroactivity are subj ect to additional problems. First, an analysis that 
defines temporal limits on lawmaking power by characterizing the 
lawmaking as legislative or judicial in nature is inherently circular. 
Justice Scalia has argued that the judicial power by its n ature does not 
include prospective lawmaking power; judicial lawmaking must there­
fore be limited to pure retroactivity. 149 The only constitutional limit 
upon which Justice Scalia relies ,  however,  is the requirement that 
courts exercise the judicial power; he c ites no independent constitu­
tional authority for the proposition that retroactivity is a definitional 
component of the judicial power. 1 5 0  If, in contrast, the j udicial power 
were defined to include prospective adjudication, the constitutionally 
derived lawmaking power of the courts could not be subj ected to tem­
poral limitations on the grounds that the judicial power is "inherently" 
retrospective .  This patent circularity is one of the most striking logical 
weaknesses of the separation of powers approach to retroactivity. 1 5 1 
Second, Justice Scalia ' s  narrow characterization of the j udicial 
power is based on a formalist approach to separation of powers doc­
trine .  Although the thorny formalist-functionalist debate over separa­
tion of powers principles is too involved to resolve here ,  functionalist 
principles counsel a broader conception of the judicial role in lawmak­
ing . 1 5 2  Many recent cases addressing the tension between the legisla­
tive and judicial functions have favored a functionalist approach .  For 
example, in 111istre tta v. United S tates 1 5 3 the Court upheld against a 
149 See supra pp. 1 075-76 .  
I SO See James B .  Beam Disti l l ing Co .  v. Georgia, 50 1  U .S .  5 2 9 , 549 ( Scalia, ] . ,  conc urring in  
the  j udgment). 
1 51 It is thus also a logical weakness of the Plaut decision, which relied in  part on such an 
approach. See supra p. 1078 .  
1 5 2 Functionalism rejects the theory that the Constitution sharply separates the  powers ac­
corded to each branch, arguing that "the Constitution blends, as well as separates, powers in its 
effort to create a government that will work for, as well as protect the li berties of, its citizens. "  
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm , Inc. ,  1 1 5 S. Ct .  1447 ,  1465 ( 1 99 5 )  (Breyer, ] . ,  concurring in  the  j udg­
ment) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison)). Justice Breyer ' s  opinion in Plaut is 
directly functionalist: he did not advocate an absolute prohibition against reopening final judg­
ments but found the particular statute at issue unconstitutional because it "both reopens final 
j udgments and lacks the l iberty-protecting assurances that prospectivity and greater general i ty 
would have provided." !d. at 1 46 5 .  
1 53 4ss U.S .  3 6 r  ( 1 989) .  
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separation o f  powers challenge the power o f  the Federal Sentencing 
Commission to make substantive rules of a political nature , although 
the Court conceded that this power would generally be characterized 
as legislative . 1 54  Similarly, in Freytag v.  Commissioner, 15 5  the Court 
held that Article I courts can exercise the federal j udicial power .  1 5 6  
Even Justice Scalia has  acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a for­
mal distinction between courts and Congress that is based on the tru­
ism that courts adjudicate and Congress legislates :  " ' Adjudication '  . . .  
is no more an ' inherently ' judicial function than the promulgation of 
rules governing primary conduct is an ' inherently '  legislative one . "1 5 7  
The nature of the j udicial power has also changed over time, fur­
ther weakening the notion that the definition of judicial power can 
serve as an objective benchmark for limits on retroactive lawmaking. 
Although common law adjudication persists, the judicial role has ex­
panded to encompass constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
Whatever theory of constitutional interpretation one espouses, and 
whether or not one accepts the Supreme Court ' s  claim of interpretive 
supremacy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey , 1 5 8 it is clear that constitu­
tional interpretation involves the development of changing legal rules. 
Determining the Court 's  role in effecting those changes would require 
addressing the nature of, and j ustification for, constitutional change .  
The j udicial role has experienced even greater growth i n  the area 
of statutory interpretation.  Statutory interpretation, which in recent 
years has spawned an entire jurisprudence of its own, may require 
courts to enter  a lawmaking partnership with Congress . 1 5 9 In some 
areas, Congress has ceded the development of an entire field of law to 
the courts . 160 In the face of open-textured or minimalist legislative ef­
forts that leave the bulk of the lawmaking function to the judiciary, 
1 54  See id. at 3 80-4 1 2 .  
1 5 5  s o r  U . S .  868 ( 1 9 9 1 ). 
1 5 6 See id. at 88g--go . 
1 5 7  !d. at 9 1 0  (Scalia, J . ,  concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (cit ing Standard 
O i l  Co. v. United States, 2 2 1  U . S .  r ( I 9 I I )) .  
1 5 8 sos  U . S .  8 3 3 ,  868 ( 1 9 9 2 )  (declaring that the Court is  " invested with the authority to decide 
[the people's]  constitutional cases and speak before all others for their  constitutional ideal s "  (em­
p h asis added)). 
1 5 9 See, e.g. , RICHARD A. Pos:-.JER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: C RJS1S AND RJC FOR�I 2 98-3 1 5  
( 1 98 5 )  (argu ing that some statutes, such as § 1 983 and the Sherman A n ti trust Act, require the 
federal courts to exercise broad lawmaking power i n  the common law trad ition) :  \Vi l li am N. Esk­
ridge,  Jr . , Spinning Legislative Supremacy , 78 GEO.  L .J.  3 1 9 ,  3 3 0-3 1 ( 1 989)  (proposing a process 
of  lawmaking in which the " present court and the departed legislature are col laborator-partners i n  
creating statutory meaning"); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating t h e  Wo rlds of S tatute and Com­
m o il Law, 9 Sur. Cr. REv. 4 2 9 ,  43 6-47 ( 1 994) (arguing for the integration of statutes and the 
common law into a u nified. evolving system of l awmaking). 
1 60 Th e  development of a private right of action for federal securities fraud is one obvious 
example. See, e .g. , Blue Chip Stamps v .  Manor Drug Stores, 42 1 U . S.  7 2 3 ,  7 3 7  ( 1 9 7 5 )  (describing 
private actions u nder J ob- s as " a  j u dicial oak which h as grown from li ttle more than a legislative 
acorn"). 
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courts have responded by incorporating traditionally legislative activi­
ties, such as policy analysis, into the judicial role . 1 6 1  
Some commentators have condemned judicial involvement with 
constitutional and statutory lawmaking as improper j udicial activ­
ism. 162 The foregoing discussion,  however, demonstrates the difficulty 
of cordoning the modern lawmaking function into formalist categories .  
The extent to  which j udicial lawmaking i s  improper depends upon 
one 's  conception of the appropriate judicial role . The antiquated fic­
tion that judges find law and legislators make it does not provide a 
sufficiently nuanced framework for determining rules of retroactivity. 
Separation of powers analysis simply cannot resolve the retroactivity 
debate . 
The fact that the temporal scope of judicial lawmaking is a func­
tion of two interrelated doctrines,  retroactivity and stare decisis, adds 
additional complexity. The rules of stare decisis govern the extent to 
which precedent controls a subsequent j udicial decisionmaker. A 
weak doctrine of stare decisis renders much of retroactivity analysis 
inconsequential by reducing the extent to which a judicial decision 
creates generally applicable legal rules that must be given prospective 
effect by later courts . 
Stare decisis and retroactivity can both be viewed as doctrinal 
boundaries for judicial lawmaking; the former is a substantive limita­
tion,  the latter a temporal one . The full extent of their relationship is 
beyond the scope of this Article . Nevertheless, it is important to ob­
serve that, although the Court has never explicitly addressed the con­
stitutional status of retroactivity, the Court has concluded ,  with the 
concurrence of Justice Scalia, that stare decisis is not of constitutional 
magnitude . 1 63 Rather,  the appropriate degree of fidelity to prior deci­
sions is a matter of policy, 1 64 and whether stare decisis "shall be  fol­
lowed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of 
the court. " 1 65 If the Constitution does not address the extent to which 
the judicial power is affected by the choice of stare decisis principles ,  
there is no reason to infer  a specific temporal context to the Constitu­
tion 's  grant of judicial power. 
1 6 1  See PosNER, supra note 1 5 9, at 3 1 4-1 5 .  
1 62  See,  e .g. , Richard E .  Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence 
of Economic Rights,  73 :N.C.  L. REV. 3 2 9, 348-5 2 ( 1 995 )  (describing "judicial restraint" criticism 
of the Court's activism on a variety of constitutional issues). 
i 6J See, e. g. , Payne v.  Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 8 2 8  ( 1 99 1 )  ("S tare decisis is not an inexorable 
command; rather, it ' is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the 
latest decision . "' (quoting Helvering v .  Hallock, 309 U .S .  r o6 ,  r 19  ( 1 940))); cf Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional A djudication ,  88 CoLU:\1. L. REv. 7 2 3 ,  7 5 4-5 5 ( 1 988 )  
(questioning whether the doctrine of stare decisis is a constitutional imperative). 
1 64 Se e  Payne ,  501 U.S. at 8 2 8 .  
1 6 5  Hertz v .  Woodman, 2 1 8 U . S .  2 05 ,  2 1 2  ( 1 9 1 0). 
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Justice Stevens has offered a final argument addressed to concerns 
about adjudicative retroactivity based on Article III . 1 66 Focusing o n  
the remedial power o f  the courts, his dissent i n  Anzerican Trucking 
drew a distinction between the judicial decision to apply a rule and 
the legal effects of that application. 167 When a court applies a :ule of  
law, Justice Stevens explained, i t  must address two distinct issues : how 
the rule affects the parties '  respective rights and responsibilities,  and 
what remedy, if any, is warranted by this assessment. 1 68 Courts can 
disassociate these issues to justify a decision not to award certain relief 
in connection with a retroactive rule on the theory that such relief  
would be unfair or contrary to the parties ' expectations . 1 6 9  This dis­
tinction allows the Court to pay lip service to the principle of full ad­
judicative retroactivity while addressing the equitable considerations 
that have motivated nonretroactivity. 1 70 
Viewing retroactivity purely in remedial terms, although appealing 
in theory, 1 7 1  is unsatisfying. From the perspective of the litigant, win­
ning the application of a particular rule of law has little value unless 
the litigant is entitled to the relief justified by that rule . 1 7 2  The Court 
has remained unconvinced as well and has recently expressed skepti-
166 See American Trucking Ass'ns v .  Smith, 496 U .S .  1 6 7 ,  2 1 2 -24  ( I 990) (Stevens, J . ,  
dissenting). 
1 67 Professors Fallon and Meltzer h ave built u pon Justice Stevens 's  dissent in  American 7i·uck­
ing to develop a theory of constitutional remedies in  which the use of new law as a constitutional 
concept j ustifies modifications in  remedial doctrine to accommodate the b urdens of ful l  retroactiv­
i ty. See Fallon & Meltzer, supm note 3, at l i 7 9-I S 0 7 .  
1 6 8  Justice Stevens described these issues as representing the two senses in which retroactivity 
may be used: 
A decision may be denied "retroactive effect" in  the sense that conduct occurring prior to 
the date of decision is not j udged under current law ,  or it may be denied "retroactive 
effe c t "  in  the sense that independent principles of  law limit the relief that a court may 
provide under current la.w. 
A merican 7i·ucking, 496 U.S .  at 209 (Stevens, ]. , dissenting). 
1 69 Courts use a variety of equitable principles, such as laches, unclean hands. and waiver, to 
deny l i tigants remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. Denying recovery under an other­
wise valid contract based on the doctrine of unclean hands does not imply that the contract is 
invalid. Similarly, a j udicial decision to withhold certain relief under a retroactive rule need not 
be the equivalent of refusing to apply the ru le retroactively. 
1 iO See United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U . S .  2 86 ,  296 ( I 970) (Harlan, ] . ,  concurring) 
C'To the extent that equitable considerations, for example, ' rel iance , '  are relevant, I would take 
this into account in  the determination of  what relief i s  appropriate in  any given case .") .  
1 i l  This  view is  also consistent with the  principle that remedial legislation,  because it  does not  
change the  nature of existing rights and causes of action, i s  more common!y and appropriately 
retroactive in nature than substantive legislation. S ee, e .g. , Landgraf v. USI Film Prods. , 5 I I 
U.S .  2 44 ,  2 96-97 ( I 994) (B lackmun, ]. ,  dissenting) . 
1 / 2  See, e .g. , RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE I 5 6-5 7 ( I 98 6 )  (explaining that a pragmatist 
j udge will reject prospective adjudication because people will not litigate novel cases but for the 
prospect that, i f  they succeed in  persuading a j udge to adopt a new rule, that rule will be applied 
in their own favor); LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF L.-'. w 5 7  (rev. ed.  1 969)  (arguing that i t  
would be ironic i f  the  on ly reward a successful litigant received for persuading a court  to overrule 
a mistaken decision was "to have a now admittedly mistaken rule applied against h im "). 
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cism about whether the distinction between retroactivity and remedy 
is anything more than semantic . 1 73  Moreover, the remedial approach 
is subject to the same line-drawing difficulties associated with the 
Chevron Oil test. The approach requires the Court to dete rmine 
whether a rule is "new" and,  if so,  whether equitable considerations 
justify remedial modifications. The problems associated with these de­
terminations are considered in the next section .  
D.  Prudential Considerations 
If the Constitution does not provide adequate tools to determine 
the temporal limits of judicial and legislative lawmaking - either be­
cause it does not speak to the question or because constitutional analy­
sis requires threshold determinations about the nature of lawmaking 
and institutional roles - further  development of retroactivity doctrine 
must look to prudential considerations.  The rhetoric of the Court ' s  
retroactivity analysis has focused primarily on  two prudential consid­
erations: fairness and efficiency. 1 74 It is typically thought that prospec­
tive laws are more fair and that retroactive laws are more efficient. 
Closer analysis shows competing fairness and efficiency arguments 
both for and against retroactivity.  
I. FaiYness AYguments. - Fairness arguments about retroactivity 
are based on principles of equity and justice . 1 75 Commentators have 
suggested that fair retroactivity rules should provide notice of applica­
ble legal standards and protect reliance interests . 1 7 6  There are good 
1 73  See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, r r s S .  C t. 1 74 5 ,  I i49 ( 1 995 ) (questioning how a 
court could deny retroactive relief by characterizing i ts action as remedial without reducing 
Harper to merely '·symbolic significance"). This concern i s  consistent  wi th one of  the central i n­
sights of legal realism: legal rules should not be defined in the abstract, but  by their practical 
dfects. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next S tep ,  30  CoLUi\l .  L. REv. 
4.3 1 ,  459  ( 1 930) ('" [R]ules ' . . .  are what they do.") ;  see also Felix S .  Cohen, Transcendental Non­
sense and the Functional Appmach , 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809,  838-39 ( 1 93 5 )  (argu ing  that legal 
rules are defined by their consequences). 
1 i4 Cf Graetz, supra note i i ,  at 63-Si (using fairness and efficiency considerations to analyze 
the propriety of addressing the retroactive effect of legal change through granclfathering). More 
generally, the Court ' s  analysis can be understood as an effort to mediate between the phi losophi­
cal objectives o f  reasonableness and rationality. See Keating, supra note 8, at 3 1  r n.  1 (analyzing 
tort law in  terms of reasonableness principles based on moral j ustice and rational i ty principles 
based on economic concepts and attributing the philosophical distinction between these ap­
proaches to Rawls and Kant). 
1 75 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in B onjorno , which c i ted various h istorical sources that 
decry retroactive statutes as u njust, is eloquent on this point. See  Kaiser Aluminum &. Chern. 
Corp.  v. Bonjorno, 494 U .S .  8 2 i ,  85 5-5 6  ( 1 990) (Scalia, ] . ,  concurring). 
1 76 See Guido Calabresi ,  Retroactivity: Paramount Powen and Contractual Chailges , 7 I  Y.-\LE 
L.J.  I 1 9 1 ,  r r g r  n . 2  ( 1 96 2 )  (characteriz ing both Hochman and Slawson as considering fairness "the 
ultimate test of the validity of retroactive laws"). Protec tion of reliance interests arguably causes 
parties to determine the rules applicable to their conduct and act in accordance with those rules .  
Cf Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council ,  sos U.S .  1 003 ,  I 034 ( 1 9 9 2 )  ( Kennedy, J . ,  concurring 
in  the j udgment) (measuring whether a regulation constitutes a taking by the degree to which it  
interferes wi th "reasonable, investment-backed expectations"). 
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reasons to promote these goals .  The justice of a legal system is what 
gives its rules legitimacy. Notice enables people to predict the conse­
quences of their transactions and increases the influence of legal rules 
upon primary conduct. 
Fairness concerns are typically raised in support of prospective ap­
plication of new legal rules . The Court 's  initial experimentation with 
prospective adjudication, the Chevron Oil test, was driven by fairness 
concernsY7 Chevron Oil explicitly directs a court to inquire into the 
equitable aspects of application of a new rule , including whether a liti­
gant 's  reliance on the prior rule should be protected. Those Justices 
and commentators who have defended use of the Chevron Oil test 's  
discretionary approach to adjudicative retroactivity have been moti­
vated by the need to protect settled expectations .  17 8 Fairness consider­
ations also form the basis for opposition to retroactive legislation . 1 7 9  
Fairness concerns can be used to justify substantive limits on retroac­
tive lawmaking, transition relief to mitigate the costs imposed by 
retroactivity, and the presumption against retroactivity adopted as a 
rule of construction in Landgraf. 1 80 
However ,  determining whether the application of a new legal rule 
to preadoption transactions is fair can be problematic . First, particu­
larly in the context of c ivil litigation, the choice of which legal rule to 
apply is often a zero-sum game . 18 1  If retroactive application of a new 
legal rule disfavors one litigant, it favors the other. To the extent that 
some degree of fairness is achieved by prospective application of a 
change in law that would disadvantage one litigant, it is exactly 
matched by the unfairness of not applying the change in law to a liti-
1 7 7  S ee, e .g. , James B. Beam Disti l l ing Co. v. Georgia, 5 0 1  U.S .  5 2 9 ,  5 5 1 ( 1 9 9 I )  ( O ' Connor, ] . ,  
dissenting) ("[T]he purpose of the Chevron Oil test is t o  determine the eq uities o f  retroacti \·e 
application of a new rule .") .  
1 78 S ee, e.g. , id. at 552  (''(I]t i s  precisely in  determi ni ng general retroa�tivity that the Chevvon 
Oil test is most needed; the broader the potential reach of a new rule, the greater the pote n tial 
disruption of settled expectations."). 
1 i9 A substantial body of academic scholarship,  particu larly in the tax area, h as analyzed the 
fairness of the temporal l ine-drawing associated with legislative change. See,  e .g. , Graetz, supm 
note i i ,  at 73-8 7 ;  Levmore, supya note 3 ,  at 2 7 3- 7 9 ;  Kyle D. Logue, Tax Tmnsitions, Opport u n is­
tic Re troactivity, and the Benefits of Govemment Pre commitment , 94 MIC H. L. RE\' I I 2 9 passim 
( 1 996) .  Commentators are p articularly able to evalu ate the fairness of new tax laws because pro­
visions such as grandfathering and delayed effective dates are commonly used i n  ta.x law to pro­
vide relief from the retroactive effects of  legal c hange. 
1 80 See Bonjonw , 494 U.S .  at 8 5 6  (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The presumption of nonretroactiv­
ity, in short, gives effect to enduring notions of what is fair, and thus accords with what legisla­
tors almost always intend .") .  
18 1  Dr. Shachar has argued more generally that transition gains necessarily equal transition 
losses. S e e  Avishai Shachar, From Income to Consumption Tax: CYite1·ia joY Rules of 1i·ansition , 
97 HA R\', L. REV. 1 5 8 1 ,  1 5 8 6-90 ( ! 984). 
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gant who successfully argued for legal change . 1 82 Looking to the liti­
gants ' interests thus provides little guidance .  
Second, although the argument that new rules upset expectations 
has intuitive appeal, the actual degree to which a new rule affects j us­
tified reliance interests varies considerably from case to case . Reliance 
depends upon the nature of the rule , the clarity and predictability of 
the law prior to the adoption of the new rule , the relative extent to 
which expectations about the rule affected the primary conduct to 
which the rule applies ,  and the degree to which these expectations 
were reasonable . 183 The case-specific nature of these factors is a 
weakness of the Chevron Oil test. Chevron Oil also suggested that 
reliance could be a function of the degree of novelty associated with a 
particular legal change . 184 This statement suggests ambiguity in iden­
tifying which legal changes constitute new rules for the purposes of 
Chevron Oil analysis. When a new rule is the result of a clarification 
by the Court or Congress of unsettled law - as opposed to an over­
ruling or a change in interpretation - there is little reason to believe 
that parties have a reliance interest in any particular formulation of 
the rule . 1 85 Even if they do, their reliance may not be  reasonable if 
the rule is unsettled. 186 
The Court 's  effort to distinguish between substantive and proce­
dural rules in its retroactivity analysis 1 87 appears to be motivated by 
1 82 Downplaying this consideration is tempting when litigation involves a private litigant on 
one side and a government entity on the  other. Civi l  liability is no less significant, however, when 
it  is imposed on the  government: the  fact that the  government bears the  cost  is not a defense to 
the imposition of u njustified liability, and the costs u ltimately will be spread to individuals 
through the tax system.  
1 83 See Chevron Oil  Co.  v.  Huson, 404 U .S .  97 ,  I o6-o7 ( I 9 7 I ) .  The magnitude o f  the  gain or  
loss  resulting from legal change also affects the  degree to  which reliance interests are  implicated. 
S ee, e . g. , Graetz, supra note 3, at I 8 2 6  (arguing that the most significant fairness criterion may be 
the magnitude of the loss) . There are practical problems with using magnitude as a means to 
assess fairness. S e e  Levmore, supra note 3, at 2 72 n .  I3 (questioning whether a description of the 
degree of retroactivity should consider magnitude in relative terms, absolute terms, rate of return 
terms, or other terms). 
184 See Chevron Oil,  404 U.S. at Io6 ;  see also United States v .  Johnson ,  4 5 7  U .S .  5 3 7 ,  549-50 
& n . I 2  ( I 9 8 2 )  (describing the different roles o f  novelty in triggering retroactivity analysis in  crimi­
nal and civil cases). 
185 The Court could have addressed this concern by precisely formu lating what c onstitutes a 
" new" rule of law for purposes of retroactivity analysis. One could argue that only an "overrul­
ing" change triggers the fairness considerations requiring prospectivity or Chewon Oil-type analy­
sis. In i tial commentary supporting nonretroactive adj udication focused on the transition costs of 
overruling decisions. See, e . g. , Schaefer, supm note I S ,  at 63 I ;  Note, supra note 1 5 ,  at 95 r .  
Nonetheless, application o f  Chewon Oil ' s novelty requirement has led to conflicting a.nalyses in 
the courts. See John Bernard Corr ,  Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court DoctYine "As Ap­
plie d " ,  6 r  N.C.  L.  REV. 745 , 7 63-66 , i 7 5-79 ( 1 983 ) .  
l86 S ee, e . g. , Graetz , sujJm note 3 ,  at  I 8 2 3-24 (arguing that transition relief should not  be 
based on what people expect but  on some normative vision of what they are entitled to expect). 
1 8 7 See Landgraf v. U SI Film Prods. a.nd Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc . ,  5 I I U .S .  2 44 ,  
2 90--g i ( I 994) (Scaiia, ]., concurring in the judgments) (observing that t h e  m aj ority dictated that 
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the perception that substantive rules give rise to reliance interests i n  a 
way that procedural rules do not. However, the line between substan­
tive and procedural rules is not sufficiently clear to provide a worka­
ble distinction . 1 88 Even if it were , the distinction is not a useful 
measure of reliance interests. 1 89 Substantive rules are not inherently 
more important to a litigant than procedural rules; both can be out­
come determinative . 1 90 Procedural rules affect the degree and quality 
of access to the legal system and thus determine the protection af­
forded by substantive legal rules and remedies . 1 9 1  
A third problem with considering reliance interests i s  that nomi­
nally prospective rules can also defeat parties '  expectations.  As the 
Court observed in Carlton, "the detrimental reliance principle is not 
limited to retroactive legislation .  An entirely prospective change in the 
law may disturb the relied-upon expectations of individuals . . . .  " 1 92 
C hanges in the tax laws, like the change at issue in Carlton , com­
monly present this type of concern . 1 93 Indeed, the temporal boundary 
drawn by bright-line retroactivity rules may be completely arbitrary. 1 94 
procedural changes in the law wil l  apply retroactively and substantive changes wil l  not); cf Land­
graf, s r r U.S .  at 2 75 n . 2 9  (describing exceptions to the procedural test). 
1 3 8  See, e . g. ,  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U .S .  3 6 1 ,  392 ( r 989 )  (describing the distinction 
"between substantive and procedural rules" as  a " logical morass"); see also Sun Oi l  Co.  v. vVort­
man, 486 U .S .  7 I 7 , 7 2 6-2 8 ( r 988 )  (explaining that the distinction depends on context) . 
189 The Court has refused to accept the substance-procedure distinction as a basis for deter­
mining application of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, e .g. , Collins v. Youngblood,  497  U .S .  3 7 ,  46 
( 1 990) ("[B]y simply labeling a law ' procedural , '  a legislature does not thereby imm unize it from 
scruti ny u nder the Ex Post Facto Clause . ") ;  B eazell v. Ohio, 2 69 U.S .  r 6 7 ,  1 7 1  ( 1 9 2 5 )  (holding 
that the constitutional prohibition against retroactive changes in the law does not apply to some 
procedural changes, but stating that · ' [j]ust what alterations of procedure wil l  be held to be of 
sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition cannot be embraced within a 
formula or stated in a general proposition"). 
1 90 Se e, e.g. , Andrus v .  Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S .  604, 607 n.6 ( 1 9 7 8) (applying 
retroactively a statute eliminating the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal question 
j urisdiction to a case on appeal). 
19 1  As the Bmdley Court recognized. the value of  a substantive right depends in part on the 
availabi l i ty of procedures to redress violations of that right. The purpose of  statutes authorizing 
awards of attorneys ' fees in  public interest l iti gation is to faci l itate access to j udicial remedies.  
S ee B radley v .  School Bd.  of Richmond, 4 1 6  U .S .  696, 7 1 9  ( 1 9 74 ) .  Moreover, the availability of 
attor neys ' fees is central to the l i ti gants ' ongoing calculation of whether i t  i s  appropriate to settle, 
continue to litigate, or abandon the litigation.  See Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting Hist01·y: The P;-opriety 
of Eradicating PriOJ· Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORI'>IELL L. REV. 589 ,  
5 94-95 , 63 2-35  ( 1  99 1 )  (describing the economic analysis of  a settlement decision based o n  the 
expected costs and benefits of settlement as opposed to further l i tigation). 
Another aspect of the complexity and indeterminacy of the binary retroactivity construct is 
defin i tional. Application of a particular ru le can often be characterized as either substantive or 
procedural, retroactive or prospective, depending on how one describes the objectives of the rule 
and the transactions to which it is d irected. See supm p.  1 0 7 2  (discussing the identification of the 
relevant retroactivity event). 
l 92 United States v .  Carlton, 5 1 2  G .S .  2 6 ,  33-34 ( 1 99-f ) .  
1 93 See Logue, supra note q g ,  at r 1 33-34 . 
1 94 See Mhlungu & Four  Others v. The State, Case No. CCTh s /94 (Consti tutional Court of 
South Africa June 8 ,  1 995 )  (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). In ivlhlungu , the court 
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2. Efficiency Arguments. - Although fairness arguments are typi­
cally used to support prospective lawmaking, efficiency is generally 
viewed as favoring retroactivity . 1 95 Efficient lawmaking  can be de­
fined as lawmaking that maximizes the net benefits of legal change . 
The traditional economic conception of rational or  efficient legal 
change is based on the utilitarian conception of a net gain in social 
welfare without regard for distributional issues .  This conception ex­
plains the failure of economic analysis to address the moral concerns  
of fairness arguments . Retroactivity could produce net  social gain and 
yet impose clearly identifiable costs; there are winners and losers when 
a law is applied retroactively. 1 96 
Efficiency arguments typically add an additional normative factor 
to the analysis: the assumption that legal change has occurred because 
of a determination that the new rule is an improvement. l 9 7  The view 
that the new rule improves the operative legal principles supports the 
application of that rule to as broad a class of cases as possible . 1 98 This 
j ustification is particularly strong if the new rule is curative or  restora­
tive, that is, if it is designed to undo a rule perceived as mistake n . 1 99 
Although his argument was not couched in economic terms, Justice 
White based his dissent in Kaiser A luminum & Chemical Corp. v. 
was called upon to interpret the plai n  language of Section 2 4 1 (8 )  of the South African Constitu­
tion, which states that proceedings pending before the Constitution went i nto effec t should "be 
dealt with as if this Constitution had not been passed ." !d. at r .  The court nonetheless rejected a 
literal interpretation of Section 2 4 1 (8)  and held that the protections of the new Constitution ap­
plied retroactively to pending criminal proceedings on the ground that a circumstance as arbitrary 
as a o ne-day difference in the date of service of the indictment should not determine the differ­
ence between conviction and acquittal. See  id. at 2 -3 .  
1 95 Accordingly, full retroactivity i s  generally supported by advocates o f  economic analysis .  
S e e, e .g. , Kaplow, supra note 3,  at 6 1 5 - 1 6 ;  Levmore, supra note 3 ,  at 2 7 3-7 8 ;  see also Graetz, 
supra note 3, at 1 8 2 5  (describing the economic costs of transition relief). 
1 96 Because efficiency arguments about retroactivity are premised on the achievement of net or 
aggregate gains through broader application of new rules, and because these gains come at the 
expense of losses to others, the relevant concept of efficiency is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See, e .g. , 
G raetz, supra note i i ,  at 6 7 -68 (choosing Kaldor-Hicks over Pareto efficiency). A legal change or 
outcome is Kaldor-Hicks efficient i f  i t  maximizes net aggregate social welfare - the sum o f  indi­
viduals' welfare - regardless of  whether each individual is made better off. S e e  generally RICH­
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS O F  L\\V 1 1-13  (3d ed .  1 986) (describing the Pareto and 
Kaldor-Hicks conceptions of efficiency). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency raises normative issues because 
of the distributional questions posed by a legal change that improves the welfare of some at a cost 
to others. 
1 97 See, e .g. , American Trucking Ass ' ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 1 6 i ,  201 ( r g go) (Scal ia, J . ,  concur­
ring in the j udgment) (arguing that it "does not make sense" to suggest that a decision can be 
applied prospectively when that approach would result in the Court enforcing an u nconstitutional 
statute). 
1 98 See, e .g. , Levmore, supra note 3 ,  at 306 n . i i  (noting that retroactivity may be j ustified if 
reforms are desirable because it  allows the reforms to be implemented more qu ickly). 
1 99 See, e .g. , Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc . ,  s r r  U.S .  2 98 ,  3 1 4-q ( 1 994)  (B lackrnun,  J ,  
dissenting) (defending the goal of applying "remedial and restorative" legislation broadly through 
retroactive application). 
I 997) RETROACTIVITY A ND LEGAL CHANGE r o 8 g  
B onjorno 200 on this reasoning.201  Justice White argued that a new 
federal statute providing a mechanism for calculating postj udgment in­
terest should be applied retroactively to pending cases .  In response to 
the majority 's  fairness argument that retroactive application changed 
the risk of appealing a judgment, Justice White argued that changing 
that risk was Congress ' s  intention.202 The Court would frustrate the 
objectives of the legislation by refusing to apply it to "precisely the 
kind of situation demonstrating the need for the amendment. "203 
The objectives of a new legal rule may also be undercut if people 
are able to avoid its application by rushing to complete transactions 
prior to enactment. Rules that impose new fees or taxes typically as­
sume a base set of transactions to which the rule will apply. If people 
can avoid the rule by accelerating their transactions, the government 's  
revenue goals will be harder to achieve . Similarly, efforts to avoid new 
legal rules may result in allocational inefficiency, 204 provide windfalls 
to parties who can anticipate the legal change,205 or create disparate 
treatment for similarly situated transactions. Opportunistic avoidance 
of new legal rules is important outside the tax context as well. Re­
moving transactions that would otherwise be covered by a legal 
change reduces the influence of all government regulation .  For exam­
ple, if people can avoid new building codes by starting construction 
before legislation is signed, the capacity of legislation to enhance safety 
standards is reduced. Retroactive lawmaking allows the lawmaker 
greater control over the class of transactions that are subject to new 
rules .  
Even in circumstances in which the objectives of a new rule do not 
require retroactive application,  engaging in the line-drawing associated 
with nonretroactivity may be inefficient. Prospective lawrnaking may 
arbitrarily distinguish between classes of transactions based on the for­
tuity of when they were completed or,  even more arbitrarily, the date 
upon which litigation commenced or concluded. To the extent that 
application of a new rule has wealth effects, partial application of the 
200 494 U.S .  8 2 7  ( 1 990). 
201 S ee id. at 858 (White, J . ,  dissenting). Justices B rennan,  Marshall, and B lackmun joined 
Justice ii\'hite 's  opinion. 
202 S ee id.  at 86o ("I stil l  do not understand why we should not apply new § 1961 to l itigation 
in progress when we know that the principal reason for Congress ' amendment of § 1 9 6 1  was to 
change the risk of postjudgment l itigation.") .  
z o J  Id. at 8 5 9 · 
204 See Levmore, supra note 3 ,  at 2 7 3-7 4 .  
205 For example,  during the partial shutdown of the federal government in  November 1 995 ,  
the Securities and E:.;change Commission lost its ability to  charge the  fu l l  fee associated with the 
registration of securities. In anticipation of a budget agreement that would restore this power, 
hundreds of companies attempted to save an estimated $ 2 3 . 7  mi l lion by registering securities dur­
ing the shutdown. The subsequent budget agreement addressed this opportun ism by granting the 
SEC authority to charge the h igher fee for those registrations retroactively. See S . E . C. Raises Fee. 
in Stock and Bond RegistYation ,  N.Y. Tli\l t:S, Nov. 2 2 ,  1 9 9 5 ,  at D3 . 
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rule through nonretroactivity may cause some people to bear a dispro­
portionate share of the burden. This concern motivated legislation 
that retroactively assessed user fees from successful litigants in the 
United States-Iran Claims Tribunal. In United S tates v. Sperry 
Corp. ,206 the Court endorsed Congress ' s  efficiency-based j ustifications 
for retroactivity, which included the need to collect sufficient fees to 
reimburse the government for its share of the costs of operating the 
Tribunal,207 the need to ensure that everyone who benefited from the 
existence of the Tribunal bore proportionate responsibility for these 
costs,208 and the need to prevent early users of the Tribunal from gain­
ing a windfall at the expense of later litigants . 209 The Court found 
that retroactivity directly furthered all of these objectives .  
At a more general level of  economic analysis, as Louis Kaplow has 
observed, the debate between retroactivity and prospectivity concerns 
the degree to which the government should provide transition relief 
when it changes legal rules . 2 1 °  Kaplow explains that a change in ap­
plicable legal rules is a risk that is functionally similar to other  risks in 
the market. 2 1 1  From a law and economics perspective ,  the market 
provides a better mechanism for addressing risk than does the govern­
ment. 2 1 2  Accordingly, Kaplow concludes that transition relief for new 
rules is generally inefficient. 2 1 3  In Kaplow 's  analysis ,  market actors 
assume the potential for legal change as one of a variety of risks, and 
the imposition of the costs of that change lacks a moral component 
j ustifying government mediation . 2 1 4  Kaplow's  argument also depends 
on the contested empirical conclusion that the market is a better 
means of addressing the costs of legal change than are legal con­
straints on retroactive lawmaking. 2 1 s 
Market remedies may be  impractical solutions to some retroactive 
legal changes .  For example , one might question whether market reme­
dies such as insurance are viable options for addressing the impact of 
judicial decisions that retroactively eliminate sovereign immunity in 
206 493 u.s.  5 2  ( ! 989). 
207  See id. at 6o.  The statute explicitly stated that the fees were intended to reimburse the 
government for its costs in  administering the Tribunal. 
z os See id. at 64-65 . 
2 09 See id. at 65 . 
2 10  See Kaplow, supra note 3 ,  at 5 r r -1 2 ,  598 .  
2 1 1  See  id .  at  5 1 2 .  
2 1 2  Economic analysis i ndicates that government interference with the market through transi-
tional relief c reates distortion and inefficiency. See id. at 5 2 9-50 .  
2 1 3 See id .  at 5 99,  602 . 
2 14 See id. a.t 5 7 6-78 .  
2 1 5 See id. at 5 3 5 .  Some scholars have criticized this conclusion . See, e.g. , Logue, supra note 
r 79 ,  at r 13 r-3 2  (raising an argument for transition relief based on the efficiency of the govern­
ment commitment to legal rules) ; ] .  Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Ti·ansitions and the 
Protection Racket: A Reply to ProfessoYS Graet: and Kaplow , 75 VA. L. REV. I r s s ,  I r 6 z-66 ( 1 989) 
(arguing that transition rel ief may be more efficient in  the context of tax reform) .  
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tort for public officials . 2 1 6  Insurance simply may not be available to 
address the risks that accompany some forms of legal change . 2 1 7  Re­
troactive lawmaking may also create unacceptable public costs. Retro­
active application of the Warren Court ' s  constitutional criminal 
procedure decisions, for example, would have freed thousands of con­
victed criminals. Retroactively changing a standard of civil l iability 
may reqeire the retrial of hundreds of cases .  
The presence of transition costs creates conditions of path depen­
dence : 2 1 8  even if a legal change is unquestionably an improvement, the 
costs associated with converting from the old rule to the new rule may 
constitute a b arrier to change . A change that is efficient in the ab­
sence of such transition costs may not be economically superior once 
transition costs are taken into account. 2 1 9  Prospective lawmaking of­
fers a solution to the path dependence problem by reducing the costs 
of the transition. If a new rule is more effici ent with respect to future 
transactions, a lawmaker can adopt it exclusively for those transac­
tions, thereby avoiding the transition costs associated with changing 
the applicable rules midstream for past or  pending transactions. 
J.  Application of Prudential Considerations. - The Supreme 
Court ' s  decision in Lamp] illustrates how fairness concerns and effi­
ciency concerns offer conflicting direction for retroactivity law.  The 
Lamp] decision , which shortened the limitations period applicable to 
most private securities fraud claims, was extremely controversial, pri­
marily because it applied the new, shorter limitations period retroac­
tively to dismiss cases that had been timely under the precedent 
applicable when they were filed .  This aspect of the decision was heav­
ily criticized, and Congress ultimately responded by enacting section 
2 1 6  I n  Spanel v. Mounds View School  DistYict No. 621 ,  J I S  N.W.2d 795 (Minn .  1 96 2 ), the 
court developed an innovative solution to this problem. Intending to overrule the common law 
defense of sovereign immunity for municipalities, but concerned about the cost of  such a decision, 
the court announced that i t  would eliminate the defense for torts "committed after the adjourn­
ment of the next regu lar session of the Minnesota Legislature." ld. at 796. The transition relief 
provided notice to m unicipalities of the possibi l i ty of future liability, allowed the legislature a 
chance to pass a statute that would preserve the defense uninterrupted, and afforded the legisla­
ture the opportunity to consider alternative means of effec ting the transition .  
2 1 ' See, e .g. ,  Lawrence Blume & Daniel L .  Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: A n  Economic 
A nalysis , 72 CAL. L.  REv. 5 69, 5 7 2  (1984)  (noting  that private insurance markets have not pro­
vided coverage for the risks associated with regulatory changes such as rezonings) ;  Michael Roths­
chi ld & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive lnsumnce Mm-kets: An Essay on the 
Economics of Imperfect Information , 90 Q.J .  EcoN. 6 2 9, 6 34-3 i ( 1976)  (explaining how adverse 
selection in the insurance industry leads to market fai lure). 
2 1 8 See generally Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics , 1 09 HARV. L. 
REv. 64 I ,  643-44 ( 1 996) (stating that path dependence produces su boptimai equilibria due to the 
presence of transition costs). 
2 1 9 The metaphor, in terms of  path dependence, is that descending one evol utionary peak is 
sometimes necessary in  order to c limb to the top of a neighboring, higher peak. 
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2 7 A  of the Exchange Act,Z 20  which restored the prior limitations pe­
riod for cases pending at the time of the Lamp] decision .  According to 
supporters of the legislation,  imposing a different l imitations period 
retroactively on litigants whose claims had appeared timely when filed 
was unfair. 2 2 1  
Fairness concerns d o  not, however, require prospective application 
of the Lamp] rule . The Supreme Court 's  choice of temporal limits in 
Lamp] was a zero-sum decision . Protection of plaintiffs through enact­
ment of section 2 7 A came at the expense of defendants, who were 
forced to litigate cases that were not timely filed under the limitations 
period as more correctly interpreted by Lampf. Policy j ustifications 
support consideration of the interests of these defendants as well as 
the interests of the plaintiffs ; the justifications include providing repose 
from old claims, protecting the legal system from stale claims ,  and re­
ducing forum shopping. Indeed, concern about these policy implica­
tions thwarted congressional efforts to modify the limitations period 
after Lamp]. Thus, there was a cost to retaining the cases rendered 
untimely by the Lamp] holding. 
Lamp] also illustrates the fact-specific nature of reliance interests. 
Although the shortened limitations period rendered a variety of cases 
untimely, presumably the only plaintiffs with reliance-based claims of 
unfairness were the plaintiffs whose filings were not timely under 
Lampf but who, had they anticipated it ,  could have met the limitations  
period designated by the Lampf decision .  Many of  the claims rendered 
untimely by Lamp] were simply discovered after the three-year statute 
of repose ; plaintiffs could not have filed these claims in a timely man­
ner even with 2 0 - 2 0  foresight. Therefore ,  a reliance  argument cannot 
j ustify protection of these plaintiffs ; their decision to file outside of the 
three-year period was not made in reliance upon an e rroneous under­
standing of the law, but was constrained by their ability to ascertain 
the existence of a claim. As for the plaintiffs who would have been 
able to meet the Lampf deadline,  protecting the reliance-based interest 
2 20 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1 9 9 1 ,  Pub.  L. No. 1 0 2 - 2 4 2 , 
§ 4 7 6 ,  105  Stat. 2 2 36 ,  2 387  (codified at 1 5  U.S .C.  � 7 8 aa- 1 ( 1 994)) (adding  section 2 7A to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1 934). 
2 2 1  See, e .g. , 1 3 7  CoNe. REc. S 1 86 2 4  (daily ed. Nov. 2 7 ,  1 9 9 1 )  (statement of  Sen.  B ryan) 
(describing proposed section 2 7 A as "only addressing the most immediate problem - the unfair 
application of the Supreme Court's Lampf decision to cases that were pending at the time that 
the decision came down" and stating that Congress was "correcting some of  the most serious 
adverse affects [sic] the Lampf decision has wreaked upon pending cases") ; 13 7 CoNG. REC. 
H I I 8 I I  (daily ed. Nov. 2 6 .  1 9 9 1 )  (statement of Rep .  Dingell) (describing Lampf as producing a 
"completely unfair result  [that] undermines the reliance of parties on preceden t  and significantly 
u ndermines the principle of stare decisis"); 1 3 7  CoNe . REc. S w6 9 1  (daily ed.  July 2 3 ,  1 9 9 1 )  (state­
ment of Sen. B ryan) C'[T]he Lampf decision wi l l  result in the dismissal of a great num ber of 
legitimate cases currently under l i tigation .  Plaintiffs who have made good faith efforts to fi le suits 
under current law will  see their cases evaporate due to new conditions i mposed by the Supreme 
Court  - conditions that cannot possibly be met. "). 
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of  plaintiffs who knowingly delayed filing i s  arguably inappropriate, 
although a variety of factors influence the decision of when to file a 
claim. 
The uncertain vitality of the old rule in Lampf further weakens the 
case for protecting the plaintiffs ' reliance interests .  The decision fol­
lowed a period of several years during which the rules governing stat­
utes  of limitations for private actions implied under federal law were 
in flux. In decisions outside the securities law area, the Court had 
signaled its dissatisfaction with the old procedures . 2 2 2  These decisions 
led several lower courts to question the merit of borrowing a limita­
tions period for federal securities fraud from state law . 2 2 3  The rule 
eventually adopted by the Lampf Court - borrowing a limitations pe­
riod from another section of the federal securities laws - was antici­
pated in some lower court decisions . 2 2 4  These indications  that the law 
was unsettled limit the degree to which the Lampf decision can be 
characterized as an unfair surprise .  
More generally, Lampf exemplifies the imprecision with which line­
drawing between retroactive and prospective application addresses re­
liance interests. Even if the Lampf decision had been nominally pro­
spective , it would have applied to all cases that had not yet been filed. 
Not even section 2 7 A addressed Lampf's application to unfiled cases .  
Consequently, Lampf irrevocably eliminated the ability of some pro­
spective plaintiffs - specifically those plaintiffs for whom the pre­
Lamp! limitations period had not yet expired as of the date of the 
Lampf decision - to file claims . To the extent that these plaintiffs 
had relied on the old limitations period, their reliance interest does not 
appear to be different or less compelling than that of plaintiffs whose 
cases were pending. Protection of both reliance interests would require 
not only that Congress exempt pending cases from the new rule , but 
also that it provide a transition period to allow potential plaintiffs to 
file their claims. 
In sum, the Lampf decision illustrates the practical and theoretical 
difficulties of basing temporal line-drawing on principles of fairness. 
Although the Court has not acknowledged these shortcomings, Lampf 
itself exemplifies the Court 's  dwindling effort to address fairness con­
cerns through retroactivity doctrine . In Reynoldsville Casket , the 
Court clarified this position, expressly indicating that fairness and reli-
222 See,  e.g. , Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs . ,  Inc . ,  483 U .S .  1 4 3 ,  r s 6  ( 1 988 )  
(holding that the Clayton Act  provided a better source than state law for borrowing a limitations 
period for a claim u nder RICO);  Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S .  1 5 1 ,  
r 7 1 -72  ( 1 983 )  (holding that federal Jaw provided a better source than state law for borrowing a 
statute of l imitations for a federal statutory labor claim) .  
2 23 See Fisch,  supra note 1 3 5 ,  at S r o6-o8 . 
224 See,  e .g. , In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig. , 843 F . 2d  1 5 3 7 ,  1 549 (Jd Cir .  1 988 )  (en bane) 
(adopting a u niform federal l imitations period for rob-s claims). 
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ance interests provide insufficient j ustification for adj udicative 
nonretroactivity.  2 25 
The retroactivity of the Lampf decision can be defe nded on  effi­
ciency grounds . Indeed, retroactive application may appear p resump­
tively appropriate on the theory that Lampf reflects the correct 
statutory interpretation of federal securities law and that continued ap­
plication of pre-Lampf limitations periods to previously filed cases 
would require courts to apply bad law.2 26  Retroactive application has 
the further advantage of avoiding differential treatmen t  b ased on  sub­
j ective factors, such as the degree of individual plaintiffs ' knowledge 
or reliance .  As the application of Chevron Oil principles illustrates ,  
the case-specific reliance inquiry in statute of limitations cases is un­
workable . Moreover, as indicated above , the section 2 7 A distinction 
between filed and unfiled cases is completely arbitrary. However ,  as 
Congress observed in enacting section 2 7 A, retroactive application of 
Lampf could frustrate the underlying objectives of the federal securi­
ties laws. Particularly problematic in Lampf was the fact that retroac­
tive application allowed perpetrators of securities fraud scandals to 
escape accountability and to impose the costs of their wrongdoing on 
the general public . 2 2 7  This public cost of retroactive application was 
central to the congressional decision to overrule the retroactive appli­
cation of Lampf. 2 28 
III. RETROACTIVITY AND LEGAL C HANGE 
Retroactivity doctrine has been fundamentally influenced by the 
legal process school. The legal process school, exemplified by the work 
of Lon L. Fuller, 2 2 9  Henry M. Hart, Jr . ,  and Albert M.  Sacks,230 em­
barked on a search for process-based principles23 1  by which to assign 
Z2 S  See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, r rs S. Ct. 1 74 5 ,  1 749 ( 1 995 ) .  But  cj id. at 1 7 5 2  
(Kennedy, J. ,  concurring i n  the judgment) (arguing that i n  some extraordinary cases "courts may 
shape relief in light of disruption of important reliance intr.rests or the unfairness caused by unex­
pected j udicial decisions"). 
2 2 6  See TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F .  Supp. 5 8 7 , 592 (E.D. La. 1 99 2 )  ("The l imitations pe­
riod ' found ' in Lampf thus did not represent a change in  the law, but rather, a mere c larification 
what the law has always been [sic]. Courts such a.s the Fifth Circuit, which h ad previously ap­
plied other limitations periods to section ro(b) claims ,  had thus clone so in  error . ") ,  rev'd on other 
gmunds sub nom. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 997 F . z d  39  ( 5 th Cir .), 
affd sub nom. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co .. 5 1  r U.S .  6 58  ( 1 994). 
2 2 7  See Fisch, supra note 1 3 5 ,  at S 1 1 3 .  
2 2 8  See id. 
2 2 9  See, e.g. , FULLER, supra note q 2 ;  Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of A djudication,  
92  HARV. L. REV. 353 ( ! 978) .  
230 See, e .g. , HART & SACKS, supm note r .  
23 1 See Akhil Reed Amar, Law S tory,  roz HARV. L .  REv. 688 ,  69 r ( 1 989) (book review) ("The 
iegal process school focuses primary attention on who is, or ought, to make a given legal decision, 
and how that decision is, or ought ,  to be made.") .  
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responsibilities within the legal system. 232  Such principles were 
thought to be divorced from political influences and thus defensible 
independent of ideology. 233 
The influence of the legal process approach can be seen in retroac­
tivity doctrine ' s  effort to resolve the temporal application of legal 
change by reference to the institutional process through which the 
change occurred.234 The bright-line principle that j udicial lawmaking 
is retroactive and legislation is prospective235  is ostensibly neutral in 
application and lends a process-based conception of legitimacy to rules 
adopted in conformity with it. If the nature of adjudication is back­
ward-looking, then the retroactivity of judicial lawmaking is difficult 
to attack as unfair or inappropriate . Similarly, if the nature of legisla­
tion is forward-looking, then distinguishing between those affected by 
the adoption of a new statute and those whose conduct predated the 
statute ' s  effective date does not seem arbitrary. 
Subsequent scholars disagreed both with the descriptive claim that 
the legal process approach was value-neutral and with the substantive 
principles underlying its claimed legitimacy.236 The critical legal stud­
ies movement, for example, argued that the supposedly neutral princi­
ples of process were simply a means to mask the exercise of political 
power. 237  Moreover, the procedures that appeared promising for 
23 2 This description is based on a synthesis of the efforts of Ful ler, Hart, and Sacks .  Each 
author had his own emphasis and approach ,  however. Fuller dealt to a large extent with the 
legislative process, and Hart and Sacks focused on adj udication. Fuller ' s  theory sought to identify 
the principles legitimizing the legal system, see Fuller, supra note 2 2 9 , at 3 64-6 5 ;  Hart and Sacks 
were less interested in affirmatively constraining lawmaking power than in  examining the conse­
quences of  allocating that power between i nstitutions, see HART & SACKS, supra note I ,  at 
I 5 8-74 . 
23 3  S ee, e .g. , Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, T h e  Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
i'vficmanalysis of Institutions, I09 HARV. L .  REv. I 393 ,  I 396 ( r gg6 )  (describing the legal process 
effort to formulate neutral principles independertt of substantive ideology). 
234 The legal process school considered j udicial lawmaking to be different from legislation in 
procedure rather than in content; courts can only use certain types of procedure in adopting legal 
rules and can only address certain types of  legal problems. See, e .g. ,  John Hasnas, Back to  the 
Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to 1l1iss the Point of 
the Indeterminacy Argumen t ,  45 DuKE L .J. 84 ,  92  ( I 99 5 )  (identifying procedural centrality as the 
legal process school ' s  distinction between j udicial tasks and the tasks of a democratically elected 
legislature); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in  the 1950's , 2 I U .  MICH. J.L. REFORM s 6 r ,  5 6 6-?2  
( 1 988)  (describing the centrality of  procedural rather than content-based limitations i n  the  legal 
process approach) .  In particular, Hart and Sacks espoused a theory in which the principle of 
"reasoned elaboration" constrained decisional law .  S ee, e .g. , HART & SACKS, supra note I ,  at 
I 43-s s .  
235  Ful ler explicitly included retroactive legislation as one o f  his eight elements o f  immorality 
in the law, thus grounding the general rule of prospective legislation in a moral norm. See 
FuLU�R, supm note I7  2 ,  at 5 I -62 . 
236 See  Rubin , supra note 2 3 3 ,  at I 398-I402 (describing efforts by the law and economics and 
critical legal studies movements to discredit the legal process school). 
23 7  See id. at I 40 I ;  see also Daniel B .  Rodriguez, The Su bstance of the New Legal Process,  7 7  
CAL. L.  REv. 9 I 9 , 943-44 ( I 989)  (book review) (describing how critical legal studies scholars re­
vealed shortcomings in  the legal process school ' s  effort to be apolitical). 
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resolving private two-party disputes could not be applied as  readily to 
the political and social policy struggles of the Cold War era and the 
c ivil rights movement.23s 
These shortcomings are mirrored more generally in  existing retro­
activity analysis . 2 39  The substantive objectives of fairness and effi­
ciency are , to a large degree , incommensurate . 2 40 Even if one accepts 
the overly simplistic conclusion that prospective legal change is more 
fair and retroactive legal change more efficient, there is no obvious 
way to balance or choose between these factors. In the absence of a 
specification of substantive values of the sort that the legal process 
school sought to avoid, a process-based approach to retroactivity is in­
conclusive .  This result may be unsurprising given the characterization 
of retroactivity doctrine as a subspecies of choice of law doctrine , 2 4 1 
which is itself arguably indeterminate . 242 The result is nonetheless 
unsatisfying. 
In recent years , the legal process school has reemerged as an influ­
ence in academic discourse .  A group of scholars, sometimes described 
as engaged in the "new legal process , "  has sought to combine the pro­
cess orientation of Hart and Sacks with newer insights provided by 
law and economics, critical legal studies, and public choice theory. 2 43 
The new movement is an effort to respond both to those who criticize 
law as indeterminate and to those who describe the lawmaking process 
as the naked exercise of political power. It attempts to integrate a 
structural approach with an understanding of the manner in which 
various sources of power, including market power and political power, 
impact the legal structure . 244 
This integration offers particular promise for retroactivity analysis .  
In viewing retroactivity as a choice of law question,  the traditional 
legal process approach has cabined the temporal question within a 
framework that is ,  for the most part, devoid of substantive value j udg­
ments about either the external principles and policies motivating legal 
238 See Rodriguez , supra note 2 3 7 ,  at 943-44 . 
239  Although Hart and Sacks addressed questions of retroactive lawmaking i n  The Legal Pro­
cess and recognized that their broader theory of adjudication blurred the traditional l ine between 
adjudication and legislation , see, e .g. , HART & SACKS,  supra note r ,  at 34 r-44,  5 14- I S ,  they made 
no effort to resolve the implications of their theory for retroactivity princ iples . 
240 S ee, e . g. , Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U .  L. 
R�::v. 4 ,  68 ( 1 994) (describing equity and efficiency as normative goals that, within the neoclassical 
model, "must be traded against each other ") . 
24 1 See, e .g , James B .  Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 5or  U .S .  5 2 9 , 5 34-35 ( 1 9 9 1 )  (plural ity 
opinion) (stating that " retroactivity is properly seen in the first instance as a matter of choice of 
law"); McNulty, supra note 8 r ,  at 5 8-5 9 (describ ing retroactivity as a choice of law issue). 
242 See, e .g. , Joseph vVilliam Singer , Real Conflicts , 6g B . U .  L. REV. r ,  6 ( r g S g )  (stating that 
"modern choice-of-law analysis is i ndeterminate"). 
2 43 See Rubin, supra note 2 3 3 ,  at 1 406-2 9 (characterizing various modern academic approaches 
as variations on a new legal process approach) .  
244 See id. at 1 4 1  r-33 . 
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change o r  the manner in  which legal change occurs. An examination 
of the jurisprudence of legal change can be used to formulate a 
predominantly process-based approach to retroactivity. 
The first section of this Part develops the concept of a jurispru­
dence of legal change and distinguishes the process of legal change 
from the external criteria against which legal change is typically evalu­
ated .  The second section uses the tools of the new legal process to 
develop a process-oriented construct, equilibrium theory, as a means of 
contextualizing legal change . Finally, the third section uses equilib­
rium theory to deconstruct the implications of retroactivity for relative 
institutional power in effecting legal change. 
A. The Jurisprudence of Legal Change 
Retroactivity analysis involves an assessment of the appropriate 
consequences of legal change . The jurisprudence of legal change can 
be divided into two questions: the positive question of how legal 
change occurs, and the normative question of how it should occur. 
Each of these two inquiries can be subdivided into three further com­
ponents: the external principles against which legal change is evalu­
ated, the impetus for the change , and the manner by which the change 
is implemented.  
The majority of modern jurisprudential theories are directed at the 
external principles underlying law and legal change . Both the law and 
economics theory of law as driven by market forces and the philosoph­
ical theory of legal reform based on John Rawls 's  A Theory of Jus­
tice245 provide external criteria by which to evaluate legal change .  
Similarly, the classic debate between natural law and positivism fo­
cuses on the extent to which legal rules are distinct from moral princi­
ples external to the legal system. 2 46 This Article does not consider the 
underlying substantive evaluation of legal change , but focuses instead 
on the process by which legal change, however motivated ,  occurs . 
The implementation of the principles motivating legal change is 
distinct from the source of those principles ,  yet the former issue has 
received relatively little attention . Herbert Hovenkamp has reflected 
on the characterization of legal change as evolutionary - incremental, 
cumulative ,  and connected through time in the sense that subsequent 
245  JOHN R;.WLS, A THEORY O F  ]USTICE ( 1 9 7 1 ) . 
246 See,  e .g. , H .L.A. Hart, Positivism and the S epamtion of Law and lvl orals , 7 1  HARV. L .  
REv. 5 9 3 ,  6 2 1-24 ( 1 95 8 )  (defending positivism 's distinction between what law is and what it 
should be); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart , 7 1  
HARV. L .  REv. 630, 644-48 ( 1 958)  (criticizing Hart for overlooking the ways i n  which morality 
informs all law); see also Anthony ].  Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054 
passim ( 1 995 )  (describing the historical and analytical distinctions among positivism, legal realism, 
natural law, and the legal process school). 
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developments build upon e arlier systems . 2 4 7  A c cord ing  to 
Hovenkamp, a variety of evolutionary jurisprudential theories ,  some of 
which are b ased on Darwinian principles ,  use natural selection to ex­
plain how improvements will be preserved and inferior developments 
weeded out. 2 48 Vincent Wellman provides an additional layer of anal­
ysis by subdividing evolutionary jurisprudential theories according to 
their developmental nature . Wellman categorizes developmental evolu­
tion as "teleological" and explains that teleology is distinctive because 
of " its idea of development because of or toward some identified goal, 
value ,  purpose or final point. "249 
The competing view is to characterize legal change as revolution­
ary in the sense that connotes a sudden and substantial alteration of 
the status quo . Hovenkamp states :  "[The ]  theory of legal evolution en­
ables one to avoid its more imposing cousin, legal revolution, by 
presenting legal change as continuous and connected through time ."2 50 
Hovenkamp describes revolutionary legal change as a " fallacy" because 
of its unarticulated normative assumption that evolutionary legal 
change is inherently legitimate : "[Evolutionary theory (incorrectly) sug­
gests] that the law is always improving. Every change is self-pro­
claimed to be  for the better . "2S 1 
Although traditional retroactivity doctrine is not tied to a jurispru­
dential conception of legal change , the rhetoric about e fficiency and 
equity in the analytical debate masks an underlying fissure between 
efficiency advocates and fairness advocates concerning the nature of 
legal change . Efficiency advocates adhere to the neoclassical law and 
economics conception of legal change : changes in law reflect incremen­
tal reforms in accordance with externally derived principles such as 
wealth maximization. 25 2 This view supports the efficiency preference 
for retroactivity. To the extent that legal change is incremental and 
predictable , the equitable arguments for notice and reliance appear 
247  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Fedemlism Revised,  34 HASTINGS L.]. 2 0 1 ,  2 1 $- 1 6  ( ! 9 8 2 )  (book 
review). 
248 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in  Ju rispmdence , 64 TEX. L.  REV. 6 4 5 ,  
646-4 7  ( 1 9 8 5 ). 
249 Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections o n  a Them·y of Contract ,  
41  U. MIAMI L.  REv. 9 2 5 , 95 7 n . r 1 8  ( 1 98 7 ) .  
250 Hovenkamp, supm note 2 4 7 ,  a t  2 1 5 .  
2 S i  fd. at 2 1 5-1 6 .  
2 5 2  Richard Posner i s  frequently credited with being the first to propose that common law 
developments are systematicaliy efficient. S e e  RICHARD A.  POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS O f  
LAW ( r st ed .  1 9 7 3 ). For further discussion of this efficiency argument, see Robert Cooter & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges? ,  9 J. LEGAL STU D .  1 3 9 ,  
1 5 7  ( r 98o); John C .  Goodman, A n  Economic Theory of the Evolution of t!ze Common Law , 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 393,  3 93-94 ( 1 9 7 8); and George L.  Priest, Th e Common Law Process and the Selec­
tion of Efficient  Rules , 6 ]. LEGAL STUD. 65 , 65 ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  For a simi lar argument  regarding statu­
tory evolution, see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE G :<:NTUS OF AiVI ERICAN CORPORATE LAw 148  ( 1 993) ,  
and Ralph K. Winter, Jr. , State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the The o ry of the Corpomtion , 
6 ]. LEGAL STUD. 2 5 1 ,  2 54 ( 197 7) .  
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1ess compelling. The application of  a new legal rule to a broader class 
of cases is most justified when the new rule reflects an improvement 
over the old law. 
In contrast, fairness advocates generally doubt that legal change is 
e ither synonymous with improvement or consistent with any fixed ob­
j ective . 2 5 3  They are more apt to view legal change as the result of a 
power struggle , implementation of the values of a successful insurgent, 
or random experimentation in policy. 254 The jurisprudential theories 
of public choice255  and critical legal studies256 reflect this perspective 
and are consistent with greater mistrust of retroactive lawmaking.  In 
a legal system in which change is random or politically generated, pre­
dicting legal change is harder and burdening particular individuals 
with the costs of that change is more unfair. The lawmaker ' s  ability 
to target precisely who will bear the costs of legal change through ret­
roactive lawmaking also leads to greater concerns about retaliation or 
oppression if legal change is politically motivated . 2 5 7  
This conflict about the manner of legal change , once exposed, 
threatens to turn the debate over retroactivity rules into a debate over 
the relative merits, positive or normative , of substantive jurispruden­
tial theories .  The effort to divorce the construction of legal structure 
from such a complex substantive debate was one of the motivating 
principles behind the legal process movement. 
An alternative approach that remains similarly faithful to neutral 
principles is to reject as unduly rigid the foregoing jurisprudence of 
legal change. It is unnecessary and unproductive to force the charac­
terization of legal change into the b inary construct of revolution versus 
evolution. Moreover, this binary construct masks the existence of two 
distinct components in the characterization of legal change : the magni­
tude of the change and the degree to which it is teleological . Although 
we typically expect an evolutionary change to be both incremental and 
2 53 See,  e .g. , Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 2 1 5 ,  at r r 6 2-65 . 
254 See,  e .g. , Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of S tare Deci­
sis , 65 CHL-KENT L.  REv. 93 ,  98 ( r g8g)  (describing legal change as a process by which ru les 
"seek to effectuate wealth transfers from societal groups that possess relatively little political 
power to other, more powerful, groups and coalitions"); Ramseyer & N akazato, supra note 2 r 5 ,  at 
I I 6 2-65 (describing legal changes as politically generated reorderings of winners and losers that 
provide no net social gain). 
2 5 5  See generally DANIEL A. FARB ER & PHILIP P.  FRICKEY, LAW .-\ND PUBLIC CHuiCE 7 ( 1 9 9 1 )  
(surveying the findings of public choice theory). 
256 See generally Critical Legal S tudies Symposium,  36 STAN. L.  REv. 1 (r 984)  (disc ussing criti­
cal legal studies themes); Hasnas, supra note 234 ,  at 95-98 (same). 
2 5 7 See Harold J .  Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Law­
making, 84 CEo. L .J .  2 1 43 ,  2 1 59  ( r gg6) ;  see  also Daniel Patrick Tokaj i ,  The Persistence of PYeju­
dice: Pmcess-Based Theory and the Retroactivity of the Civil Rights A ct of I99 I ,  103 Y.-\LE L.J. 
5 6 7 ,  5 6 9-70 ( 1 993 )  (discussing how retroactive legislation can target identifiable groups for polit­
ical benefits). 
I I OO HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W [Vol . r r o : r os s  
focused m a particular direction, the two components n e e d  n o t  b e  
connected.  
This Article offers a model of legal change, understood through the 
metaphor of equilibrium, in which both revolutionary and evolutionary 
legal change are sometimes possible . Rather than characterizing legal 
change systematically according to either a substantive legal theory or 
the structural role of a particular lawmaker, as the formalist separa­
tion of powers approach attempts to do, this Article claims that legal 
changes must be evaluated individually. The Article also rejects the 
rigidity of the jurisprudential categories ,  arguing that any given 
change falls somewhere along a spectrum between revolution and 
evolution, and that assessment of the nature of the change provides a 
way to consider its temporal scope. 
It is impossible to classify a legal change in isolation ,  however. 
Herein lies a key deficiency in both the Chevron Oil and the Landgraf 
approaches to retroactivity. In analyzing the effect of a p articular new 
rule , it is necessary to consider the change in context. A legal change 
is properly characterized as evolutionary or revolutionary b ased on its 
effect upon the particular legal context into which it 1s introduced. 
Equilibrium theory provides a methodology with which to conceptual­
Ize that legal context. 
B. Equilibrium Theory and Legal Change 
The concept of law as equilibrium is a product of the legal process 
schooP58 In their pioneering work transforming the institutional com­
petence questions nascent in The Legal Process into a modern frame­
work consistent with public choice theory, Professors William Eskridge 
and Philip Frickey use a metaphor of equilibrium to describe the in­
teraction of competing institutional forces in formulating  and main­
taining public law.259  If institutions such as the courts, Congress, and 
the executive branch are viewed as competing forces , then the balance 
of those forces in producing a particular regulatory context can be de­
scribed as an equilibrium. 
The equilibrium concept can be extended beyond the Eskridge and 
Frickey construct of institutional equilibrium. This Article borrovvs 
the use of equilibrium as a metaphor; rather than focusing on the bal­
ance between institutions, however, the Article follows the direction of 
\1\loodrow Wilson and Felix Cohen260 and looks to physics for an alter-
2 5 8 See Wil liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P .  Frickey, The Supreme Cow·t, 1 993 Te rm - Fore­
<.vord: Law as Equilibrium , ro8 HARV. L. REv. 2 6 ,  2 7 -2 9 ( 1 994) .  
759  See id.  at 30-4 2 .  
2 60 See WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVE:Rl'i!v!ENT IN THE Ut\:ITED STAT ES 54-55  
( I go8 )  (relating the traditional constitutional theory of checks and balances to the Newtonian 
physics idea of creating order through the balance of  opposing forces); see also Cohen, s upm note 
r 7  3, at 82 i (analogizing j urisprudence to modern physics). 
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native equilibrium conception to describe the stability of a regulatory 
context. 2 6 1  
In  physics ,  as in Eskridge and Frickey ' s  model, a balance of forces 
produces equilibrium. 2 62 The state of equilibrium can be described as 
a coming to rest in which there is no tendency to change . 2 6 3  Equilib­
ria are further characterized according to the property of stability. 2 64 
A stable equilibrium is one that tends to return to the same resting 
point if disturbed by a change in relevant forces . 2 65 An unstable equi­
librium, in contrast, will not endure or  return if disturbed but moves 
readily to a different equilibrium position . 2 66 The explanation for the 
stability of an equilibrium position lies in its potential energy. In a 
stable equilibrium, potential energy is at a minimum. B ecause work is 
required to displace the equilibrium position, displacement is unlikely. 
In an unstable equilibrium, potential energy is at a maximum.267  
Thus,  internal energy is available to move to a new position once a 
disturbance occurs . 26s  
A simple example illustrates these concepts .  A coin can be placed 
in three possible equilibrium positions :  heads, tails, or balanced on its 
edge. All three are equilibria because the coin will not move if noth­
ing changes in the forces acting upon the coin - wind, gravity, and so 
forth . Heads and tails are stable equilibria because, even if the coin is 
disturbed slightly, it has a tendency to return to the original position .  
In contrast, the coin on its  edge is literally and figuratively unstable . 
A disturbance will move the coin away from its equilibrium position,  
2 6 1  The physical and social sciences are rich with equilibrium theories. S ee, e . g. , K ENNETH B .  
HARVt:Y & G E RALD B .  PORTER, INTRODUCTION TO PHVSIC.-\L INORGANIC C H D·l bTRY 2 84-95 
( 1 963)  (describing equ ilibrium in the context of  thermodynamics); A RTHUR. ] .  V.-\NDER, }.-\ �I ES H .  
SHERMAN & DoR.OTH Y S.  LUCIANO, HUIVIA:--i PI-1\'SIOLOGY: THr: MECHAN IS�IS O F  B o D Y  FuNC­
TION 83, r r 6 ,  133 (4th ed. 1 98 5 )  (discussing chemical, diffusion, and osmotic equilbria); PAU L 
\VONNACOTT & RONALD WONNACOTT, ECONOMICS 5 1 -5 2 (4th ed . 1 990) (describing demand/sup­
ply equilibrium). 
2 62 The forces acting upon an object are in balance when the sum of  those forces is zero. S ee, 
e.g. , DOUG LAS C. G!ANCOLI, PHYSICS: PRINCIPLES WITH APPLICATIONS 1 6 1  ( 2 d  ed. 1 98 5 ). 
2 63 See, e.g. , THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS 406 (Robert M. Besancon eel . ,  3d ed. 1 98 5 )  
("[E]quilibrium i s  obtained i f  the system does not tend to undergo any further change o f  its own 
accord. Any further change must be produced by external means.") . 
2 64 Eskridge and Frickey define a stable equilibrium as one in  which "no implementing institu­
tion is able to interpose a new view without being overridden by another institution." Eskridge & 
Frickey, supra note 2 5 8 ,  at 3 2 .  
2 65 See, e .g. , FREDERIC K ].  KELLER, PHYSICS 20 2  ( z d  ed .  1 993) .  
2 66 See id. Quantum physics may provide an even better analogy to legal change than classi­
cal physics. Under quantum theory, only certain levels of energy, known as quanta, are capable 
of being transferred to a system and thus disturbing an equilibrium. S ee, e .g. , P.vV.  ATKT:-\S, 
QUANTA : A H.".:-\DBOOK OF CONCEPTS 1 8 8-89 ( 1 9 74) .  Two aspects of quantum theory are also 
applicable to legal change: the requirement that forces accumulate to a point at which they are 
capable of producing change, and the observation that fractional components of the necessary 
quanta are insufficient to produce a change. 
2 67  See 1 ROR E RT RESNICK & DAVID HAL LIDAY, PHYSICS 2 9 1  (3d ed. 1 9 i i ). 
268 See id. 
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most likely causing i t  to fall into one o f  the two stable equilibrium 
positions. The concept of stability, even in the simple example of the 
coin, need not be absolute . A coin lying flat is in a stable equilibrium, 
but the coin will nonetheless be irrevocably disturbed if the table upon 
which it rests collapses.  A larger and less predictable disturbance is 
thus required to do the work necessary to disturb a stable equilibrium 
than to disturb an unstable one . Using the terminology of the previous 
section, we can associate disturbance of a stable equilibrium with rev­
olutionary change. In an unstable equilibrium, evolutionary change is 
sufficient to produce a new position. 
Applying these concepts to legal change, a given regulatory context 
can be viewed as a legal equilibrium and described as stable or  unsta­
ble based on its response to a disturbance .  If legal treatment of an 
issue is in a state of stable equilibrium, the legal regime is not readily 
changed through small or incremental shifts in political forces - the 
type of shifts associated with evolutionary legal change.  We can view 
stability as an indication that potential energy, the forces tending to 
produce legal change , is at a minimum. Accordingly, a stable equilib­
rium requires a significant influx of energy to produce a new legal 
context - the effort associated with revolutionary legal change. 
Changes in legal rules can be expected in an unstable legal equilib­
rium, by contrast, because of its inherent potential for change . The 
magnitude of force necessary to produce a disturbance i s  modest. Ac­
cordingly, revolutionary legal change is not required to d isturb an un­
stable equilibrium; evolutionary change is sufficient. 
Characterizing a legal context as a stable or an unstable equilib­
rium is a proxy for evaluating the nature of the disturbance created by 
regulatory change . In contrast to previous efforts to understand legal 
change in terms of a new rule , such as the Chevron Oil test, equilib­
rium analysis focuses on the contextual setting. By analyzing legal 
context in terms of equilibrium theory, we can determine whether a 
particular legal change should be viewed as evolutionary or revolution­
ary. This assessment can then be used to formulate transition policy. 
Vvhether one characterizes a particular legal context as stable or 
unstable is crucial. This Article develops the use of stable equilibrium 
as a legal standard for retroactivity analysis. A particular legal context 
is in stable equilibrium when the applicable legal rules are clear, have 
been promulgated by a higher legal authority, have persisted over time 
and in a variety of specific cases, and have not been widely criticized 
or questioned by lawmakers with comparable authority. The extent to 
which the government has attempted to induce reliance upon th e legal 
status quo may also be relevant . 269  
2 6 9  Commentators dispute the degree to  which the government should be permitted to make 
binding commitments about the legal consequences of transactions. Government commitment can 
be seen as an effort to tie the hands of future lawmakers and as an impediment  to the operation 
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The foregoing factors characterizing a stable equilibrium are 
closely linked to the evolutionary/revolutionary characterizations of 
legal change described above . If a rule has persisted over time,  if it 
has been applied in a range of cases, and if its contours have been set 
by a high lawmaking authority, then the rule is more difficult to 
change .  People become accustomed to rules that have persisted over a 
period of time , 2 70 and supplanting rules that have become widely 
known and understood creates an educational cost. Rules enacted by 
a higher authority are costlier to change as a matter of simple mechan­
ics. The process associated with the Supreme Court overruling its 
own previous decision is more protracted and uncertain than the pro­
cess of changing a rule created by a lower court; similarly, Congress 
cannot enact a replacement statute as easily as an administrative 
agency can amend its rules .  When legal change in a higher authority ' s  
rule i s  accomplished, the adoption of the change indicates a greater 
force ,  or a different type of impetus, than that associated with incre­
mental development, correction, and similar evolutionary processes. 
These factors do not establish a bright-line rule . The stability of 
regulatory context is a matter of degree ,  and, in any given case, indi­
vidual factors may point in opposite directions. This complexity 
makes equilibrium theory particularly useful for retroactivity analysis, 
however, because the theory's  quantitative nature parallels the nonbi­
nary nature of retroactivity. A standard-based approach also permits 
application of various factors without the specification of arbitrarily 
precise criteria. 2 7 1 
Two examples demonstrate that the absence of a clear line separat­
ing stable and unstable equilibria does not indicate indeterminacy. 2 7 2 
The first example is the determination of the statute of limitations for 
of democratic principles. Nonetheless, the government's ability to commit may be efficient for the 
same reasons that private party commitment is efficient. Commitment can increase the influence 
of rules on primary conduct by ensuring that transactions undertaken within the bounds of the 
existing regulatory scheme will receive th10 anticipated legal benefits of that scheme. See,  e.g. , 
Ramseyer & N akazato, supra note 2 I s ,  at I I 5 8 ,  I I iO (arguing that laws can be viewed as binding 
commitments by Congress and t:1at such commitments may be socially desirable). Resolution of 
this debate is beyond the scope of this Articie, which does not take a normative position on the 
use of retroactivity policy to facilitate government commitment. 
Situations in  which the government has deliberately attempted to induce reliance on the stabil­
ity of its rules are simpler. Because a stable equilibrium may promote regulatory objectives, the 
government's affirmative effort to establish stability should be reflected in  the equilibrium analy­
sis. This result could be achieved through a variety of approaches, such as holding the govern­
ment accountable under a quasi-contract or regulatory estoppel theory. 
2 70 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, sos U .S .  833 ,  856  ( I 99 2 )  ("[F]or two decades of economic 
and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that de­
fine their vievvs of themselves and their places in  society, in  reliance on the availability of abor­
tion in the event that contraception should fai l . ") .  
2 i  1 See HART & SACKS, supra note I ,  at qo.  
2 7 2  Unlike an effort to  predict the  resolution of an area of legal uncertainty, the  characteriza­
tion of equilibrium status is not prej udiced if conducted after the fact. A court can examine 
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a private claim of federal securities fraud, as addressed b y  the 
Supreme Court 's  decision in Lampf. Prior to Lampf, the rules specify­
ing the statute of limitations applicable to a cause of  action implied 
under a federal statute were unclear . With respect to federal securities 
fraud claims, application of the "old rule" of borrowing from state law 
did not provide clarity in the law because of ambiguity about which 
limitations period to borrow and about whether to borrow equitable 
provisions such as tolling doctrines also.  27 3 Dozens of lower court de­
cisions repeatedly examined the limitations question and came to dif­
ferent conclusions regarding which principles to apply . 2 7 4  
Before the Lampf decision ,  neither Congress nor  the Supreme 
Court had made an authoritative statement regarding the appropriate 
procedure for determining the statute of limitations in federal securi­
ties fraud cases or the appropriate limitations period itself. The cir­
cuits that had spoken to the question had reached  different  
conclusions . 2 7 5  Commentators disagreed about the actual state of the 
law276 and the ideal limitations period . 2 7 7  Thus, when Lampf adopted 
a new rule of limitations for federal securities fraud ,  the rule did not 
disturb a stable equilibrium. 
Examination of the legal context of aiding and abetting liability in 
connection with securities fraud claims leads to the opposite result. 
The Supreme Court eliminated aiding and abetting liability for securi­
ties fraud claims in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank . 2 7 8 Prior to 
the Court ' s  decision, the availability of an implied private right of ac­
tion for aiding and abetting securities fraud appeared to be settled :  
every circuit that had addressed the question had upheld the existence  
of such a claim.n9 The Securities and Exchange Commission consist­
ently assumed the existence of aiding and abetting liability in de­
ploying its enforcement authority.280 Explicit statements in two 
congressional reports acknowledged the existence of aiding and abet-
sources contemporaneous with the legal change, such as scholarly literature, lower court decisions, 
and legislative debate, to characterize the legal context. 
2 73 See Fisch, supra note 1 3 5 ,  at S r o3-04 . 
2 7 4 See id. at S r o6-o8 . 
l i S  See id. 
2 i6  See, e . g. , LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELI GiV!AN, FUNDAMENTALS OF S F: C U RITI ES REGULATION 
I I 2 0 (3d eel. I 99 5 )  (noting a trend toward the use of state b lue sky laws prior to 1 99 1 ); Arthur  F .  
Matthews, Shifting the Burden of Losses i n  the SecUJ·ities Markets: The Role of Civil RICO in 
S ecw-ities Litigation , 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 896, 924  ( 1 990) (noting an emerging trend toward 
borrowing the express limitations period in  other sections of the 1 934 Act). 
2 7 7  See, e .g. , Committee on Fed. Regulation of Sec. ,  Report of the Task Force on S tatute  of 
Limitations for Implied Actions , 4 I Bus. LAw. 645 , 658 ( r  986 )  (advocatin g  congressional legisla­
tion setting the limi tation at two years from discovery of the violation, with a four-year absolute 
cut-off). 
2 78 S I I  U.S .  I 64 ,  ! 7 6-?8  ( 1 994) .  
2 79 See id .  at 192 & n .  I (Stevens, ] . ,  dissenting) (noting that only the D.C. Circuit  had not 
confronted the issue directly). 
280 See id. at r 9 7 -98 . 
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ting liability and noted its consistency with the remedial purposes of 
the securities laws. 281 Few commentators questioned the existence of 
the cause of action ,  although some questioned whether it was based on 
a fair reading of the statute .282 The litigants in the Central B ank case 
themselves had not considered the issue worthy of Supreme Court re­
view; the Court directed the parties to brief the question.283 Accord­
ingly, the legal status of aiding and abetting liability was in a stable 
equilibrium, which the Central Bank decision disrupted .  284 
C. Equilibrium Theory and Retroactivity 
I. Retroactivity Rules for S table E quilibria. - A stable equilib­
rium can be disrupted, but only through the application of substantial 
force . Legal change in a stable equilibrium is characterized by para­
digmatic or political shifts rather than by clarification or mere error 
correction. These characteristics are inconsistent with the foundational 
assumptions of incrementalism and improvement on which economic 
arguments about the efficiency of retroactivity are based. 
The existence of a stable equilibrium justifies the protection of reli­
ance-based interests . A longstanding legal rule that has engendered 
agreement among lawmakers and has been consistently and frequently 
applied is relatively predictable, and people 's  reliance on such a rule 
in planning their conduct is reasonable . That reliance imposes a cost 
on legal change . Protection of reliance is more efficient in the context 
of a stable equilibrium because the costs of compliance with existing 
legal rules - predicting the legal consequences of a planned transac­
tion - are small . 2 85 Greater compliance creates uniformity and cer­
tain ty in transactions ,  discourages opportunistic behavior ,  and 
enhances the ability of legal rules to influence primary conduct. This 
argument also has a normative component. Stability and predictability 
in the law reflect values that are worthy of independent protection.  
Z8 l  See H.R .  REP. No. r oo-9 r o ,  a t  2 7  n . 2 3  ( 1 988)  (noting that express preclusion of respondeat 
superior liability u nder the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1 988 does 
not affect the availability of aiding and abetting liability); H.R. REP. No. 98-3 5 5 ,  at ro ( 1 983 )  
(advocating " the  j udicial application of  the concept of aiding and abetting liability to  achieve the 
remedial purposes of the securities laws"). 
Z8 2  See, e .g. , Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section ro(b) of the S ecurities Act  
of I934 , 69 CAL. L. REv.  So,  83 ( 1 98 1 )  (arguing that the  imposition of secondary liabi lity i s  i ncon­
sistent with the statutory language and legislative history). 
2 83 See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, soS U .S .  9 59 ,  959 ( 1 993)  (granting certiorari and 
ordering the parties to address the additional question "[w]hether there is an implied private right 
of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section w(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1 934 and SEC Rule rob-s "). 
284 See Strauss, supra note 1 5 9 , at 5 1 2 -13  (arguing that 18 years of congressional acquiescence 
in  judicial imposition of secondary liabil ity suggested "solidified consensus" about the status quo). 
285  See, e .g. , Cass, supra note 3, at 960 (arguing that predictability reduces the costs of deci­
sionmaking and increases societal well-being by permitting individual behavior to adj ust) . 
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Finally, the government engenders greater respect for its laws and 
its lawmaking institutions if it can commit to the stability of its laws.  
A commitment to stability can increase the ability of rules to influence 
primary behavior by ensuring that transactions undertaken within the 
dictates of the existing regulatory scheme will receive consistent legal 
treatment in the future . 2 86 Retroactive legal change undercuts this 
commitment. Those who have worked to secure the legal change ob­
tain a windfall if the change is subsequently applied to pending or  
completed transactions, given the relative inability of the counterparty 
to those transactions to anticipate the change and protect itself 
contractually. 
These arguments suggest that, at least in the context of a stable 
equilibrium, the lawmaker should avoid retroactivity. If the lawmaker 
concludes that the law is in a stable equilibrium and that the legal 
change is sufficient to disturb that equilibrium, the lawmaker should 
consider minimizing the costs of disruption by limiting the temporal 
application of the new rule or otherwise providing transition relief. 
B ecause the costs of disruption are similar whenever a new rule has 
retroactive effects ,  this approach should not be limited to rules that 
are explicitly retroactive . 
The presumption against retroactivity in a stable equilibrium does 
not bar retroactivity completely. Retroactivity may be appropriate in 
certain circumstances :  if the legal change is sufficiently small that 
e ither it does not disturb the equilibrium or the costs associated with 
the disturbance are minimal; if limited temporal application of the new 
legal rule or other transition relief adequately mitigates the impact of 
the disturbance;  or if  retroactive application is specifically necessary to 
achieve an important component of the regulatory goal that cannot be  
adequately achieved through prospective application.  
Application of this standard involves two changes in the nature of 
judicial review of legislation. First, if the legislature has failed to spec­
ify the temporal application of a new rule , equilibrium theory suggests 
that courts should affirmatively minimize the application of the rule to 
pending and prior transactions.  This expansion of the default rule 
transforms Landgraf from a narrow presumption based on textualist 
principles of statutory interpretation to a legal-process-influenced ap­
proach ,  which presumes that both nominal retroactivity and retroac­
tive effects lie outside the ordinary scope of the legislature ' s  objectives .  
Courts should assume that Congress seeks to avoid inadvertent retro­
active effects if it disrupts a stable equilibrium. 
Second, if the legislature has made an express determination of 
temporal scope, a reviewing court should focus on the degree to which 
2S6 Cf Logue, supya note I i9 ,  at I I 3 2  (arguing that tl·,e failure of the government to keep its 
tax incentive commitments results in citizens demanding a higher return before responding to 
government i ncentives). 
� 
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retroactive legislation is justified and apply the Due Process Clause 
more rigorously. Although the court should not substitute its judg­
ment for that of the legislature, two issues regarding the legislative 
judgment are particularly within judicial competence :  whether the 
temporal categories created by the rule are arbitrary in light of the 
legislative objectives ,  and the degree to which the government has 
committed itself to prior regulatory treatment. 
Consideration of these questions does not require the Court to jetti­
son its existing due process analysis. The first of these inquiries is a 
requirement of rational basis that is consistent with the current due 
process and equal protection framework.287  The second inquiry can be 
understood as a requirement of procedural due process . 2 88 When Con­
gress affirmatively invites parties to structure their transactions in reli­
ance on existing legal rules, changing these rules without notice and an 
opportunity to mitigate the effects of the change violates important 
due process principles .  
Although equilibrium theory 's  skepticism about retroactively apply­
ing rules that disrupt a stable equilibrium may superficially suggest a 
throwback to the pre-Harper acceptance of adjudicative nonretroactiv­
ity, closer analysis reveals that adjudication will rarely disturb a stable 
equilibrium. In part, this conclusion stems from the nature of the ju­
dicial function. The lawmaking power of the courts is restrained by 
their inability to control their lawmaking agenda in a way that the 
legislative power is not. Courts can make law only as a by-product of 
deciding cases and, for the most part, have little role in determining 
which issues come before them for decision .  VVithin the context of de­
ciding a particular case , courts are further constrained by the require­
ment that their rules be tied to an explicit text or to common law 
precedents . In either case, the reasoned elaboration that provides le­
gitimacy to j udge-made rules demands that a court employ accepted 
interpretive principles rather than making naked policy j udgments . 289 
:Nevertheless, adjudication sometimes bears a close resemblance to 
legislation. Decisions in which the Supreme Court overrules its own 
28 7 See, e.g. , Romer v. Evans, I I 6 S.  C t .  1 6 2 0, r 6 2 7-28 ( 1 996) (holding  that a Colorado statute 
that arbitrarily disadvantaged a single group without any rational objective for the classification 
violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
2 8S Th e  second inquiry is also similar to a breach of contract analysis. Ky!-: Logue draws an 
even stronger connection between evaluating the legitimacy of government behavior in breach ing 
an express contract and evaluating the appropriate scope of retroactive legislation concerning  tax 
incentive subsidies. See  Logue,  supra note r 7 9 ,  at I 1 3 8-5 2 .  
289 Commentators disagree on the extent to w h ich interpretive principles constrain j u d ges from 
making  policy choices.  See, e .g. , Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretati o n ,  34 STAN . L. REv. 
7 39, 7 4 z -45 (l g8 2) (argu ing that "an interpretation can be measured against a set of notms that 
transcend the particular vantage point of the person offering the interpretation"); ?au! Brest, In­
terpretation and interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 76 5 ,  7 7 1 -7 2  ( 1 98 2 )  (questioning Fiss 's  analysis and 
arguing that j udges ' backgrounds and policies affect their choice of interpretive princi pies and 
their application of those principles) .  
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precedent or fashions a new principle of constitutional law are exam­
ples of adjudication that may disrupt a stable equilibrium.  Judicial 
lawmaking that upsets a stable area of the law resembles legislation in 
both the justification for the change and the need to address the con­
sequences of the change . 2 90 To the extent that courts adopt revolution­
ary legal change , they reqmre the temporal flexib ility of  
nonretroactivity. 
The argument for allowing courts to address the consequences of 
judicially initiated legal change is particularly compelling with respect 
to constitutional legal change given the limited means of achieving 
such change outside of the courts. B ecause constitutional change fre­
quently disrupts a stable equilibrium and because the magnitude of 
many constitutional changes is high, constitutional chan ge can create 
substantial transition costs . If the Court overrules itself, these costs 
are even greater due to the reliance engendered by the prior precedent. 
William Treanor and Gene Sperling describe how judicial overrul­
ing of a prior decision of unconstitutionality can revive previously un­
enforceable statutes with no additional legislative action . 2 9 1  Treanor 
and Sperling argue that judicial overrulings should not be able to re­
vive these dormant statutes , 2 92 in part because revival would result in 
costs for the actors who have relied on the previous regime. The au­
thors identify further systematic costs of revival, including interference 
with majoritarian lawmaking  and infringement of political reliance in­
terests . 2 93 Their argument thus mirrors equilibrium theory; both seek 
to address the private and social costs associated with the retroactive 
effects of adjudication .  
2 .  Retroactivity Rules for Unstable Equilibria. - Although sta­
bility is more common, the law is replete with areas in unstable equi­
librium or a state of flux .  These areas are the most common sites of 
legal change , both because change is relatively easy in an unstable 
equilibrium and because instability frequently reflects the need for cor­
rection, clarification, or evolution . Accordingly, the majority of situa­
tions requmng application of retroactivity analysis involve the 
introduction of new rules into unstable legal equilibria. 
The presence of an unstable equilibrium indicates that legal change 
is predictable in the same way that the toppling of a coin b alanced on 
its edge is predictable . Relatively little force is needed to effect change 
in an unstable equilibrium and, once that force is applied ,  the poten-
2 90 See Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matted': Teague and New Rule s ,  6 1  U. CHI.  L .  REv. 
4 2 3 ,  4 2 7  ( 1 994) (suggesting that the Court 's  need to reconsider i ts retroactivity principles at the 
time of the Linklette1' decision was a result of the Warren Court's shift from evolutionary to 
revolutionary changes in  the law of constitu tional criminal procedure). 
2 9 1 See William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, PYOspective Ovenuling and the Revival 
of "Unconstitutional" S tatu tes ,  93 COLUi\1. L .  REV. 1 90 2 ,  1 90 2-03 ( 1 993) .  
292 See id .  at r go6-o i .  
2 93 S e e  id. a t  I 9 q- 1 8 ,  1 9 2 3-2 4 ,  1 930 .  
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tial energy within the system will drive i t  to a new equilibrium 
position.  
The likelihood of legal change in an unstable equilibrium makes 
reliance on the legal status quo unreasonable and thereby mitigates 
potential fairness problems arising out of retroactivity. This contextual 
framework also minimizes the significance of the novelty or magnitude 
of the legal change , obviating some of the application difficulties of 
Chevron Oil . Indeed, equilibrium theory suggests that fewer  expecta­
tions are upset by a large change when the law is in flux than by a 
small change to a stable equilibrium. 
Traditional economic arguments for retroactivity are more compel­
ling in the context of an unstable equilibrium. Because instability in­
creases the cost of ascertaining and predicting the legal consequences 
of transactions, incurring these costs may also be wasteful, from a so­
cietal perspective, in the face of unsettled or conflicting legal rules. 
Protecting the expectations generated as a consequence of these ex­
penditures through transition relief would be inefficient. B ecause in­
stability is  likely to create issues of line-drawing and other 
uncertainties of application, the broader scope of retroactive legal 
change allows uniform treatment and prevents opportunistic behavior. 
B roader temporal flexibility allows a lawmaker to avoid arbitrary dis­
tinctions in legal treatment generated by the clarification process by 
providing that a single rule applies to transactions without regard to 
the technical enactment date of a statute or the speed at which differ­
ent cases proceed through the court system. Finally, an unstable equi­
librium signals the market that there is a risk of legal change . This 
signal permits the market to respond to the possibility of legal change 
by developing mechanisms to facilitate bearing and shifting the risk 
associated with that change . To the extent that the market can ad­
dress the risk of legal change, through insurance for example , the pro­
cess functions best when the prospect of legal change is predictable . 
Thus, equilibrium analysis suggests that the traditional hostility to 
retroactive legislation is misplaced in an unstable equilibrium. Indeed, 
the general tolerance for retroactive application of corrective or cura­
tive legislation can be explained by characterizing such statutes as leg­
islative efforts to stabilize an unstable equilibrium. Equilibrium 
analysis also supports the considerable deference of existing due pro­
cess analysis to the legislative judgment to regulate retroactively.  The 
independent rational basis requirement for legislating retroactively, 
which is imposed by Pension Benefit Guaranty ,294 is satisfied by the 
existence of an unstable equilibrium. The tenuous basis for reliance 
2 94 See  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp . v. R. A. Gray & Co. ,  467  U.S .  ? I i ,  730  ( 1 984) .  
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interests within an unstable equilibrium provides a defense for retroac­
tive legislation against claims that it is "harsh and oppressive . "2 95 
The same reasoning applies to judicial lawmaking. · To the extent 
that j udicial lawmaking most commonly occurs within the context of 
an unstable equilibrium, equilibrium analysis is consistent with a gen­
eral rule of adjudicative retroactivity. Equilibrium analysis p rovides 
normative support for the intuition that adjudication should normally 
be retroactive .  By identifying adjudication as prototypically evolution­
ary, the analysis explains why adjudication is generally constrained by 
a different calculus of rationality and reasonableness than is legisla­
tion .  Equilibrium analysis also explains that, when judge-made law 
moves closer to revolution ,  it bears a greater resemblance to legisla­
tion .  This analysis clarifies the circumstances under which adj udica­
tive retroactivity may be inappropriate . 
Equilibrium theory departs from existing retroactivity doctrin e  in 
its implications for judicial norms of statutory interpretation. The pro­
priety of retroactive lawmaking in an unstable equilibrium supports 
rejection of the Landgraf rule of construction for statutes lacking an 
express specification of temporal scope .  Although the Landgraf default 
rule has initial appeal because of its apparent clarity, it does not with­
stand scrutiny. 
First, application of the Landgraf presumption is neither simple nor 
predictable . Landgraf does not provide that all statutes will be applied 
prospectively absent express indication to the contrary. Rather ,  the 
Landgraf opinion explains that the presumption is only triggered by 
statutes that are truly retroactive, as defined, somewhat incoherently, 
by the opinion . 2 96 Justice Blackmun made a convincing argument in 
dissent that a presumption against retroactive legislation did not re­
quire prospective application of section ro2 of the C ivil Rights Act 
because the statute did not change the legal status of prior conduct; it 
merely increased the remedies available to redress conduct that consti­
tuted illegal discrimination under prior law. 297 The latent ambiguity 
in LanclgYaf results from the Supreme Court 's difficulty in defining ret­
roactivity, an issue that is complicated by the unworkable distinction 
bet-ween nominal retroactivity and retroactive effect .  Thus, the Land­
graf mle requires an initial j udgme::1t by the courts as to whether a 
new rule is sufficiently retroactive to trigger the presumption of non­
retroactivity. The circularity in this process is apparent. 
295 Unit;;:d States v. Carlton, 5 1 2  U.S.  2 6 ,  30 ( ! 994) (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U . S .  1 3 4 ,  I 4 i  
( 1 938))  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 96 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods. ,  s r r  U.S.  2 44,  z 68-i3 ( 1 994).  
2 9i  S ee id. at 2 9 i  (Blackmun, j. ,  dissenting) (arguing that the presumption against retroactivity 
"need not be applied to remedial legislation, such as § 1 0 2 ,  that does not proscribe any conduct  
that w a.s previously legal"). 
I 
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Second, the Landg1'af opinion supported its p resumption against 
retroactivity with the rationale that prospective application was gener­
ally consistent with congressional intent, 2 98 an assumption that is not 
necessarily true . 2 99 More importantly, the ideal default rule is not nec­
essarily the rule that legislators will select most often .300 Several schol­
ars have argued that the political process constrains the use of 
retroactive legislation.301  Public choice theory suggests that those 
targeted by the legislation have the ability to mobilize and often defeat 
retroactive laws.302 If this observation is correct, it will be politically 
costly for Congress to specify that its rules will be  retroactive .  Con­
gress is therefore unlikely to overcome a default rule of prospectivity 
even when it determines that retroactivity would be  socially desirable . 
Instead, selection of a default rule of retroactive application in­
creases the likelihood that Congress will explicitly specify the range of 
application .  This default rule encourages Congress to evaluate through 
the political process the extent to which its legislative goals are fur­
thered by retroactivity and to balance those objectives against the 
political costs of retroactive legislation .  Thus, a default rule of retroac­
tivity may produce greater congressional attention to the costs and 
benefits associated with the temporal line-drawing than a default rule 
of prospectivity, if from a perspective of comparative institutional 
competence Congress is best situated to determine the temporal appli­
cation of new legislation. 
J.  Applying Equilibrium Theory to Retroactive Legal Change. -
The use of equilibrium theory to analyze the regulatory context offers 
a substantially different retroac tivity framework than existing method-· 
ology. The implications of this new approach can most easily be un­
derstood in comparison to current doctrine . 
This Article has, for example , c riticized the rationale of the Land­
graf decision. Existing process-based theories of statutory interpreta-
298 See Landgraf, S I I  U.S. at 2 86 .  
2 9 9  See, e .g. , Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc . ,  s r r  U.S .  2 98 ,  3 1 5  ( r 9 94)  (Blackm u n ,  ] . ,  dissent­
ing) (arguing that only a crabbed reading of legislative purpose can support the conclusion that 
Congress, in  enacting curative or corrective legislation, chooses to allow repudiated laws to sur­
vive); Landgmf, s r I  U.S .  at 2 8 6  (suggesting that Congress may have intended the I99 I  Act to 
apply retroactively to pending cases but not to cases finally decided); see also Courtney Simmons, 
Unmasking the Rhetoric of Pm·pose: The Supreme Co zo-t and Legislative CompYomise , ''4 EMORY 
L . J .  r q , r q- r 8  ( I 995 J  (arguing that silence is  a common means of legislative compromise). 
300 For an economic analysis of the role of default rules, see Ian Ayres & P.obert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contmcts: An E cono mic TheoYy of Default Rules ,  99 YALE L.J. 3 ] ,  9 1 ,  
93-95 ( I  989), which concludes that the efficient default rule may differ from the rule that most 
bargainers would choose due to information costs and other problems with the barg2.in ing  
process . 
30!  See,  e . g. , Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 2 1 5 ,  at I I / I - 7 2  (arguing that the possibility of 
retroactive legislation aliows legislators to extract rents from vested interests that hope to nnin­
tain the status quo). 
302 See Krent, supra note 2 5 7 ,  at 2 r ;,t. 
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tion provide little guidance in situations like Landgraf. S hould the 
legislative silence regarding the temporal application of the I 99 I 
Amendments be viewed as a rejection of the retroactivity proposed 
and defeated in I 990?  Or should the failure to include language limit­
ing the I 99 I  statute ' s application to future conduct be viewed as an 
endorsement of retroactive application? Alternatively, if congressional 
silence is viewed as delegating to the Court the power to determine 
temporal application, what principles should the Court apply? 
Equilibrium theory clarifies the analysis by defining a set of pro­
cess-based principles common to both the legislative and the judicial 
decision .  The policies implicated by the retroactivity question are the 
same regardless of whether Congress or the Court is the deci­
sionmaker .  Recognizing this equivalence frees the Court from the in­
determinate task of reading some normative judgment into the absence 
of explicit congressional guidance .  Instead, application of equilibrium 
theory encourages the Court to classify the regulatory framework 
within which the I 99 I  Amendments vvere adopted and to evaluate the 
temporal reach of the legislation in that light. 
The different provisions of the I 99 I  Civil Rights Amendments at 
issue in the Landgraf and Rivers cases lead to different results under 
equilibrium analysis . The expanded damage provisions  of section I 0 2 , 
the section at issue in Landgraf, marked a significant change in the 
potential monetary liability of an employer under Title VII .303 B efore 
the amendments, an employer ' s  liability was clearly limited to equita­
ble remedies and back pay. 304 These limitations dated from the enact­
ment of the original statute in I 964 . 305 Adoption of broader damage 
provisions reflected a prototypical legislative choice between compet­
ing political values, the type of choice that characterizes  revolutionary 
legal change. Accordingly, section I02 should be characte rized as dis­
turbing a stable equilibrium and, despite the statute 's  remedial nature , 
should only be applied prospectively.306 This conclusion provides 
guidance beyond the parameters of the Landgraf case . If application 
of the statute to cases arising before it was adopted is inappropriate , 
the statute should not be applied to continuous patterns of conduct 
predating enactment even if, as at least one commentator has sug-
303 See Landgraf, 5 1 1  U .S .  at 2 5 3-55 .  
304 See id. at 2 5 2 -5 3 .  
305 See id. 
306 Bu t  see, e .g. , United States v. Alabama, 362 U .S .  6o2 , 604 ( 1 960)  (holding that an amend­
ment to the Civil Rights Act of 1 95 7 ,  although silent as to its temporal reach ,  applied retroac­
tively, presumably because of  its remedial nature); Ayers v. Allain, 893 F . 2 d  73 2 ,  7 5 4-55 (5 th Cir .  
1 9 90) (characterizing as remedial a provision of the Civil  Rights Restoration Act of 1987  that 
overturned the Supreme Court 's  decision in  Grove City College v. Bell ,  465 "C .S .  5 5 5  ( 1 984) ,  and 
applying the provision retroactively). Karl Llewellyn identifies retroactive application of remedial 
statutes as a canon of construction. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Th e ory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons A b out How Statutes Are to Be Constru e d ,  3 VAND. L.  RF:v.  
395 ) 402 ( 1 9 5 0). 
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gested, such application is technically consistent with the Landgraf 
holding. 307 
In contrast, Rivers arose in the context of an unstable equilibrium, 
with Congress acting to reverse the Supreme Court 's  I 98 9  decision in 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union .308 Section IOI of  the I 9 9 I  
Amendments did not expand liability under § I g 8 I  but rathe r  restored 
liability that Patterson had eliminated .  Prior to Patterson , circuit 
courts had generally concluded that § I g8 I barred discriminatory fir­
ings ; indeed, this conclusion was the law in the Sixth C i r c uit at the 
time of the events giving rise to the litigation in Rivers .309 Patterson 
destabilized the law by holding that § I g8 I did not apply to discrimi­
natory firings . 3 1 °  Congressional adoption of section I O I  r eversed this 
holding and returned liability for discriminatory discharge to its pre­
Patterson status . 3 1 1  Accordingly, section I O I  should be viewed as an 
effort to address the unstable equilibrium created by Patterson . 3 1 2  
This reading o f  congressional objective i s  consistent w ith the struc­
ture and legislative history of both the I ggo and I 9 9 I  amendments .  
Retroactive application would impair no reliance interests because no 
one was able to rely on a body of law in fiux. 3 1 3  The legal status of 
discriminatory firings prior to the Patterson decision was unclear at 
best, but there was certainly no authority in the text of § r g8 I  or in 
appellate decisions that would have justified an employer ' s  reliance on 
an interpretation that § I 98 I  did not apply to discharges .  Prospective 
application of the statute created a number of arbitrary c ategories of 
employers whose liability depended on the timing of the i r  termination 
decision and the speed at which the litigation progressed through the 
judicial system. Ironically, the Rivers decision rewarded defendant 
employers who injected sufficient delay into the process to ensure that 
their pre- I g8g conduct was reviewed after Patterson . Rivers also re­
warded the opportunistic behavior of employers who took advantage 
30i See Leonard Charles Presberg, Comment, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, R e t ,·oactivity, and 
Continuing Violations: The Effect of Landgraf v. USI Film Products and Rivers v. Roadway 
Express, 2 S  U. RICH. L. REV. 1 363 ,  1 396-1404 ( 1 994). 
308 491 U.S. 1 64 ( ! 989) .  
3°9 See  The Supreme Co urt, 1993 Term - Leading Cases , 108 HARV. L .  REv. r 39 ,  320 ( 1 994) 
(explaining that the Sixth Circu it, l ike most other courts ,  had held § 1 98 1  appl icable  to discrimi­
natory discharge prior to the Pattenon decision). 
3 10  See Patterson , 491 U.S. at 1 7 1 .  
3 1 1  See Civil Rights Act of 1 9 9 1 ,  Pub. L .  No. 1 0 2 - 1 66 ,  § 1 0 1 ,  105 Stat. 1 0 7 1 ,  I 0 7 1 -7 2 .  
3 1 2  Eskridge and Frickey describe the status of discrimination law followin g  Patterson as an 
example of unstable equilibrium because, although the Supreme Court decision  precluded award­
ing monetary damages, other lawmaking institutions favored monetary remedies for workplace 
discrimination. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2 5 8 ,  at 3 2 .  
3 13 Although i t  might b e  argued that a Supreme Court precedent automatically stabil izes the 
legal context, both the inconsistency of Patterson with the views of other lawm akin g  institutions 
and the speed and degree of congressional response cast doubt on the stability of the post-Patter­
son law. See id. 
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of the legal uncertainty created by Patterson to engage in discrimina­
tory conduct by gambling on the prospect that, although Congress was 
likely to respond to Patterson , the nature of the political process 
would make a retroactive response difficult. Accordingly, it would 
have been both efficient and fair for the Court to conclude that the 
applicability of § r g 8 r  to discriminatory firings was in a state of unsta­
ble equilibrium and that, absent congressional direction to the con­
trary, section r o r  should have been applied retroactively. 
This analysis of Landgraf and Rivers demonstrates the application 
of equilibrium theory to traditional retroactivity analysis .  As section 
II.A of this Article explains, however, retroactivity concerns are impli­
cated in a much broader range of cases than the Supreme Court has 
recognized. The recent decision in United S tates v. Winstar Corp. 3 1 4  
illustrates tht applicability o f  equilibrium methodology to the analysis 
of legal change beyond the traditional retroactivity framework. 
Winstar involved a challenge by several thrifts to changes in regu­
latory accounting principles imposed by the Financial Institutions Re­
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of r g8g C'FIRREA"). 3 1 5  In 
connection with the savings and loan crisis in the early r g 8os , the fed­
eral government encouraged healthy thrifts to merge with failing 
ones . 3 1 6  As part of the inducement for these mergers, the Federal 
B ank Board offered various accounting incentives to facilitate the abil­
ity of the merging thrifts to meet the capital requirements imposed by 
:federal law.  Accordingly, each of the plaintiffs in Winstar merged 
with a failing thrift _ 3 1 i  After these mergers, Congress enacted FIR­
REA, which prevented the plaintiffs from using the accounting incen­
tives to satisfy the regulatory capital standards . 3 1 8  As a consequence 
of this rule change , many thrifts that were previously in full compli­
ance with the legal capital requirements fell out of compliance . The 
plaintiffs were among these thrifts and were placed in receivership by 
the Office of Thrift Supervision. 3 1 9  
The Court held for the plaintiffs in  Winstar, 1'1nding that the gov­
ernment had entered into enforceable contracts with the plaintiffs and 
that the adoption of FIRREA had caused the government to breach 
3 14 I I 6 S.  C t .  2432  ( r gg6) .  
3 1 5  Pub. L. No. 1 0 1 - 7 3 ,  §§  3 0 1 -308,  1 03 Stat. 1 83 ,  2 7 7-354 (codified as ame n ded in scattered 
senions of 12 U.S.C.). 
3 l 6  Th e  fear that the governme n t  would be unable to meet the demands on federal savings and 
loan insurance funds imposed by the multitude o f  thrift failures motivated this policy. S e e  Win­
star, 1 1 6 S.  Ct. at 2 44 2 .  
31 i Th e  FSLIC and the Bank Board approved the terms o f  these "supervisory mergers." S e e  
Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d  1 5 3 1 ,  1 5 3 5  (Fed. C ir .  1 9 9 5 )  ( e n  bane). 
3 1 8  See Winstar, I I 6  S.  Ct. at 2 4 4 6 .  
3 1 9  The impact o f  FIRREA o n  the regulatory status o f  thrifts that engaged i n  supervisory 
mergers generated numerous lawsuits by thrifts that could not meet the new capi tal standards. 
S ee, e .g. , Guaranty Fin. Senrs., Inc. v .  Ryan, 928 F . 2 d  994 ,  1 003-04 11 .3 ( r i th C i r .  1 99 1 )  (citing 
cases). 
t 
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these contracts .320 The Court held that, although the government 
could not be prevented from changing the law, it was liable to the 
thrifts for damages.3 2 1  The Supreme Court ' s  decision, however, dem­
onstrates the problems inherent in the contractual approach.  First, 
this approach requires the factual predicate of an enforceable contract. 
Other courts applying the new capital requirements have found either 
insufficient agreement to establish enforceable liability or a contractual 
right of the government to modify the contract terms through legisla­
tion.322  Second, analyzing the case in contract terms is problematic 
because Congress, which caused the breach, was not a party to the 
contracts .323 Third, the contractual approach does not allow courts to 
assess the validity of applying the legal change to the plaintiffs ; it sim­
ply permits a suit for damages .324  Fourth, and perhaps most troub­
ling, the contractual approach creates a complex conflict between the 
government's  ability to commit itself by contract and the sovereign 
power to effect legal change. The Court attempted to address this 
conflict in Winstar through three contractual doctrines, the unmis­
takability doctrine,  the reserved powers doctrine ,  and the sovereign 
acts doctrine ,325 but this effort led to a plurality opinion and little 
agreement among the Justices .  
Application of the retroactivity principles described in this Article 
substantially improves the analysis of the regulatory c hange considered 
in Winstar. The new capital standards imposed by FIRREA were 
nominally prospective :  thrifts had to satisfy these standards only after 
the effective date of the statute . Accordingly, traditional retroactivity 
doctrine did not require courts to subject the legislation to even the 
minimal due process scrutiny imposed under Pension Benefit Guar­
anty . 3 26  Yet the problem faced by the plaintiffs arose precisely be­
cause of the retroactive effect of the legislation .  FIRREA altered the 
320 See Winstar, 1 1 6 S.  Ct. at 245 1 -5 3 .  
3 2 1  S e e  id. a t  2 4 7 2 .  
322 See, e .g. , vVinstar Corp . v .  United States, 994 F . 2 d  7 9 7 ,  8 I I - l 2  (Fed. C ir .  1 993) ;  Guaranty 
Fin. Servs. , 9 2 8  F . 2 d  at r oo r .  
323 The Supreme Court resolved this issue b y  concluding that the Bank B oard and the FSLIC 
had the authority to promise to pay damages i f  they could not provide the agreed-upon regulatory 
treatment. See Winstm·, u 6  S. Ct .  at 2 4 6 2 . 
324 In other lawsuits involving this issue, plaintiffs asserted that the legislation violated the 
Takings C lause. See, e .g. , Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F . z d  
5 9 8 ,  6 1 3-14 ( D . C .  C i r .  1 99 2 ) . However, plaintiffs generally have been unable to establish the 
predicate property right that is necessary for protection against a taking. S e e, e .g. , id. (holding 
that, because Transohio did not have a property right that trumped Congress 's  power to regulate, 
no analysis was requ ired u nder the Due Process or Takings Clauses). 
325 See Winstar, I I 6  S .  Ct.  at 2453-6 1  (discussing the unmistakability doctrine); id. at 2 46 1 -63 
(discussing the reserved powers doctrine); id. at 2463-65 (discussing the sovereign acts doctrine). 
32 6 See, e .g. , Transohio , 967 F . 2 d  at 620 ("[T]his case does not raise any retroactivity questions 
."). The Supreme Court ' s  Winstar opinion noted the analogy to other doctrines imposing 
temporal l imits on legislative change, such as takings j urisprudence and the Contract C lause. See 
Wins tar, I 1 6  S. Ct. at 245 5 -5 9 .  
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ability o f  the thrifts to comply with regulatory c apital requirements ,  
thereby changing the legal consequences of  the pre-FIRREA supervi­
sory mergers .  Analysis of the legislation in terms of its retroactive ef­
fect permits a more direct assessment of the question posed by the 
plaintiffs ' claim: did Congress act inappropriately by changing the 
legal consequences of supervisory mergers after the plaintiffs had en­
tered in to the mergers ?32 7 
Analyzing the legislation in these terms does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that the regulatory changes are illegitimate or that the 
thrifts should win but requires the Court to focus on different analyti­
cal factors before reaching a conclusion .  If, on one hand, the regula­
tory treatment of supervisory goodwill was in a stable equilibrium at 
the time the thrifts entered into the supervisory mergers, application  of 
new regulatory standards that caused the thrifts to fall out of compli­
ance should have been subjected to a more rigorous due process 
review. 
There are indications in the Winstar record of the presence of a 
stable equilibrium. For approximately a decade , the B ank B oard had 
agreed to the accounting practices used in the regulatory merge rs . 328  
The B ank Board 's  use of the practices was undertaken "with Congres­
sional consent";329  indeed, Congress affirmatively mandated "forbear­
ance" two years before enacting FIRREA.330 In addition ,  the record 
suggests that the government affirmatively induced the plaintiffs to 
enter into regulatory mergers with the promise of  stable regulatory 
treatment.33 1 This factor,  if supported by the evidence ,  further j usti­
fies enhanced judicial scrutiny of the retroactive effect of FIRREA.  If 
the regulatory climate was one of stable equilibrium, the Court ' s  in­
quiry should have focused on a factor never examined in this case : 
whether congressional obj ectives justified FIRRE A ' s  retroactive effect 
3 2 i Congress did provide a degree of transition relief in  FIRREA. S ee, e .g. , Guaranty Fin. 
Servs. , 928 F . 2d  at 996-97 (describing FIRREA's  requirements for phasing out the use of supervi­
sory goodwil l  in  calculating core capital). 
328 For example, Bank Board Chairman Richard T. Pratt testified before Congress in  1 98 2  and 
explained the manner in which these accounting practices were being used to conserve FSLIC 
insurance.  S e e  Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1982: Hearings B efore the Subcomm. 
on H ous. and Community Dev. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Af ain , 9 i  th 
Cong.  1490 ( 1 9 8 2 )  (statement of Richard T.  Pratt, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.) .  
3 29  S. Rt:P. No. 1 0 1 - 1 9 ,  at 9 ( 1 989). 
330 See William K. B lack, Ending Our Forebea1·en' Forbearances: FIRREA and Superuisoyy 
Goodwill, 2 STAN. L. & PoL 'v REv. 1 0 2 ,  1 14 n . 1 4  ( 1 990) .  
33 1 Compare Brief for Respondents Winstar Corp . & the Statesman Group, Inc . ,  Winstar (No. 
95 -865 ), available in 1 996  vVL 1433 1 9 ,  at * 2 -*3 (claiming that " the  regulators aggressively urged 
Winstar and Statesman - neither of which were previously involved in the savings and loan 
industry - to acqu ire the insolvent thrifts" and that "the key inducement" for the acquisitions 
"was the regulators '  express contractual promise to accord regulatory capital treatment to supervi­
sory goodwill . . .  for the specified periods"), with Transcript of Oral Argument, Wins tar (No. 9 5 -
8 6 5 ) ,  available i n  1 996 W L  1 9 74 2 2 ,  at * s  (Apr. 2 4 ,  1 996) (statement of Deputy Solicitor General 
Paul Bender) ("It 's  not clear who i nduced whom in these transactions . ") .  
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on the plaintiffs ' ability to meet the compliance standards. The analy­
sis proposed in this Article would require the Court to find a greater 
legislative justification than the general need to improve capital stan­
dards before allowing FIRREA to have such a powerful retroactive 
effect. 
On the other hand, if the regulatory climate was more accurately 
described as an unstable equilibrium, the thrifts should not have been 
able to avoid the impact of the regulatory change through contract or 
other theories .  Although the cases do not provide enough detail to 
permit a full evaluation of the regulatory climate , it is possible to de­
scribe the regulation of capital standards as being in a state of flux at 
the time of the mergers. The district court in Trans ohi o ,  for example ,  
found that "Transohio should reasonably have expected that Congress 
might change capital rules to meet a growing crisis in the comprehen­
sively regulated savings and loan industry ."332 If the capital rules 
were in flux, the thrifts relied on the current legal treatment at their 
own peril, and the imposition of transitional relief would be ineffi­
cient.333 Rather, the thrifts should be viewed as having "wager[ed on] 
the chance that the rules would be changed against the potential re­
turn if they were not. "334 
Because Winstar and related cases have been litigated primarily on 
contractual theories of liability, resolving the question whether the ac­
counting standards adopted by FIRREA should be applied to the reg­
ulatory mergers is difficult based on the existing record. Redefining 
the inquiry in terms of the appropriate retroactive effect of the statute 
clarifies the main issue as the temporal limits of regulatory change 
rather than the nature of government contracts .  Even if the govern­
ment's use of regulatory mergers and "accounting gimmicks" were , as 
one commentator describes it, an "insane" mistake ,335 retroactivity 
analysis still would be the appropriate means of determining whether 
parties who entered into transactions under the prior law should bear 
the costs associated with a subsequent shift in government policy.336 
332  Transohio Sav. Bank v .  Director, Office of Thrift Supervision ,  96 i F . 2d  5 98 ,  6os  (D.C.  C i r .  
I 9 9 2  ) .  
3 3 3  Cf B lack,  supra note 330 ,  at  r 1 3  (arguing that providing compensation i n  this case would 
create an incentive "to suborn or simply fool an incompetent government official"). 
334 Guaranty Fin. Servs . ,  Inc. v. Ryan, 9 28  F . 2 d 994, 999 ( r r th Cir. 1 99 1 ) . Similarly, u nder 
this description of the legal climate, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the contracts al located 
the risk of legal change to the government in the absence of express contractual language to the 
contrary, see United States v. Winstar Corp., r r 6  S .  Ct. 2 43 2 ,  24 5 1-5 2  ( 1 996), awards the plain­
tiffs the type of windfall to which efficiency arguments in  support of  retroactivity are addressed. 
335  B lack,  supra note 330, at r 0 2 . 
336 See ,  e . g. , Marianne Lavelle, Failed S &L Has Its Day in Court , N.·H'L L.J. ,  May 6, r gg6 ,  at 
A r  r (quoting Wins tar a.nd Statesman 's  lawyer, who described the issue as whether the plaintiff 
thrifts in  Winstar will h ave to bear the $24 mill ion cost of the government's change in  bank 
regulatory policy). 
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This discussion demonstrates the utility o f  equilibrium theory for 
retroactivity analysis. As these cases illustrate , equilibrium theory of­
fers a coherent yet general analytic framework that can be used with 
any underlying substantive field and without relying on  the special 
cases and exceptions that riddle traditional retroactivity doctrine .33i  
IV. THE EFFECT O F  RETROACTIVITY ON LAWMAKING POWER 
Equilibrium theory 's  focus on the process of legal change also ex­
poses the degree to which retroactivity rules affect institutional law­
making power.338 The foregoing analysis has characterized legal 
change in the context of a stable equilibrium as revolutionary in na­
ture . Examination of the lawmaking process has suggested that, as a 
descriptive matter, revolutionary legal change is most commonly asso­
ciated with the legislative process and that adjudicative lawmaking is 
typically evolutionary. This distinction mirrors the traditional distinc­
tion between adjudicative and legislative retroactivity doctrine ,  which 
is based on a descriptive assessment of each branch ' s  dominant law­
making process rather than on normative principles about judicial and 
legislative power. 339 To the extent that legislation disrupts a stable 
equilibrium, it should normally be prospective in application .  Disrup­
tion of stable equilibria is consistent with a characterization of legisla­
tive lawmaking as based on politics and policymaking. 340 Judicially 
created rules ,  in contrast, pose countermajoritarian difficulties if they 
are based entirely on policy justifications that are divorced from tex­
tual, precedential, or other coherence arguments . 34 1  
Analyzing retroactivity doctrine in terms of legal change also has 
important normative implications .  Retroactivity doctrine limits both 
the nature of legal change and the manner in which it occurs .  The 
33 7  See Reynoldsville Casket Co.  v .  Hyde, r r s S .  Ct.  I 74 5 ,  I ? S O-S I ( 1 9 9 5 ). 
33 8 For an ambitious legal process approach to the issue of comparative i nstitutional compe­
tence, see N EIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, EC­
ONOMICS, AND PUBUC POLICY ( 1 994) .  
33 9 The application of retroactivity analysis to lawmaking by administrative agencies casts fur­
ther doubt on the validity of premising retroactivity rules on institutional identity because this 
premise would allow an agency to choose between retroactin and prospective legal change by 
choosing between adj udicatory and rulemaking procedure. See supra note 9 ·  
340 See City o f  Richmond v .  } .A .  Croson Co. ,  488 U .S .  469 ,  5 1 3 ( 1 989) (Stevens, } . ,  concurring 
in  part and concurring in  the JUdgment) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that 
promulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against the enactment 
of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern about the use of the political 
process to punish or characterize past conduct of private citizens. "); Abner J .  Mikva, The Shifting 
S ands of Legal Topogmj!hy , 96 HARV. L .  REv. 534, 541 ( 1 9 8 2 )  (reviewing Gumo C-\LAR RESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AG E OF STATUTES ( 1 9 8 2 )) ("Lawmaking by statute is not incremental; 
statutes are traumatic and . . .  often rework entire areas of law."). 
341 See genemlly Cass, supm note 3, at 948-66 (providing an ideal model of j udicial decision­
making authority); Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence TheoYies: DwoYkin's R ights 
Thesis, RetYoactivity, and the LineaY 0YdeY of Decisions , 72 CAL. L.  REv. 3 6 9 ,  3 70-7 1 (r 984)  
(providing an overview of coherence theory i n  legal argument) . 
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limits imposed shackle a lawmake r ' s  ability to designate the temporal 
reach of a new legal rule . Alternatively, retroactivity rules can be 
viewed as a way of disciplining institutions for improper rulemaking. 
Nonretroactivity, in particular , promotes alterations in the legal re­
gime by allowing the lawmaker to reduce the transition costs associ­
ated with legal change . A lawmaker that can avoid some of the 
adverse consequences associated with legal change, or cater to interest 
groups by limiting the transactions that will be subject to a new rule ,  
can adopt rules that would be too politically or pragmatically costly 
under a requirement of full retroactivity. If the retroactivity doctrine 
applicable at the time had compelled the Warren Court to apply its 
criminal procedure decisions to all cases on direct appeal and habeas, 
for example, the Court would have faced serious obstacles to recogniz­
ing broader constitutional protections for defendants. Similarly, the 
prospect of exposing municipalities to huge, uninsured l iabilities might 
have deterred state courts contemplating the abolition of sovereign im­
munity for public officials in tort actions if temporal limitations on the 
effect of such holdings were not possible . 
Recognizing the substantive impact of retroactivity doctrine on 
lawmaking power provides an alternative framework for evaluating 
adjudicative retroactivity. Flexible retroactivity rules allow the courts 
to address the costs of disturbing stable equilibria and, in turn, make 
courts more likely to do so.342 Accordingly, a court that has the power 
to limit the temporal application of newly announced legal rules can 
more easily initiate substantial legal change . 343 
This Article does not take a position on the appropriate limits on 
judicial lawr11aking.344 Equilibrium theory cannot resolve the substan­
tive debate about whether courts should exercise lawmaking power; 
yet the analysis is helpful because it exposes the political overtones of 
the debate over judicial nonretroactivity. 
3-12 Courts and commentators recognized the threat that prospective adj udication posed to the 
legitimacy of the exercise of the j udicial power during the initial state court experimentation with 
prospective adjudication in the nineteenth century. Critics of the practice viewed retroactive ad­
j udication as discouraging courts "from indiscriminately modifying the law."  Thompson, Judicial 
Impairment , supra note 1 2 1 ,  at 1 4 2 5 .  
343 Judicial mechanisms t o  afford transition relief need not duplicate legislative approaches .  
S ee, e.g. , Weinberger v.  UOP, Inc. ,  45i  A . z d 7 0 1 ,  7 1 4-15  (Del .  1 983)  (fashioning a "quasi-ap­
praisal" remedy to protect litigants who, believing the statutory appraisal remedy to be either 
i neffective or inapplicable, had not followed the required procedure). For example, the Wein­
berger decision was technically retroactive but protected p laintiffs ' reliance interests by means 
analogous to prospective adj udication. The precision with which the court selected the c lass of 
plaintiffs entitled to this equitable remedy demonstrates a textured appreciation for the transition 
issues created by adoption of a new legal rule .  S e e  id. (applying the remedy in pending cases and 
in pending and proposed mergers in which prospective plaintiffs might have already lost the op­
portunity to perfect statutory appraisal rights). 
344 Cj Cass, supra note 3, at 994-96 (constructing a normative model of adj udication based on 
the objective of increasing the predictability of retroactive j udicial decisions). 
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Equilibrium theory thus reveals that criticism o f  prospective adju­
dication may reflect concern about conferring too much lawmaking 
power on the courts .345 Acknowledging the substantive overtones of 
the retroactivity debate explains, for example, Justice Scalia ' s  hostility 
to prospective adjudication. By endorsing a rule of full retroactivity 
for judicial lawmaking, Justice Scalia prevents the j udiciary from ad­
dressing the costs of disturbing stable equilibria, thereby limiting the 
judicial power to initiate legal change . This approach is consistent 
with Justice Scalia 's  political preference for legislative lawmaking and 
judicial restraint_346 
Even if limitations on judicial lawmaking were desirable ,347 such 
limitations need not come from retroactivity doctrine .  A variety of al­
ternative mechanisms can be used to c ircumscribe the j udicial role and 
to limit the extent to which adjudication disrupts stable equilibria. 
When the Court is engaged in common law adjudication or statutory 
interpretation,  for example, it is likely to disturb a stable equilibrium 
only when it overrules its own precedent. The adoption of strong  
principles of stare decisis348 would cause instances of direct overruling 
to be rare .349 In the area of constitutional interpretation ,  judicial 
adoption of new rules ,  as well as overruling of prior precedent, can 
disturb a stable equilibrium. A substantive policy of  limited j udicial 
activism would reduce the frequency with which the Court develops 
new legal principles of constitutional origin . Similarly, increased ad-
345 See ,  e .g. , Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. G ilbertson,  501 U.S.  3 5 0, 366 ( 1 99 1 )  
(Stevens,  ]. .  dissenting) (objecting to judicial selection o f  the proper statute o f  l imitations for fed­
eral securities fraud as "a lawmaking task that should properly be performed by Congress"). Jus­
bee Stevens expressed this concern:  "vVhen the Court ventures into this lawmaking arena, 
however, it inevitably raises questions concerning the retroactivity of its new rule that are difficult  
and arguably i nconsistent with the neutral, nonpolicymaking role o f  the j udge."  !d. at 3 6 i-68 .  I t  
is ironic that the LinkletteY Court premised its move to prospective adj udication on the  work of 
John Austin ,  see Linkletter v. vValker, 381  U.S.  6 1 8 , 6 2 3-24 ( 1 96 5 )  (relying  on the Austinian view 
of  the judicial function), because, although Austin accepted the idea that j udges as well as legisla­
tures make law, he  clearly preferred legislation to j udge-made rules .  S e e  2 JOHN AuSTI N,  L e:C­
TURES ON JuRISPRUDENCE 66r (Robert Campbell  ed. ,  London, John M urray s th ed.  r 8 8 5 ) . 
346 Justice Harlan also took this position :  
What emerges from today ' s  decisions is that in  the realm of constitutional adj udication in  
the criminal fie ld the  Court i s  free to  act, in  effect, l ike  a legislature, making its new 
constitutional rules wholly or partially retroactive or only prospective as it  deems wise. I 
completely disagree with this point of view. 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.  6 6 7 ,  6 i 7  ( I 9 i J ) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in  part). 
34i S e e  geneyafly Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Seif-Restmint,  59 l!'\D. L.J . r ,  
ro-r8  ( 1 983)  (outl ining the ''varieties of self-restraint"). 
348 See, e .g. , Lawrence C. Marshal l ,  "Let Co ngress Do It": The Case joY an A bsolute Rule of 
S tatutory S taYe Decisis,  88 MICH. L.  REv . I i 7 , 1 83 ( 1 989) (advocating  an absolute rule of stare 
decisis in statutory and federal common law cases). 
349 Under the proposed model, the degree to which adj udicative nonretroactivity would conflict 
with the traditional rule of adj udicative retroactivity depends, in large part, on the choice of stare 
decisis principles. The doctrine of stare decisis operates as a gatekeeper, controlling the circum­
stances of j udicially initiated legal change in  the context of stable equi l ibria. 
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herence to principles of stare decisis would reduce the number of occa­
sions on which the Court reinterprets settle d  principles of 
constitutional law.3So 
The impact of retroactivity doctrine on lawmaking power appears 
more clearly in the context of legislative retroactivity rules . A legisla­
ture that can adopt rules with retroactive as well as prospective effects 
can apply its policy preferences to a broader range of transactions 
than one limited to prospective rulemaking. Existing due process scru­
tiny of legislative retroactivity fails to consider two significant implica­
tions of this power. First, legislative retroactivity increases the power 
of the current legislature at the expense of prior legislatures . A rule 
allowing Congress to undo retroactively the laws enacted by a prior 
Congress favors the current majority view over decisions made by past 
majorities .35 1 A consequence of such a rule is a general reduction in 
the impact of legislative rules due to the government ' s  diminished 
ability to commit itself to a regulatory policy.3 5 2  
Second, the legislature 's  ability to enact retroactive laws increases 
its power relative to the courts . 3 53  Plaut illustrates the problems that 
arise when Congress and the Court disagree about the appropriate 
legal rule to apply to a particular transaction.354  Although the Court 
has frequently defended its decisions by alluding to Congress ' s  ability 
to change a rule with which it disagrees, the history of the I 99 I 
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act illustrates that the political im­
pediments to retroactive legislation limit congressional power to cor­
rect a perceived judicial error in pending cases . 355  Under Plaut ,  
congressional power is subject to a still greater limitation .  Due  to the 
time constraints associated with the legislative process,  there will in­
variably be a class of cases that will reach final judgment under the 
j udicially adopted rule before legislatures can act. Plaut ' s  restriction 
3 50 Decisions  that overrule prior holdings have become increasingly common.  See Earl lVI. 
Maltz, S ome Thoughts on the Death of S tare Decisis in Constitutional Law, r gSo \Vrs. L. REv. 
4 6 7 ,  4 6 7 .  
35 1 S e e  Joh n  0 .  McGinnis & Michael B .  Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative 
Supermajority R equirements: A Defens e ,  l OS YALE L.J 483 ,  sos-o6 ( 1 9 9 5 )  (arguing that this limi­
tation upon the ability of one legislature to impose its will on a future legislature is  a fundamental 
part of the traditional understanding of the legislative power); see also U nited States v. Winstar 
Corp., I I 6  S.  Ct. 2 43 2 ,  2 4 5 3-55 ( r gg6) (describing the development of American limitations on the 
absolute power of subsequent legislatures). 
3 52 See supm note 2 69 .  Frank Michelman explains that society suffers this "demoralization 
cost" because of the additional risk that uncompensated changes in  government policy impose on 
future i nvestment decisions. Frank Michelman. P1·operty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
E thical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law. So H.:..Rv. L.  REv. I I 6 5 ,  1 2 1 4 ( 1 9 6 7) .  
353  See  The Supreme Court, I993 Term - Leading Cases ,  supra note 309 ,  at 3 1 8- 1 9  (describing 
occasions on which Congress has retroactively overruled judicial decisions with which it 
disagrees). 
354 See supra pp. 1 0 7 7-78 . 
35 5  See  supm note 93 · 
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o n  legislative interference with final judgments entirely e liminates the 
prospect of legislative correction in those cases. 
Thus, retroactivity rules impact both the ability of one lawmaking 
branch to affect the legal rules adopted by the other and the degree to 
which the courts can reserve for themselves the ultimate authority to 
determine the rule of decision in any particular case. The propriety of 
a particular balance of lawmaking authority may depend, in part, on  
the type of lawmaking involved. I t  may be  more important to  ensure 
that a subsequent legislature has the ability to overrule its predecessor 
than to facilitate the legislature 's  ability to overrule common law adju­
dication. The Supreme Court has not considered the adjudicative con­
text - common law, constitutional law, or statutory interpretation -
relevant to the determination of a court 's  authority to adjudicate non­
retroactively. Under equilibrium theory, however, the very existence 
of a lawmaker with authority to supersede a judicially adopted rule 
affects the descriptive assessment of whether that rule disturbs a stable 
equilibrium, the normative question whether the disruption is appro­
priate , and the normative question central to retroactivity analysis : 
how the temporal reach of the new rule should be applied to address 
the consequences of legal change . 
Ultimately, equilibrium theory modernizes the analysis of retroac­
tivity doctrine by identifying analytical factors consistent with the ap­
proach of the new legal process school.-'56  Casting the retroactivity 
debate in terms of the respective responsibility of C ongress and the 
courts for effecting legal change leads to an inquiry into comparative 
institutional competence. This inquiry requires an evaluation of the 
relative ability of Congress and the courts to assess and address the 
transition costs associated with adopting new legal rules .  E quilibrium 
theory provides the tools for this analysis. 
V .  C oNCLUSION 
Judicial analysis of retroactivity has failed on two levels. The 
Court has struggled to articulate a conception of retroactive lawmak­
ing and to develop a means by which to evaluate the appropriate tem­
poral limits on lawmaking in various contexts . At a more fundamental 
level, the Court has failed to perceive the relationship between its 
analysis of retroactivity and the process of legal chan ge . Arguments 
such as Justice Scalia 's ,  which are framed in constitution al or histori­
cal terms , mask an underlying political viewpoint about the allocation 
of lawmaking power in our political system. 
356 Cf The Supreme Court, 1993 Tenn - Leading Cases , supra note 309 ,  at  3 16 ("Traditional 
doctrines of j udicial retroactivity and statutory nonretroactivity incorporate only the most simplis­
tic vision of the relationship between Congress and the Court - that of the maker and the 
interpreter of law respectively." (footnote omitted)) 
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Using equilibrium theory, this Article exposes the assumptions 
about legal c hange that drive retroactivity principles .  The Article ex­
plains that in the context of an unstable equilibrium our intuitions  
about the legitimacy of retroactivity are j ustified,  and retroactive law­
making is an appropriate and efficient means of clarifying, correcting, 
and incrementally adjusting the regulatory climate . In a stable equi­
librium, however, legal change imposes considerable costs on individu­
als subject to the change and on the legal system as a whole. A 
doctrine that grants rulemakers the flexibility to adjust the temporal 
reach of legal change in order to minimize transition costs encourages 
the disturbance of stable legal equilibria. 
By moving retroactivity analysis from the Chevron Oil test 's  fixa­
tion on the nature of the change to an evaluation of regulatory con­
text, equilibrium theory emphasizes the framework into which legal 
change is introduced. Understanding the context of legal c hange fur­
thers an assessment of the descriptive and normative consequences of 
the change . B ecause retroactivity rules constrain a lawmaker ' s  ability 
to adjust the temporal reach of legal change and therefore to moderate 
the transition costs associated with legal change , retroactivity doctrine 
directly influences the cost and feasibility of effecting  legal change . 
Retroactivity analysis is properly understood to be  rooted in substan­
tive views about the process of legal change . Exposing the political 
overtones of the retroactivity debate thus reveals its consequences for 
the relative lawmaking power of Congress and the courts . 
